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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the New Atheism as a secular fundamentalism that is both a 
utopian ideology and a social movement.  It situates New Atheist thought within the 
context of the historical development of atheist thought and outlines the features of the 
ideology it promotes. It also examines the New Atheism’s role in the secular movement 
through research on major movement actions, campaigns, and debates on goals and 
strategies. It argues that the New Atheism comes into conflict with two other movement 
discourses: secular humanism and libertarian rationalism.  These ideological conflicts are 
propelling the movement away from the New Atheism’s aggressive critique of religion 
toward more a more accommodating and inclusive approach that emphasizes basic 
humanistic values.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Atheism and Secularity: An Emerging Field 
 In 2012 a special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Religion was devoted to 
the theme of “Non-religion and Secularity”. Articles in this issue gave a sampling of 
studies of the non-religious in the United States, Great Britain, and India, while an 
introductory essay addressed the “state of the union” in the emerging interdisciplinary 
field of non-religion and secularity, a sub-field within the social scientific study of 
religion (Bullivant and Lee 2012). The editors of this special issue, Stephen Bullivant and 
Lois Lee, founded the Non-religion and Secularity Research Network in 2008, and a 
journal specifically dedicated to the field (Secularism and Nonreligion) in 2012. In her 
Research Note on terminology in the same issue, Lee (2012) explains that the concepts of 
“nonreligion” and “secularity” are intended to cover all positions that are defined in 
reference to religion but are considered to be other than religious. She also acknowledges 
that the name given to the field is a problematic issue and her proposal is not accepted by 
all those working in it (as a nascent field, some disagreement regarding basic terminology 
is to be expected).  Phil Zuckerman, author of two qualitative studies of the beliefs of 
atheists in the United States and Scandinavia (2008; 2011), uses “atheism and secularity” 
to describe the field in his collection on the subject (2010). While noting that none of 
these terms or titles are perfect, I will use “atheism and secularity” for the moment. But 
the more important issue is, why did this new field come about, and what exactly are its 
concerns?  
Atheism and secularity studies is a scholarly response to the same social, cultural, 
and political developments that are addressed by the burgeoning literature on secularism 
and post-secularism (e.g. Calhoun et al. 2011; Gorski et al. 2012; Mendieta and 
VanAntwerpen 2011), which is heavily influenced by Charles Taylor’s seminal work, A 
Secular Age (2007). Taylor argues that the persistence of religion as an element of both 
public and private life compels us to question the assumptions that underwrite the 
secularization thesis, which posits that modernization brings functional differentiation of 
secular (public/political) and religious (private) spheres, and in some formulations, a 
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decline in religious belief and practice (Taylor 2007). Major events like the Iranian 
Revolution and the rise of the Christian Right led some scholars to point to a 
“deprivatization” of religion worldwide that contradicts the traditional secularization 
paradigm, with religion continuing to play a significant role in politics globally (Berger 
1999, Casanova 1994). This trend continued with the election of George W. Bush, and 
the destruction of the World Trade Center and the subsequent “war on terror”. 
Meanwhile, the numbers of those who declare no religious affiliation in western societies 
has been growing for twenty years (Bruce 2011). Taylor argues that there is in fact no 
contradiction here, and that rather than moving inexorably toward a society where 
religion slowly disappears, our “secular age” is characterized by an explosion in the 
possibilities of belief and non-belief.  
Atheism and secularity studies are concerned with one specific group that is 
characteristic of this secular age and its new forms of belief – one which appears to be 
growing in number in western societies. While data on atheists specifically is scattershot 
and inconclusive, evidence does point to the steady growth of those who have no 
religious affiliation. This group is commonly known as the “nones” because they select 
“No Religion” in surveys and censuses. The nature of this group and the reasons for its 
growth, particularly its relationship to the ‘religious revival’ that contradicts the 
secularization thesis, are topics of growing interest (e.g. Baker and Smith 2009a, 2009b; 
Lim et al. 2010; Schwadel 2010; Vargas 2012). Within the category of the nones are 
those who are not simply religiously unaffiliated, but non-religious or explicitly atheist, a 
group that constitutes a sub-field in its own right, with a literature whose purpose can be 
divided into two major categories: (1) understanding the process of and reasons for 
apostasy, as well as the demographic and psychological characteristics of atheists (e.g. 
Beit-Hallahmi 2007; LeDrew 2012; Smith 2011; Stinson et al. 2013; Zuckerman 2008, 
2011),and (2) examining the perceptions of atheists among the general public in various 
contexts, particularly with respect to the notion of “discrimination” (e.g. Cragun et al. 
2012; Didyoung et al. 2013; Edgell et al. 2006; Hammer et al. 2012; Swan and Heesacker 
2012; Zuckerman 2009). More specifically there are those who explicitly and publicly 
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declare their opposition to religion and their adoption of atheism as both a belief and an 
identity, and join (or to some extent participate in) atheist organizations. This group of 
“active atheists” is of concern in the present study, which contributes to a developing 
literature specifically on this topic (e.g. Cimino and Smith 2007, 2011, 2012; Hunsberger 
and Altemeyer 2006; LeDrew 2013; Niose 2012; Pasquale 2010; Smith 2013). In 
addition to these focused areas, there have recently been a number of collections and 
companions to atheism and secularity studies in general (e.g. Arweck et al. 2013; 
Bullivant and Ruse 2013; Martin 2007; Zuckerman 2010).  
 The surge in scholarship in these fields came about – not coincidentally – in the 
wake of the intellectual and literary phenomenon known as the New Atheism, most 
famously represented by Richard Dawkins (2006), Christopher Hitchens (2007), Sam 
Harris (2004), and Daniel Dennett (2006).  The books by these authors (the first three in 
particular) were phenomenal bestsellers and ignited a wave of public debate about 
religion and its place in the modern world. There is an interdisciplinary literature devoted 
to a critical analysis of New Atheist thought, and to understanding the significance of 
their success in terms of the socio-cultural context of their emergence (e.g. Amarasingam 
2010; Eagleton 2009; Fergusson 2009; LeDrew 2012; McAnulla 2012; Plantinga 2011; 
Schulzke 2013a, 2013b; Wilde 2010). These works, and the many others like them, treat 
the New Atheism strictly as an intellectual current. They pay little to no attention to the 
fact that these thinkers are also part of a new and growing social movement, a socially 
significant fact that merits scholarly attention.  
 This dissertation contributes to these literatures by bridging the divide between 
the theoretically and historically focused critical analyses of the New Atheism as an 
intellectual current and the more specifically sociological studies of “active atheists” 
discussed above. It accomplishes this by recognizing the connection between New 
Atheism as ideology and as a social movement. The dissertation therefore consists of two 
parts: the first situates the New Atheism within the history of atheist thought and 
delineates the belief system it advances and its purposes, while the second examines how 
the New Atheism gives rise to social action, focusing on how it interacts with competing 
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and complementary groups and ideologies. The relationship between these two 
dimensions of the New Atheism (ideology and movement) and the two types of analysis 
contained herein are explained by my overarching analytical device: a theory of secular 
fundamentalism. I argue that the New Atheism is a form of fundamentalism that, like 
other fundamentalisms, advances a highly structured belief system that is perceived to be 
under threat by the uncertainty that characterizes late modernity, and seeks to 
universalize this belief system through ideological action within an existing, but rapidly 
expanding and developing, social movement.  
 
New Atheism as Secular Fundamentalism 
 A number of scholars have taken a view of the New Atheism as a kind of 
fundamentalism (e.g. Eagleton 2009; Plantinga 2011; Stahl 2010), but none offer a 
substantive definition of the concept or a rigorous analysis of how it applies in this case. I 
thus begin by developing a concept of secular fundamentalism, which provides a 
framework by which to approach the New Atheism. I should first note that there is a vast 
literature on fundamentalism and much disagreement on the meaning of the concept, but 
these debates are not my concern here. I draw on a very select set of sources and one 
particular interpretation of the concept that applies to my case study and empirical 
findings. My approach, then, was inductive: rather than beginning with a theory of 
fundamentalism that framed my analysis, I began with an analysis of the beliefs and 
practices of the New Atheism and, through this analysis, themes and relationships 
emerged that required explanation. The concept of secular fundamentalism as outlined 
below is, in my view, an appropriate means to understand the nature of the New Atheism 
and the relationship between its two dimensions: belief system (or more precisely, 
ideology) and social movement.  
 Rather than a vestige of pre-modern beliefs, Eisenstadt (1999) argues that 
fundamentalism is an expression of modernity as much as a reaction to it, at once an anti-
modern utopian ideology and a modern social and political movement, or set of 
movements.  Fundamentalisms are anti-Enlightenment, but also distinctly modern in the 
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sense that they react to challenges to traditional patterns of belief, and share the totalizing 
and utopian aspirations of modern political movements and ideologies (such as 
communism, fascism, and Social Darwinism). Like these political movements, 
fundamentalism seeks to remake society in accordance with a vision of some essential 
truths.  Davie (2013) adds that these truths are re-affirmed within the context of profound 
upheavals, including an expanding global economy and modernity’s clash with 
traditional cultures.   
 An example is the evangelical fundamentalism that drives the Christian Right, 
which defends established beliefs and traditional values against secular values and 
scientific understandings of the nature of life. It is totalizing in seeking to bring an entire 
nation under religious rule, and also utopian in promising salvation through the 
establishment of a Christian nation in God’s favour (Williams 2012). The enemy of the 
Christian Right is secularism, or secularization, a force they wish to reverse. The 
Christian Right is anti-modern (or more specifically, anti-Enlightenment) to the extent 
that it associates science and reason with the process of secularization, understood both as 
the functional differentiation of religious and political spheres (i.e. church-state 
separation) as well as the relativization of all belief systems that comes with 
constitutional pluralism and some important characteristics of late modernity, including 
globalization and multiculturalism. It thus advances a totalizing ideology and political 
program that re-affirms the essential truths of a particular tradition and its authority in all 
spheres of life, and takes concrete action, attempting to gain political power by 
influencing government and electing government representatives sympathetic to the 
cause (Williams 2012). As such, it is both ideology and a social movement.   
 While we might typically associate fundamentalism with religion, Davie (2013) 
argues that this need not be the case and that some secular ideologies also fit the 
description. She explains that in late modernity faith in the universal emancipatory 
powers of science and reason begins to wane and the “secular certainties” that provided 
the ground for religious criticism themselves come under attack: “...precisely those 
ideologies which have threatened (and to some extent continue to threaten) the traditional 
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certainties of a whole range of religious groups become, at least potentially, the victims 
rather than the perpetrators of economic and cultural change. No longer are they seen as 
the confident alternatives, but become instead – like the religious certainties they once 
sought to undermine – the threatened tradition, themselves requiring justification and, at 
times, aggressive rehabilitation” (Davie 2013: 200-201). Thus we see the emergence of 
secular fundamentalism, which seeks to re-assert the “secular certainties” of science and 
reason. In this view, then, fundamentalism is an attempt to re-create certainty and 
authority in response to challenges to established patterns of belief: religious 
fundamentalism in response to modernity (more precisely its Enlightenment 
manifestations), and secular fundamentalism in response to late/post-modernity 
(specifically, relativism and pluralism, which challenge the universality of reason and 
scientific authority).  
 Davie argues that the New Atheism may be understood as just such a 
fundamentalist secular ideology, a view my research supports. This dissertation analyzes 
the New Atheism as a politicized reaction to two major developments in late modern 
society: (1) the rise of religious fundamentalism, and (2) epistemic relativism 
(represented in academic postmodernism), and cultural pluralism (represented in policies 
of multiculturalism). Both of these developments are perceived as challenges to the 
universal authority of science. With respect to the first, the New Atheism may be 
understood as a response to anti-Enlightenment fundamentalism, substituting its own 
reverse form of fundamentalism: an Enlightenment utopia based on faith in the 
emancipatory powers of science and reason and the progressive nature of social evolution 
in modern societies, which involves a transition from religious authority to a secular 
science-based social order (thus they defend a version of the traditional secularization 
thesis).  
 The New Atheism, then, is a response to religious fundamentalism (i.e. the 
Christian Right and Islamicism), which it considers to be ‘pre-modern’ and thus opposed 
to modernity. But just as importantly in my view, it also reacts to what it considers the 
‘post-modern’ forces of pluralism and relativism, which undermine scientific authority 
 
 
7 
and the universalization of Enlightenment values. The New Atheism advances an 
ideology that is universalist and absolutist, and more than a critique of religion, it is a 
critique of all epistemological and ethical belief systems that are perceived to conflict 
with the hegemony of scientific rationality. The modern utopia it envisions must be 
defended against these two anti-modern forces, and it does this by offering its belief 
system in the ‘marketplace of ideas’, and by promoting and defending atheism and 
scientific rationalism through the structure of a social – or more specifically, cultural – 
movement. I argue that the New Atheism is much more than just the writings of Richard 
Dawkins, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennett; rather, these four are 
leaders of a broader movement. This dissertation explains the New Atheism as a secular 
fundamentalism that advances a rigid set of beliefs and values – which I term an 
“ideology” – that legitimate a certain conception of modernity and secularization, and an 
associated form of authority. This takes the form of an intellectual and social movement 
that is essentially political, but adopts “cultural” goals and strategies.  
 The distinction between these two types of movements is important in the context 
of this study precisely because the New Atheism is one part of a broader secular 
movement that includes two other groups that favour instrumental political goals, as 
opposed to the New Atheism’s cultural goal of ideological universalization. In general, I 
favour David Snow’s definition of social movements as “collectivities acting with some 
degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels 
for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally 
or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which 
they are a part” (2004: 11). In this view movements are essentially challenges to authority 
(or in the case of the New Atheism, a defence of the extant authority of science). This 
authority can be institutionally or culturally based, and where the authority is perceived to 
lie will determine the target of collective action. This may be the state for forms of 
authority that lie in state institutions, or the general public for cultural forms of authority. 
In the former case movements take shape according to instrumental political goals that 
involve legislative and policy change, while in the latter case action is ideologically 
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oriented to promote a certain set of beliefs while denigrating and excluding rivals. The 
New Atheism, I argue, is a “cultural” movement that attempts to change belief and values 
through ideological action, while other groups in the movement adopt “political” goals 
and strategies aimed at protecting secular social institutions from religious interference, 
and legally protecting atheists from discrimination. This difference in goals and 
strategies, and more importantly, the distinct ideological orientations they result from, are 
the source of major tension within the movement. There is a further tension with respect 
to the very idea of being a movement. Many members of atheist and secularist 
organizations prefer to think of themselves as members of a community of non-believers, 
rather than collectivities mobilized to engage in instrumental action, and are motivated by 
a desire for fellowship and a sense of belonging, which comes by creating a space within 
a culturally pluralistic society. This is in contrast to the New Atheism’s goal of cultural 
universalism, which I argue is being eclipsed in recent developments in the movement by 
a turn to a more community-based approach that favours engagement with other groups – 
even religious ones – that share basic values.  
 The secular movement and the religious fundamentalism that it is in part a 
response to are deeply intertwined. Indeed, the secular movement would not exist without 
the Christian Right and radical Islamism (or it would at least be very different and much 
smaller in scale). Cimino and Smith (2007) argue that the Christian Right served as a 
“tonic” for the secular movement even before the New Atheism came about by 
presenting an ‘other’ or an enemy to rally against, though it is clear that it would never 
have expanded the way it has without Dawkins and the others to lead this growth by 
drawing unprecedented public attention to atheism. As noted above, the Christian Right is 
similarly dependent on secularism for its strength, portraying Christians as “embattled” 
by encroaching secularism and thus enhancing group solidarity (C. Smith 1998). This 
interdependence is clear in a billboard advertisement appearing in New York and San 
Francisco in October 2013, which was sponsored by Answers in Genesis, a creationist 
organization founded by Ken Hamm, who is also the founder of the Creation Museum in 
Petersburg, Kentucky. The billboards carry the message, “To all of our atheist friends: 
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Thank God You’re Wrong” along with a link to the organization’s website. According to 
Hamm, the message is necessary because “We’re in a battle. We’re in a spiritual war and 
we’re to be out there wielding our swords, the word of God” (Gryboski 2013a).  
Hamm is correct that this “spiritual war” is being waged by the New Atheism as 
well, though this competition might be better understood in terms of the “religious 
economies” approach developed by Stark and Finke (2000) that applies rational choice 
theory to religion and suggests that in religiously pluralistic societies, actors will choose 
religious beliefs and organizations based on a cost/benefit calculation, and further, that 
greater religious supply produces greater demand. 
The New Atheism actively engages in this ‘religious marketplace’, increasing the 
supply by offering its own belief system to compete with others that also offer firm 
answers, essential truths, and a program for the organization of social and political life. 
Its strategy for advancing its essentially political ideology, then, is a cultural one that 
involves entering the ‘marketplace of ideas’ and seeking a broad transformation in beliefs 
– that is, a conversion to its belief system of scientism or “scientific atheism”. They 
attempt to do this by proselytizing atheism, which in turn is done primarily by a scathing 
critique of religion (atheism as an intellectual current), and also by constructing and 
promoting a positive atheist identity that emphasizes morality (atheism as a social, or 
more specifically, cultural movement).  The New Atheism’s reductionist critique of 
religion presents it as a false set of beliefs regarding nature, a pre-modern attempt at 
scientific explanation that relies on the supernatural to fill in gaps in understanding. This 
is typical of many reductionist, transhistorical and transcultural concepts of religion as 
different sets of incompatible and non-rational truth claims that inevitably lead to conflict 
and violence, which Cavanaugh (2009) argues is one of the foundational legitimating 
myths of Western society, and is used to legitimate neo-colonial violence against non-
Western others (particularly the Muslim world).  
 My research indicates that this is precisely how the ideology of the New Atheism 
functions. Its discourse on religion is in fact an element in an ideology that legitimates 
scientism and the “political doctrine” (Asad 2003) of secularization, and more 
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specifically, its discourse on Islam is a legitimation of Western society that constructs a 
vision of ‘civilization’ through a contrast with its ‘barbaric’ Other. The New Atheism 
might in fact be understood as a renewed defence and promotion of the idea of 
secularization – which crystallized in the social sciences in the 20th century but has been 
present since the Enlightenment – against a perceived failure of secularism in practice in 
late modern society. This failure, which is ultimately considered only temporary, is a 
result of the ‘pre-modern’ and ‘post-modern’ threats of religion and relativism. Like 
religious fundamentalism, the New Atheism is a reaction to the explosion in possibilities 
of belief that characterize our “secular age” (Taylor 2007), and though they are both 
totalizing ideologies that seek to eradicate opposing worldviews, both are also themselves 
manifestations of the expanding possibilities in ways of being – or not being – religious.   
 
Overview and Chapter Outline  
 The dissertation consists of two parts, each consisting of two chapters. The first 
part (Chapters 1 and 2) is a detailed examination of the ideology of New Atheism, 
focusing on the four leaders commonly known as the Four Horsemen (Dawkins, 
Hitchens, Harris, and Dennett) and situating them within one of two major categories of 
atheist thought, which are arrived at through a review of the history of atheism in chapter 
1. The second part (Chapters 3 and 4) examines New Atheism’s manifestation as a social 
movement that seeks cultural universalization, thus sharing the totalizing aspirations of 
other fundamentalisms, and focuses on tensions within the movement between competing 
sub-groups with distinct goals and ideologies, and the New Atheism’s relative impact and 
current status.  
 These two parts are relatively distinct projects, but both are required to understand 
New Atheism, conceived comprehensively as a secular fundamentalism that is both 
ideology and social movement. I will argue that New Atheism should be understood 
precisely as a cultural movement that seeks to change beliefs and universalize an 
ideology characterized by scientism and a political doctrine of secularization. My 
research indicates that, though the atheist movement was for a time dominated by New 
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Atheism, ongoing intra-movement tensions, complexities in the views of its members, 
and new directions in terms of goals and strategy indicate that New Atheism is only one 
of a number of different ideologies and groups seeking to advance their agendas, with the 
outcome of these processes still unclear.  
The opening chapter, “A Definition of Modern Atheism”, examines the historical 
development of atheism, seeking to establish an unconventional definition of atheism not 
as “disbelief” or “lack of belief”, but rather, as itself a form (or forms) of belief. 
Reviewing the literature on theories and definitions of atheism in historical perspective – 
and drawing primarily on Buckley (1987, 2004) and Berman (1988) – it examines 
atheism’s relationship to several intellectual and socio-cultural developments: (1) the 
scientific revolution and an accompanying revolution in theology, (2) the Enlightenment, 
(3) Darwinism and science’s challenge to church authority, and (4) the rise of the social 
sciences.  This historical analysis establishes two general categories of atheism arising 
out of a 19th century division of atheist thought into two trajectories: “scientific atheism” 
and “humanistic atheism”.  Scientific atheism considers religion a false explanation of 
nature that must be destroyed by rational-scientific critique and replaced with a scientific 
worldview. It is also a political program characterized by scientism, liberalism, a 
Darwinistic conception of social progress, and in certain cases (notably the sociology of 
Herbert Spencer, whose theories provided the intellectual foundation for Social 
Darwinism), a defense of free market capitalism and individualistic approaches to social 
organization. Humanistic atheism is equally political but conceives of religion as a 
manifestation of, and response to, injustice, alienation, and existential crisis – or in other 
words, as a social phenomenon that responds to social conditions.  Hence, humanistic 
atheism focuses its critique not on the irrational elements of religious faith, but rather, on 
the social conditions that give rise to them, manipulate them, and create the need for their 
consoling effects; or as Marx writes, “the critique of heaven turns into the critique of 
Earth” (1983: 116).   
The chapter then introduces the Four Horsemen (Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, 
Daniel Dennett, and Christopher Hitchens), the leaders of the New Atheism, who seek to 
 
 
12 
revive the tradition of scientific atheism in response to developments in late modern 
society, producing a secular fundamentalist ideology that has translated into a social 
movement. I argue that their emergence and popular success is best understood in the 
context of two major events: the increasing tensions between the West and the Islamic 
world, manifest in the destruction of the World Trade Center and subsequent debates 
about Muslim immigration in western countries; and the increasing influence of the 
Christian Right in American politics under the George W. Bush administration. The 
global significance of these events, and their perceived threat to the Enlightenment 
principles of reason and scientific inquiry, inspired this movement’s reactionary attack on 
religion. After briefly establishing the socio-political context of the emergence of the 
New Atheism and introducing the Four Horsemen, the chapter concludes by noting that 
the distinction between the two major historical trajectories of atheism provides a basic 
initial framework for the following chapter’s more detailed analysis of the ideology the 
New Atheists advance. This ideology is rooted in scientific atheism, though updated with 
respect to advances in science, and explicitly tailored to the socio-political circumstances 
of the 21st century.  
 The second chapter, “The New Atheism”, presents a critical analysis of the four 
canonical New Atheism texts (Dawkins 2006; Dennett 2006; Harris 2004; Hitchens 
2007) and the ideas advanced by their authors. I interpret the New Atheism – which is 
essentially scientific atheism updated with the language and theories of evolutionary 
psychology and neuroscience – as a belief system designed not only to destroy religion, 
but to advance an evolutionistic vision of the Enlightenment narrative of progress and 
reclaim the authority of science in social and political life. These two aspects of the 
ideology at the heart of the New Atheism are discussed in distinct sections. Each refers to 
the New Atheism’s response to a perceived crisis of modernity, which is threatened both 
by ‘pre-modern’ forces of religious ignorance and ‘post-modern’ forces of cultural and 
intellectual relativism.   
The chapter examines the New Atheism as a defence of a particular vision of 
modernity against a perceived threat from the emergence of what they consider to be 
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‘pre-modern’ religious fundamentalism and scientific ignorance. This anti-modern Other, 
taking form more conspicuously in Islam but also in other fundamentalist forms of 
monotheism and even its more liberal variants, serves as a contrast by which to construct 
and defend its own fundamentalist secular ideology. This ideology centers on the notion 
of modernity as a progressive step from barbarity toward an ultimate form of civilization 
driven by the engine of science and reason.  A critical element in this progress is the 
process of secularization, which, following an evolutionary understanding of the 
development of human society and culture, is considered inevitable, even though it faces 
a major challenge in the rise of fundamentalism globally. The New Atheism adopts the 
task of defeating this ‘pre-modern’ challenge to the hegemony of science through 
rational-scientific attacks on a core concept of all monotheistic religions: faith.  At the 
same time, it endorses its own brand of faith in a teleological vision of modernity as the 
event that brings us to the end of history, with social and cultural evolution culminating 
in the universal adoption of a scientific worldview.  
 To achieve this vision, the New Atheism also aims to resolve a second crisis 
within modernity, that of the challenge from what they consider ‘post-modern’ 
relativism.  They counter relativism with a defence of the authority of the natural sciences 
in all realms of inquiry, which is the essence of scientism.  The social sciences and in 
particular the paradigm of postmodernism, with its epistemic relativism, are perceived as 
a ‘post-modern’ challenge to modernity and scientific authority. Relativism, for the New 
Atheism, is as dangerous as religious faith because it removes the grounding for the 
construction of civilization – namely, universalist science and reason.  The social 
sciences are rejected as a redundant addition to the application of Darwinian theories and 
concepts to society, culture, and economics.  The scientism that the New Atheism 
promotes, then, involves replacing the social sciences with sociobiology, and democratic 
politics with scientific authority.   
The final critical insight developed in this chapter pertains to the New Atheism’s 
celebration of modernity as a social and cultural state of affairs that allows for the 
progressive evolution of civilization. This is tantamount to what TalalAsad (2003) 
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describes as the “political doctrine” of secularization, and universalizing this ideology is 
the goal of New Atheism.  This is an essentially political project that is advanced 
primarily through ideological action: promoting and attacking various sets of beliefs in 
the public sphere. The other strategy adopted by the New Atheism is something quite 
different. It involves building a sense of community and a positive collective identity to 
create a hospitable cultural environment for atheism to flourish, which in practice 
amounts to a social – or more precisely, cultural – movement. The following chapter 
examines the social movement aspects of New Atheism, including its conflicts with other 
elements within the atheist and secularist movement, which is vexed by tensions between 
factions that are motivated by distinct ideologies.  
The third chapter, “The Atheist Movement”, begins by briefly tracing the history 
of atheist activism in the United States and establishing a theoretical framework by which 
we can research and analyze the atheist movement. Drawing primarily on Alberto 
Melucci’s (1989, 1996) work on identity-based movements, I make a distinction between 
“cultural” movements that seek to change beliefs, norms, and values through direct 
engagement with the public, and “political” movements that seek to achieve legal and 
public policy changes through instrumental action, including protests and lawsuits, aimed 
at putting pressure on state authorities.  Following this definition, I argue that the New 
Atheism is a cultural movement, since its target is not the state, but public opinion, and 
its goal is not legislative change, but broad cultural transformation – namely, the 
widespread adoption of the scientific atheist worldview, defined primarily by scientism. 
However, the New Atheism emerged within an already-existing atheist movement that 
has traditionally been structured more as a political movement concerned with civil rights 
for an atheist minority and maintaining respect for constitutionally mandated separation 
of church and state. Tensions have emerged between advocates of these two approaches. 
These tensions are the primary driving force shaping movement dynamics, and they are 
revealed in debates concerning goals and strategy, which should be understood in the first 
instance through an examination of processes of collective identity construction.  
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What I refer to broadly as the “atheist movement” is actually comprised of a 
loosely-knit network of organizations defined by atheism, secularism, humanism, 
rationalism, and freethinking, all with porous ideological boundaries (the movement is 
also commonly called the “secular movement” and the “freethought movement”, and 
there is no universal agreement on terminology). The primary focus of this study is North 
America, where the atheist movement is most active, a result of the influence of the 
Christian Right in this context, primarily in the U.S. but to a lesser extent also in Canada 
(McDonald 2011). However, the movement is largely deterritorialized and based on the 
internet, though it materializes in specific projects in local and national contexts. For this 
reason it was possible to study the movement largely through internet research. For a 
period of over three years I have regularly monitored a number of websites and blogs of 
atheist organizations and public figures/leaders. These include the websites of the Center 
for Inquiry (including President Ronald Lindsay’s blog), Center for Inquiry Canada, 
Atheist Alliance International, American Atheists, Freedom From Religion Foundation, 
Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science, and the blogs Pharyngula and 
Friendly Atheist. I chose these websites because they represent the largest and most 
active atheist organizations, and the blogs because they are among the most frequently-
visited and are written by influential public figures PZ Myers and Hemant Mehta, 
respectively (it must be noted that there is a vast array of blogs, discussion forums, and 
internet shows and podcasts dedicated to atheism, and that this is a small sampling 
restricted to some of the most important ones). I listened to the Center for Inquiry’s 
weekly podcast, Point of Inquiry, for the period of 2007-2013, with the exception of 
those episodes that were not relevant to atheism, religion, or the atheist movement – for 
instance, episodes featuring discussion of new discoveries in science – and also read all 
issues of Free Inquiry, the Center for Inquiry’s bi-monthly magazine, for the period of 
2007-2012. Atheist organizations frequently hold conferences that feature speakers and 
discussions, many of which are available online, and I have watched many presentations 
given at Atheist Alliance International and Center for Inquiry conferences from 2007-
2012. I attended two conferences in person: the Centre for Inquiry Canada 2010 
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conference in Toronto, and the Atheist Alliance International 2010 Annual Convention in 
Montreal, organized in partnership with Humanist Canada (I conducted interviews with 
attendees of the latter event – these are the subject of the following chapter).  
All of this research contributed to my general knowledge of the movement and 
informed my analysis, though the chapter focuses on a few specific instances of activism 
and movement campaigns and what they tell us about the movement’s goals and the 
ongoing debate regarding movement strategy. The chapter examines processes of 
collective identity construction within the movement, identifying three phases: coming 
out, community building, and self-representation as a moral minority, reflecting the 
division of the chapter according to three sub-headings. These processes are examined 
through the lens of some major instances of atheist activism, including the Coming Out 
Campaign, the Atheist Bus Campaign, and the Reason Rally.  The analysis reveals a 
tension within the movement between those who deny that atheists are an “oppressed 
minority” and prefer to self-represent as the emerging mainstream (the New Atheists 
belong to this group, a position that corresponds to the goal of universalism), and those 
who wish to move in a more political direction, constructing a “political identity” 
(Bernstein 2008) in order to achieve minority recognition. This approach is expected to 
allow atheists to carve out a distinctive space in the cultural landscape, and to grant them 
a stronger voice in public affairs.   
This tension regarding identity and atheists’ relationship to society is further 
expressed in debates regarding movement strategy, and together they reveal a more 
fundamental tension threatening the movement’s survival. The atheist movement today is 
defined by tensions between three major sub-groups that I refer to as atheists, secular 
humanists, and libertarian rationalists.  I argue that these groups and their differences 
with respect to goals and strategy should be understood in terms of their distinct 
ideological foundations.  Regarding goals, the distinction is between those who 
aggressively promote a scientistic worldview, those for whom atheism implies a shared 
responsibility for social justice, and those who seek to protect individual and economic 
freedom from intrusion by organized religion or the state, or both, as they are seen to be 
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in confluence – hence this group’s emphasis on the goal of political secularism (church-
state separation).  The ideologies at the heart of these divisions are scientific atheism, 
humanistic atheism, and individualism.   
The division is revealed in the first instance through intra-movement debates on 
the issue of whether to adopt a strategy of “confrontation” of religion or 
“accommodation” of liberal religious groups that are not hostile to science.  Those who 
favour confrontation (including the New Atheists) advocate intolerance of religious 
individuals and groups.  This position is derived from the basic ideology of scientific 
atheism, in which religion is understood as the antithesis of science that must be 
eliminated in the name of progress.  Those favouring “accommodation” are open to 
working with liberal religious groups that are not hostile to science because their views 
are more in line with humanistic atheism, which understands religion as a manifestation 
of alienating and oppressive social conditions.  These underlying social conditions, rather 
than their cultural manifestation in religion, are of ultimate concern in this approach.  
What is clear from the analyses of collective identity and strategy debates is that the New 
Atheism’s cultural project is no longer the dominant goal. Today, most atheists as well as 
secular humanists pursue more precisely political goals: for the former, an aggressive 
defence of a minority identity and distinct ideological boundaries; and for the latter, the 
pursuit of social issues such as science education, the environment, and most significant 
recently, gender equality.  Both groups, of course, favour a goal of political secularism – 
that is, separation of church and state.   
The tension in terms of strategy, then, could be expressed as one between atheists 
and humanists.  However, the situation is complicated by a third group that shares 
features with these groups and yet is ideologically distinct from both, which I call the 
“libertarian rationalists”. Their understanding of religion falls in line with that of the New 
Atheists and other scientific atheists, so the historical model holds in this respect. But 
their politics, and their desired goals for the movement, are quite different. This group’s 
primary concern is individual freedom and opposition to intervention in civil and 
economic life by the state, which may serve as an instrument of religious forces. This 
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libertarianism, and particularly the laissez-faire approach to economics and social 
assistance, reflects the division in 19th century scientific atheism between liberals and 
Social Darwinists influenced by Herbert Spencer – scientific atheism is still divided 
between Darwinists and Spencerists today. I argue that these libertarians constitute an 
“Atheist Right”, illustrating more than any other group the atheist movement’s 
relationship to the Christian Right. That is, both are fundamentalisms that advance a 
reactionary political ideology, while each uses the other as an enemy against which to 
unite (thus serving as an effective mobilization tool), even as they pursue goals that 
sometimes overlap. The libertarians are in tension with the other groups, particularly a 
recently emerged faction that retains an opposition to religion rooted in science, and 
which wants to tie the atheist movement to the notion of social justice. This particular 
tension cannot be reduced to the distinction between scientific and humanistic atheism 
because of the unique combination of these groups’ positions on religion and their 
politics.  
Alain Touraine writes that any social movement features “a changing set of 
debates, tensions and internal rifts; it is torn between grass-roots opinion and the political 
projects of its leaders” (2000: 94).  The fourth chapter, “Atheists”, examines these 
tensions and internal rifts between the leaders of the atheist movement and its “grass-
roots” members, reporting and analyzing the results of in-depth interviews with fifteen 
members of atheist organizations in North America (details on the interviewing method 
and contexts are discussed in the chapter). These interviews explore questions such as the 
extent to which members’ beliefs are influenced by the New Atheism, the nature and 
origin of religious belief as they understand it, their views on the meaning of atheism and 
the goals of the movement, and areas of disagreement with the official discourse and 
movement actions discussed in the previous chapter.  This is a small sampling of atheists 
and the intention is not to generalize their views as representative of the movement as a 
whole.  Rather, this chapter constructs a detailed picture of how a small group of atheists 
understand the movement, including the tensions they experience with various aspects of 
it.   
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A surprising finding is that these members express significant ambivalence about 
the debates regarding strategy, and considerably more nuanced views on religion than 
those of the New Atheists or other more ideologically motivated movement leaders.  
Indeed, their views are more in line with humanistic atheism than scientific atheism, but 
they tend to draw on the discourses provided by movement leaders because they lack 
alternative conceptual frameworks.  These nuances in the views of grass-roots members, 
and the tensions between their views and those of movement leaders, reinforce the 
argument made in the previous chapter that the atheist movement is facing a daunting 
challenge to its internal coherence, and even continued existence.  Fundamental 
ideological differences – the deep root of tensions in the atheist movement – and a lack of 
a coherent focus are threatening to fracture the movement into distinct, and even 
opposed, spheres of thought and action. Perhaps most important to note is that many 
members do not support the New Atheism’s goal of universalization but instead seek to 
carve out a space for atheists in the cultural landscape and create communities for non-
believers, which seems to support Taylor’s (2007) point regarding the pluralist cultural 
logic of the secular age, where dogmatism and absolutism (religious or secular) give way 
to the possibility of different forms of belief co-existing with one another.   
I conclude by arguing that we are now in the midst of a watershed moment in the 
history of atheism. While the New Atheism was a clear extension of the scientific 
atheism of the 19th century, the libertarian rationalists and social justice advocates 
represent the evolution of new forms of atheism. The atheist movement is at risk of 
fragmentation among groups with distinct political projects sometimes directly at odds 
with each other, which include ideological universalization, political secularism, civil and 
economic liberty, and social justice projects (particularly gender equality).  Whether the 
movement will be able to survive this fragmentation is a question that only time will 
answer. What seems clear is that we are seeing more complex forms of atheism emerging 
in the movement today, with different groups claiming different meanings of atheism and 
developing new ideologies that mix atheism and politics in novel ways that are peculiar 
to the social, cultural, and political circumstances of the 21st century.  Darwin’s 
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description of evolution as a “radiating bush” that continually produces new forms of 
increasing complexity seems apt as a metaphor for contemporary developments in 
atheism.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
A DEFINITION OF MODERN ATHEISM 
  
 “Atheism” is a complex term with an even more complex history, and thus 
notoriously difficult to define. The first and most crucial point in the definition advanced 
herein is that the term “atheism” should not be understood as a lack of belief in God, or 
disbelief in the existence of God – positions commonly referred to as “negative atheism” 
and “positive atheism”, respectively (Martin 2007). Negative atheism, sometimes also 
called “soft” atheism, might be better understood as a kind of agnosticism, which is 
essentially the position of neither believing nor believing that God exists, but simply 
lacking belief.  Unlike agnostics, true atheists assert that God does not exist, and therefore 
when we speak about atheism we are really speaking about “positive” atheism. But this is 
only a starting point, and this definition tells us little about what atheism means, and has 
meant, to the people who hold this position.  
 This chapter defines atheism by examining its historical development and the 
various meanings and beliefs that have been attached to it since explicit, “avowed” 
atheism emerged in the Enlightenment (Berman 1988). The period covered in this 
analysis may appear somewhat arbitrary, since atheist thought can be traced back at least 
as far as ancient Greek philosophers such as Epicurus and Lucretius. But as Fergusson 
(2009) argues, modern atheism has its own distinct cultural context, and thus differs in 
important ways from earlier forms,  even if there are also similarities. Modern atheism 
expresses modern forms of belief and it responds to its specific context. The selection of 
authors and events covered here may also appear somewhat arbitrary, and there are many 
important thinkers who are not mentioned, or are mentioned only briefly. The thinkers 
and events I have selected are those considered within the literature on the topic most 
important to the development and expansion of atheist thought in the intellectual sphere, 
and the public sphere more generally. There are many more important figures in the 
development of what I call “humanistic atheism” than the few discussed in this chapter, 
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but these few – particularly Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche (with Feuerbach important as an 
earlier pioneer of the perspective) are distinctive for their popular impact as well as their 
influence on intellectuals. John Stuart Mill’s views on the “utility of religion” were 
certainly influential on philosophers and social scientists, but few among the general 
public would know of them. A great deal many more, however, are aware of Marx’s 
description of religion as “the opium of the masses” and Nietzsche’s famous 
proclamation that “God is dead”.   
 From this historical perspective, atheism is a modern movement of thought and 
practice emerging from political turmoil and revolutions in various intellectual fields, and 
a form of belief – rather than a lack of belief – shaped by its socio-historical context. To 
understand the New Atheism, then, we need to begin with an historical examination of 
atheist thought and practice. Such an examination reveals that “atheism” is inextricably 
bound up with a tradition of Enlightenment principles, including emancipation through 
reason, liberal democracy, the primacy of the individual, scientific rationality, and the 
notion of progress, which is closely related to the theory – or as TalalAsad (2003) 
describes it, the “political doctrine” – of secularization (more on this in the following 
chapter).   
Following some existing theories and histories of atheism, most importantly 
Berman (1988) and Buckley (1987, 2004), I review several key events and thinkers that 
characterize a particular conception of modern Western atheism, rooted in the 
Enlightenment and the rise of reason and empiricism, though this is by no means an 
attempt to provide a definitive, comprehensive account of the history of something so 
elusive and contested in its meaning.  This history is intended to demonstrate that New 
Atheism is not really ‘new’, but rather just the most recent incarnation of a particular kind 
of non-belief from a particular intellectual tradition; that this ‘new’ atheism excludes 
certain other kinds of engagement with religion that developed diverging lines of critique 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries; and that this exclusion is a result of certain political 
and epistemological irreconcilabilities.     
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The historical narrative constructed here, then, serves the purpose of defining what 
is commonly termed “atheism” by distinguishing it historically from other kinds of (non-
)belief and religious criticism.  The chapter outlines a theory of how atheism emerged 
from a dialectical relationship between religion and science in early modernity, which 
gradually gave way to a dichotomy in the Enlightenment, and particularly in the 19th 
century as Darwinists used the theory of evolution by natural selection as a case for the 
emancipation of science from the fetters of institutionalized religion.  These Darwinists 
cultivated a “scientific atheism” that views religion primarily as the antithesis of science 
and an obstacle to social and scientific progress (progress of the former type being 
contingent upon the latter in this view).  At the same time, another distinct tradition of 
atheist thought emerged from the social sciences.  This “humanistic atheism” considered 
religion primarily a social phenomenon rather than an attempt at explaining nature.   
This split in atheist thought into two major trajectories in the 19th century is a 
useful reference point for the recent emergence of the New Atheism, which carries on the 
scientific tradition while ignoring humanistic approaches due to political and 
epistemological irreconcilabilities. Both approaches are much more than a critical inquiry 
into religious faith: they are essentially political projects. Scientific atheism understands 
religion as an obstacle to scientific mastery of the world and concomitant social progress, 
and seeks to eradicate this relic of the pre-modern world through science education and 
‘enlightenment’.  Humanistic atheism understands religion not as a pseudo-scientific 
hypothesis, but as a very human response to living in the world that can be manipulated 
and used to control and limit freedom and human potential. In some (but not all) versions 
it rejects the structure of a world that gives rise to religion, which is not a challenge to 
modernity, but rather, provides ideological support for modernity by rationalizing its 
inequities. It thus imagines alternative social formations that would cause religion to 
vanish.  These different positions on religion, understandings of what atheism means, and 
how it should be put into action, are still debated within the atheist movement today. This 
historical review of the meanings of atheism, then, helps us to understand the dynamics 
and tensions shaping the contemporary atheist movement’s early development.   
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Atheism and Enlightenment 
 Michael J. Buckley (1987; 2004) has offered a compelling account of the 
dialectical origins of atheism, with atheism emerging not out of an antagonism between 
religion and science, but rather, a relative harmony in early modernity.  In the 
seventeenth century, science was not opposed to Christianity, but rather, science was 
considered work in the service of Christianity.  Buckley argues that atheism came not 
from a contradiction between religion and science, but from an internal contradiction 
within theism itself that led to theology turning to science for its foundations.  Gavin 
Hyman (2007) endorses Buckley’s theory, suggesting that in early modernity a modern 
concept of God arose that did away with transcendence as his essential property, instead 
offering a conception of God as a ‘thing’ in the world of definite substance and location.  
When theologians determined that God was a material thing that exists within nature, 
God by definition became an object of scientific inquiry, according to both science and 
orthodox theology.   
Scientists, meanwhile, thought it natural to ground apologetic arguments through 
empirical evidence, and were encouraged to do so by theologians and clerics alike.  The 
most important figure in the development of this early modern dialectic was perhaps 
Isaac Newton, a devout Christian who devoted much of his later life to writing about the 
Bible rather than the natural sciences.  He filled in some gaps in his scientific theories 
with God, claiming that only divine intervention could account for certain irregularities 
within nature (Thrower 2000).  Newton’s discoveries brought about a profound shift and 
step forward in our understanding of the universe that signaled the possibility that science 
might be able to find answers to questions that had long been the province of theology, 
transforming the enchanted universe into a “system of intelligible forces” (Hampson 
1968: 37).   
With time, even Newton’s claim that the universe was created by a supreme being 
who intervenes in its operations for maintenance work from time to time began to appear 
dubious to many scientists, simply because it seemed to be an unnecessary addition to a 
fairly self-sufficient set of theories.  By the mid-18th century science had rejected the 
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notion of a static universe with laws generated by God in favour of a view that accepted 
nature as a product of great revolutionary transformations over an immense period of 
time, thereby making the addition of God to existing explanations superfluous (Hampson 
1968).  This development represented a new phase in the science/religion dialectic as the 
ideological foundation of atheism, with science making discoveries that did not need the 
concept of the divine designer. Buckley does point out, however, that not needing a 
designer to explain things is not the same thing as saying there is no designer.  Scientists 
were not arguing that God does not exist; indeed, most prominent thinkers of the 
Scientific Revolution were passionate believers and many developed theological 
positions to accompany their naturalistic theories (Henry 2010).  Science did, however, 
begin to claim primary entitlement to what many considered to be the primary function of 
religion: an explanation of the origin and nature of material reality.  
Buckley (2004) suggests that this development paved the way for atheism, since 
theism that was built on scientific knowledge eventually generated its own negation.  For 
modern rationalist critiques to apply to God, there first had to be some change in theology 
that made God an object that could be critiqued rationally and investigated scientifically.  
Atheism, then, was not an external challenge to theism, but rather it was the result of a 
revolution with theology itself, which is to say that the origins of modern atheism are 
ultimately theological (Hyman 2007).  In this theory atheism is not the result of a conflict 
between science and religion – this false notion of the enduring and intractable conflict 
between the epistemologies and institutions of religion and science is referred to by some 
historians simply as the “conflict myth” (Lindberg 2010) – but on the contrary, atheism 
arose from an immanent contradiction within orthodox theology produced by its 
apologetic strategies (Buckley 2004).  
This theory of the origin of atheism dominates the literature on the topic, finding 
further support (with slight differences) from Alan Charles Kors (1990) and James Turner 
(1985) in their studies of the origins of modern unbelief in France and the Unites States, 
respectively.  Turner suggests that atheism in America emerged from a dialectical 
relationship between religion and the rise of modern science and Enlightenment 
 
 
26 
rationalism, and that ultimately it was theology itself that generated its own negation by 
attempting to adapt religious beliefs to social and cultural changes, and to the standards 
of scientific knowledge.  In so doing, “the defenders of God slowly strangled him” 
(Turner 1985: xiii).  Like Buckley, Turner sees atheism arising immanently from within 
theology as it adapted to the modern world.  Kors (1990) argues that in France, atheism 
emerged immanently from within the orthodox tradition in its attempt to defend the 
existence of God against agents of ‘natural philosophy’ (what would become modern 
science). Debates between two major theological schools on how best to philosophically 
demonstrate the existence of God ironically produced better arguments against the 
existence of God, resulting in the negation of both positions.  Buttressing Buckley’s 
analysis, Kors demonstrates atheism arising out of a contradiction within theology and its 
apologetic strategies.  
Science and natural theology were principal among these apologetic strategies, 
and in the early days of concurrent revolutions in science and theology there was thus no 
real conflict, but rather, science and religion were bound together.  The shifting 
theological understanding of God – that is, the move from transcendence to materiality – 
resulted in a shift of emphasis from revelation to natural theology, which was predicated 
upon the idea that the existence of God could be inferred by reason and that science could 
provide hard evidence of his presence in nature (Topham 2010).  This relationship would 
evolve and give birth to a modern form of atheism that rejected a modern form of theism 
that was ultimately unsustainable (Hyman 2007).   That is, a theism grounded upon a 
conception of God as a natural entity amenable to scientific investigation would 
inevitably fail when the evidence failed to demonstrate his role in nature, but rather 
seemed to demonstrate more and more that the concept of God was not required to 
explain nature.  
It must be noted, however, that these developments generally did not lead directly 
to atheism, but rather to skepticism of revelation and to a belief in ‘natural religion’ or 
deism (or in other words, a move from revelation to natural theology).  Deists rejected the 
specificities of revealed religion (which was based on hearsay and thus could not be 
 
 
27 
verified rationally or empirically) while embracing the view that religion should be 
founded upon rational proofs and that evidence of God’s design could be found in nature 
(Byrne 1989).  The prevailing Enlightenment sentiment was that religion that could not 
be established by reason was nothing but superstition (Thrower 2000). This transitional 
phase to true atheism emerged out of the dialectical relationship between religion and 
science, a product of the Scientific Revolution and a revolution within theology. Many 
skeptics of this period famous for their critiques of religion were in fact deists, including 
David Hume, Denis Diderot, and notably Voltaire, whose scathing attacks on religion 
were not motivated by atheism, but rather were directed at corruption within the Church. 
Voltaire was a critic of religious institutions and revealed religion, rather than the idea of 
God, which he, like Hume, sought to situate within nature and to establish through 
reason.    
The deism trend was not restricted to Europe.  In his history of unbelief in the 
United States, James Turner argues that in 18th century America “unbelief in fact 
remained unthinkable to all but a tiny handful”, but the changes wrought by science and 
Enlightenment rationalism meant that even here the nature of faith had to change: “if 
belief were to remain secure, it needed footings solid enough to endure the buffetings of 
changing times.  Thus, by the 1790s its underpinnings had altered drastically, at least for 
the educated, as believers sought to anchor God firmly in the modern world” (1985: 35).  
Hence, deism became popular among many intellectuals and elites, most notably 
revolutionary figures such as Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine.  Rejection of 
religious authority in favour of liberal democracy, then, was an important element in 
revolutionary politics in America as it was in France, and the grounds for this rejection 
were found in deism, which undermined the authority of traditional religious institutions. 
The major exception to the rule of deism during the Enlightenment was a 
watershed event in the history of atheism: the publication of Baron d’Holbach’sSystem of 
Nature in 1770, which is generally considered the first published work of avowed 
(explicit and publicly stated) atheism in Europe (Berman 1988). D’Holbach considered 
atheism to be directly connected to the Enlightenment project of emancipation from 
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ignorance, traditional authority, and the tyranny of church and king. His criticism of 
religion may be distilled to three essential points: it is unscientific and its teachings are 
contrary to scientific truth, it supports a corrupt social order by diverting attention away 
from the here-and-now and instead toward the afterlife, and it is not a useful foundation 
for morality (Thrower 2000: 107).  These points refer to three dimensions of critique: 
epistemological, political, and moral, corresponding to the dimensions of the 
Enlightenment critique of religion as outlined by Casanova (1994), which includes the 
categories “cognitive”, “practical-political”, and the unwieldy “subjective expressive-
aesthetic-moral”, which can be more succinctly stated as the “moral-subjective” critique.   
The critical engagement with religion among 18th century Enlightenment thinkers, 
for the most part, was rarely as boldly and proudly atheistic as the work of d’Holbach, 
and never quite escaped the influence of deism and the problem of design.  Atheism, 
however, would find new life in the 19th century.  It was in this period that atheism 
evolved from its Enlightenment origins and took shape according to several new points of 
origin, from which we can derive most contemporary forms.  These new strands of 
atheism grew from the Enlightenment’s approach of general skepticism and gave it new 
grounding in the nascent disciplines of biology, anthropology, sociology, and 
psychology.  
 
Evolution, Religion, and Society  
 The influence of the concept of “evolution” in the history of atheism has been 
unjustly ignored and under-theorized. In the 19th century Enlightenment notions of 
progress found expression in the idea of evolution, which was not only a scientific theory, 
but became a dominant narrative in depictions of the history and nature of western 
civilization. It also became a cornerstone of atheism, solving (to some minds) the 
problem of the argument from the design and the question of human origins. But even 
before Darwin brought it into the scientific mainstream, evolutionistic thinking was 
applied in the emerging science of society that August Comte would come to call 
“sociology”. The atheism of this period that connected Enlightenment skepticism to the 
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expanding influence of evolutionary theories of both the natural and social worlds is what 
I call “scientific atheism”.   
 A theory of religion was integral to Comte’s general theory of society. Comte 
considered religion a slowly disappearing relic of a bygone period of social evolution. 
This idea was expressed in his famous “Law of Three Stages” which posited that all 
societies pass through three historical phases in their development: theological, 
metaphysical, and positive.  In the theological stage, marking all of human history up 
until the advent of modernity, humans understand themselves and their world in 
thoroughly religious terms and “suppose all phenomena to be caused by the immediate 
action of supernatural beings” (Olson 2008: 67).  Subscribing to the animist theory of the 
origins of religion, Comte argues that man has a natural tendency to conceive of “all 
external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his own” (1961a: 646).  This is 
essentially a less refined version of the “intentional stance” theory of religious origins 
derived from contemporary evolutionary psychology – a theory supported by Richard 
Dawkins (2006), Daniel Dennett (2006), and Pascal Boyer (2001), among others – which 
holds that a propensity for religious belief is a by-product of adaptive mental processes 
that enhanced our ancestors’ prospects for selection (namely, attributing agency to all 
animate and inanimate objects). Comte similarly describes “the primary tendency of Man 
to transfer the sense of his own nature into the radical explanation of all phenomena 
whatever” (1896: 310).  Comte here refers to primitive man’s projection of human-like 
agency to all phenomena, i.e. “The only way that he can explain any phenomena is by 
likening them, as much as possible, to his own acts” (1896: 310).  Further, in his view 
man’s attempts to control the course of the stars through primitive religious rituals 
constitute “the first symptoms of the awakening of human intelligence and activity” 
(1961a: 651), and perhaps, as Dawkins and Hitchens believe, our most primitive attempts 
at science.   
 The dominance of theological understandings of self and nature begins to sway in 
the intermediate metaphysical stage which begins in early modernity and “reconciles, for 
a time, the radical opposition of the other two, adapting itself to the gradual decline of the 
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one, and the preparatory rise of the other, so as to spare our dislike of abrupt change, and 
to afford us a transition almost imperceptible” (Comte 1961b: 1338).  In this stage 
supernatural beings are replaced by abstract forces as the cause of all phenomena, and 
philosophy turns to speculating about the nature of these forces.  Finally we arrive at the 
positive stage, where speculation concerning abstract forces is abandoned in favour of 
empirical investigation into observable natural and social phenomena and the laws that 
regulate their relationships – in other words, modern science.  Comte’s positivism 
assumes that “all phenomena are capable of being incorporated into invariable natural 
laws” and that it is an important goal to reduce all natural laws to the smallest possible 
number (Olson 2008:67).  Echoes of this sentiment resonate in Daniel Dennett’s chapter 
section on “Who’s Afraid of Reductionism?” in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995:80) and 
Richard Dawkins – always in search of “ultimate” explanations – lamenting that 
reductionism has become a “dirty word” in academic circles (1982:113).  We cannot say 
that the New Atheists’ ideas are directly influenced by Comte, but his indirect influence 
as one of the preeminent figures in early positivist and empiricist philosophy is clear, and 
his way of thinking deeply permeated Western culture, particularly after Darwin.  Unlike 
some New Atheists, however, Comte did not go so far as to suggest that social 
phenomena are reducible to biological phenomena and argued instead that the social 
world required its own science, but his “social physics” was clearly informed by an 
underlying evolutionistic orientation that has given rise to a pattern of speculation 
repeated again and again since the Enlightenment.  
 Comte can thus be placed in the same camp as contemporary scientific atheists 
who consider religion a pseudo-scientific theory or explanation of natural phenomena.  
Indeed, he mused that supernatural religion was not only inevitable, but that it is 
surprising that “the mind of Man should have restrained as far as it did the tendency to 
illusion which was encouraged by the only theories then possible” (1961a: 650).  He and 
other like-minded “positivistic evolutionists” of this period “relegated the role of religion 
exclusively to the early stages of social development” (Parsons 1961:646), much like the 
New Atheists do today. Indeed, Comte’s ideas could be considered a proto-secularization 
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theory, outlining a teleological path of social evolution characterized by a gradual decline 
in religious belief, which is replaced by secular science.  The New Atheism is, in fact, 
very much a Comtean ideology of secularization, a point to which I will return in the 
following chapter. But in order to understand this ideology we must understand atheism’s 
historical relationship to evolution as a scientific theory; hence, we must understand the 
impact of Darwinism.    
 The publication of The Origin of Species in 1859 is not only one of the most 
significant events in the history of science, but perhaps also the most significant event in 
the history of atheism.  Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection was one 
of the most provocative and controversial ideas in human history, chiefly due to its 
implicit challenge to religious explanations of human origins.  This simple but 
astonishingly successful explanation of life had no need for invocation of the divine.  It 
was self-sufficient and for the first time provided an answer to the riddle of the existence 
of life that was for thousands of years answered with God, and thus provided atheism 
with an answer to the lacuna that had plagued it for centuries. Darwin’s theory not only 
challenged the argument from design but nullified it by providing a rational, evidence-
based alternative explanation of the appearance of design in life (Dawkins 1986).  Darwin 
himself notes the implications of his theory for the oldest argument for religion in his 
autobiography: “There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings, 
and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows” (2007: 
94).  Though he never called himself an atheist, he expressed an agnosticism that grew 
out of the implications of his theory of evolution, which provided new scientific 
grounding for atheism and the critique of religion (Irvine 1955). Darwin himself pointed 
to the implications of his theory for the understanding of religion, explaining it, like 
Comte, in evolutionary terms as an early attempt at explanation of nature:  
...the belief in unseen or spiritual agencies...seems to be almost 
universal... nor is it difficult to comprehend how it arose.  As soon as 
the important faculties of the imagination, wonder, and curiosity, 
together with some power of reasoning, had become partially 
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developed, man would naturally have craved to understand what was 
passing around him, and have vaguely speculated on his own existence 
(quoted in Dennett 2006:124).   
Darwin, a shy and chronically ill recluse, rarely spoke publicly and instead left the 
defence of his highly controversial theory in the public sphere mainly to Thomas Huxley, 
who would become famous for, among other things, coining the term “agnosticism”, and 
gaining a reputation as “Darwin’s bulldog” by arguing vigorously on behalf of Darwin’s 
theory. Huxley and a handful of others took to defending and promoting the theory of 
evolution in the academy and in the more inclusive public sphere, and “effectively 
collaborated to take over the scientific establishment, with the goal of enthroning 
naturalism as the ideology of science and science as the mainspring of modern society” 
(Larson 2006: 108).  Darwin’s theory, of course, met with resistance from religious 
authorities (as well as dissenters from the scientific community), and this coupled with 
the fact that the Biblical account of the creation and significance of human beings 
contradicted evolution led some early Darwinists to engage in a public conflict with 
religious ideas. This conflict still shapes the discourse of the New Atheism today.    
It is crucial to note that for these early Darwinists, the theory of evolution was not 
simply a scientific fact that needed to be defended against irrational forces that would 
seek to discredit it.  The theory of evolution was, from the beginning, tied to a certain 
political orientation.  Darwin was born into a wealthy family of capitalists and scientists 
(Browne 2006).  This socialization proved determinative of his character and political 
views, which in turn were instructive in the development of his scientific theory, which 
was informed by a worldview informed by liberalism, individualism, and laissez-faire 
capitalism, and the right of individuals to pursue their self-interest in a freely competitive 
society (Desmond and Moore 1991).  Soon after its publication, Huxley declared Origin 
of Species to be a gun in the armory of liberalism, the most effective new weapon for 
attacking superstitious beliefs and thus promoting rational materialism (Larson 2006).   
Evolution was clearly not politically neutral in the minds of its defenders.  Rather, 
the idea was tied to liberalism and rationalism and used to promote modern goals and 
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values, and thus transcended science to become a cornerstone of the political ideology of 
the Victorian liberal intelligentsia (Jones 1980).  Indeed, many scholars agree that 
Darwin’s theory not only validated his political views, but that the theory itself was a 
product of Victorian culture, with Darwin early in his scientific career committing 
himself to a theory of nature that reflected the Malthusian socio-economic inclinations of 
British high society.  In this view, the theory of natural selection was a contingent result 
of social history, rather than an inevitable conclusion (Radick 2009).  As atheism became 
tied to the theory of evolution, it moved from simple negation of religious beliefs to an 
affirmation of liberalism, scientific rationality, and the legitimacy of the institutions and 
methodology of modern science – and thus from religious criticism to a complete 
ideological system. 
In addition to linking evolution with liberalism and capitalism, Darwinists found 
in the theory support for the idea of Western Europe as the world’s most advanced (or 
highly-evolved) society.  The theory of evolution thus took on enormous significance 
outside the realm of science, shaping the social and political thought of the day (Budd 
1977).  To this extent, it became as much an instrument of conservative political ideology 
as it was an instrument of liberalism.  This is most clear in the example of Herbert 
Spencer, who drew on both Darwinian and Lamarckian ideas for his conception of social 
evolution.  In Spencer’s social theory, evolution defines the stages that a society passes 
through (Wiltshire 1978).  The mechanism that drives this process is natural selection, or 
competition between the more and less “fit” members of society: “Society advances 
where its fittest members are allowed to assert their fitness with the least hindrance, and 
where the least fitted are not artificially prevented from dying out” (Spencer 1965: 81).  
In this sentence we see Spencer’s radical laissez-faire individualism (Gondermann 2007) 
and a warning against the danger posed to the advancement of society by welfare state 
programs and support for the poor, all with the legitimacy provided by a scientific theory. 
While Spencer did not concentrate on religious criticism and was not directly involved in 
the development of atheism, he was directly involved in the development of 
evolutionistic social theories. His view of religion was firmly in line with that of both 
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Comte and Darwin, which is clear in this statement: “Religions that are diametrically 
opposite in their dogmas agree in tacitly recognizing that the world, with all it contains 
and all that surrounds it, is a mystery seeking an explanation” (quoted in Durkheim, 
1995: 22). Religion, then, is a false explanation of nature, and both Spencer and Comte 
believed that social evolution and the rise of science would bring an end to religion.  
It is important to note that this idea of progressive social evolution, with its vision 
of a “natural unfolding of social complexity” (Dunbar 2007: 32), is predicated upon a 
misreading of Darwin, who viewed evolution as a process with no fixed direction, and 
invoked the metaphor of a “radiating bush” to describe adaptation and differentiation  
(Dunbar 2007: 31).  For Spencer, who inflected biological evolution with his own 
prejudices and politics, evolution was a journey down a singular line of improvement, 
and the key to this improvement was creating the conditions whereby the fittest could 
flourish, and would not be hindered by the lesser elements in society.  With Spencer, 
evolution moved from liberal-rationalist ideology to what would become known as Social 
Darwinism, a political ideology modeled after the conditions of survival in nature – it is, 
in short, society red in tooth and claw.  In many circles, scientific and otherwise, atheism 
became intertwined with this ideology, even though Darwin himself considered atheism 
to be an untenable position and instead preferred to refer to himself as an agnostic 
(Desmond and Moore 1991).   
Despite Darwin’s reservations, the theory of evolution meant for some that 
science was able to complete the break from religion instigated by the Scientific 
Revolution and a contemporaneous revolution in theology, now having an explanation of 
the origin of life to supplement the explanation of the cosmos.  The atheism of the 
Victorian Darwinists, constituted by this explanatory model of religion, as well as 
political liberalism and a defence of the Enlightenment principles of progress, 
universalism, and scientific-rationalism, is what I call scientific atheism.  It carries on the 
cognitive critique, focusing on the irrationality of religious beliefs, with the expectation 
that the lights of reason would eliminate the darkness of religious ignorance and 
superstition.  It emerged out of the dialectic described by Buckley, which, in the 
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Victorian period following Darwin’s theory of the origin of life, culminated in the view 
that science had replaced religion as the explanation of the material world, and that 
modern scientific society must reject religion (Segal 2004). With science claiming sole 
right to explanation of nature, critique of religion was in essence a rejection of 
worldviews that stood in the way of the legitimation and institutionalization of modern 
scientific methods.   
It is crucial to again point out that scientific atheism was not restricted to those in 
the fields of the natural sciences.  Thinkers in the fields of sociology and anthropology 
also took to positing religion as a lower stage in the evolution of humanity, such as in 
Comte’s Law of Three Stages.  E.B. Tylor shared the scientific atheist view of religion as 
a pseudo-scientific hypothesis (what Richard Dawkins [2006] calls the “God 
Hypothesis”) and believed that religion’s function is the same as that of science: to 
account for events in the material world (Segal 2004).  It is equally important to note that 
not all Darwinists took the Spencerian view of progressive evolution, and that scientific 
atheists in the Darwinian tradition today – Richard Dawkins is the prime example – are 
inclined to warp the theory of natural selection to fit their own particular visions of social 
progress. These facts taken together tell us that scientific atheism is not a necessary 
consequence of a Darwinian worldview, but rather an ideology that uses “evolution” and 
“natural selection” as metaphors in the advancement of what is in fact a deeply political 
position.   
 
From Heaven to Earth 
 The atheist defenders of Darwin, emboldened by the revolutionary theory of 
evolution by natural selection and the answer it provided to the argument from design, 
extended and refined the Enlightenment tradition of religious criticism, most importantly 
the cognitive critique.  At the same time, another revolution in thought was taking place, 
one founded on the notion that the cognitive critique did not account for the non-rational 
forces that cause belief in God. This revolution produced what David Berman (1988) 
calls the “anthropological approach” to criticism of religion, which steers atheism away 
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from ontological questions concerning God’s existence.  Instead, thinkers in this tradition 
assumed God’s non-existence, focusing their attention on the question of why people 
believe in God and how that belief is sustained despite the revelations of science.  If the 
‘light’ of reason and science failed to illuminate the ‘darkness’ of religion – if people 
continued to believe even after Newton, Darwin, and the rationalist philosophers – then 
ignorance alone could not explain the motivations and causes for religious beliefs.   
 This move might be understood as a departure from scientific atheism, which is a 
denial of the existence of God and the refutation of religious (as opposed to scientific) 
explanations of nature, and toward an approach that shifted focus from ‘nature’ to 
‘humanity’, as nineteenth century atheism directed its energy toward ennobling humanity 
rather than attacking the irrationality of religion (Buckley 2004). The atheism of the 19th 
century anthropological approach to criticism, and subsequent criticism rooted in this 
tradition – which understands religion as a social and psychological phenomenon and 
emerged from the social and human sciences – may therefore be called humanistic 
atheism. This approach surfaced largely as a response to discontent with the promise of 
the Enlightenment that modernity would lead to greater prosperity for all, as well as a 
recognition that the rationalist cognitive critique of religion did nothing to address the 
non-rational sources of religious belief, which include alienation, suffering, infantile 
neurosis and insecurity, and fear of death. It understood God as a projection of alienation 
and suffering, thereby centering humanity and its earthly interests, rather than theological 
constructions of God and the supernatural realm, as the object of inquiry. Its origin may 
be traced to Ludwig Feuerbach, while Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund 
Freud are the other major pioneers in this tradition.  Of these four, only Marx could be 
considered a true social scientist, while the others come from the perspectives of 
philosophy and psychology, but all took account of the social in their theories of religion.  
It may seem a strange collection, and indeed this is a very diverse group of thinkers.  
Nonetheless, these four are representatives of a turn in atheist thought toward a 
conception of religion as a product of the human/social condition, rather than an outdated 
from of pseudo-scientific knowledge or simple ignorance. There are, of course, many 
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others from this period who take similar approaches.  These are the four Berman (1988) 
identifies as the most significant, and indeed, in terms of both scholarly and general 
influence, it is difficult to imagine a more significant trio than Marx, Freud, and 
Nietzsche. Feuerbach, meanwhile, was a precursor to all three, and was particularly 
influential in the development of Marx’s views.   
Feuerbach’s contribution to the development of atheism was the notion of God as 
projection of the human onto the divine, which is a projection of alienation: “Religion is 
the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself” 
(Feuerbach 1957: 33).  That is, everything that is great about God is alienated from 
humanity.  Feuerbach considers this act of projection and what it reveals about the human 
condition the true, anthropological essence of Christianity, while rejecting its theological 
claims as a “false essence” (Feuerbach 1957). His project was thus to repair the division 
with the human by revealing the secret or ‘true’ essence of religion, which is that it is not 
God that is worshipped, but humanity alienated from itself.   
This philosophical project seeks to reclaim the divine properties for humanity; 
hence the basis of Feuerbach’s atheism is not a scientific-rationalist discrediting 
theological claims, but rather a recognition of the essentially human character of God.  
With this recognition established, he declares that “By his God thou knowest the man, 
and by the man his God; the two are identical” (Feuerbach 1957: 12), an insight that led 
him to a different kind of approach to religion that involved turning theology into 
anthropology.  Feuerbach believed that in order to understand (and effectively critique) 
religion we must understand the conditions of life that give rise to it. Hence, he sought to 
replace the science of God with the science of Man (Hyman 2007).  This shift in 
emphasis, from theological claims to the human condition, and from an understanding of 
religion as false explanation of nature to one that considers it a social phenomenon, is the 
essence of humanistic atheism. This approach was adopted by Marx, who reconfigured 
Feuerbach’s theory by defining more precisely the nature of the human experience that 
resulted in the projection of God – that is, alienation.   
 Marx sought to to expose the distorting ideas about social life within religion and 
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the underlying interests sustaining it, and argued that religion could not be analytically 
separated from the social world it resides in (Beckford 1989).  In his analysis religion 
could not somehow be siphoned off from social context, and in particular the material 
conditions of social life. For him religion is an ideological manifestation of alienation, or 
an expression of, and protest against, earthly human suffering. Roughly speaking, he 
echoed Feuerbach’s theory of God as projected alienation: “The basis of irreligious 
criticism is: man makes religion, religion does not make man.  Religion, indeed, is the 
self-consciousness and the self-esteem of the man who has not yet found himself or who 
has already lost himself” (Marx 1983: 115).  The alienated self, buried by oppressive 
conditions, is projected onto the divine figure, which in turn promises relief from this 
oppression in the next world.   
Marx’s description of religion as the “opium of the people” and “the heart of a 
heartless world” (1983: 115-116) serves to elucidate what Feuerbach meant by the “true” 
anthropological essence of religion as opposed to the “false” theological essence.  
Religion is true not in its theological claims, but in the sense that it is a real expression 
and manifestation of the human experience of oppression and suffering; thus, the critique 
of religion is really the critique of an unjust and oppressive world, and “the critique of 
heaven turns into the critique of earth” (Marx 1983: 116).  Marx insists that if the world 
were recreated according to his socialist vision it would have a heart of its own, and 
religion would be reduced to a vestigial organ of an oppressive social body, eventually to 
be left in the dustbin of history along with capitalism.  He agreed with Feuerbach that the 
elimination of religion is necessary for human beings to be restored to their humanity, 
and by extension this requires the end of alienation, which is at the heart of religious 
faith: “The criticism of religion ends in the teaching that man is the highest being for 
man, hence in the categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which man 
is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being” (Marx 1983: 119).    
Marx diverges from the Enlightenment tradition in his outline of the method for 
the abolishment of religion, claiming that when the oppressive conditions that necessitate 
religious belief are transformed, the comforting illusion of religion will no longer be 
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necessary and it will simply disappear – the ideology vanishes as its material foundation 
crumbles.  While scientific atheism focuses on rational-scientific education and analysis 
of religion’s transcendent ideas, Marx pointed out that this would do nothing to transform 
the earthly social relations that constitute their foundation.  He argued that the strategy of 
rational deliberation was bound to fail because it did not address this true essence of 
religion. Hence, just as Feuerbach wanted to turn the science of God into the science of 
Man by “resolving the religious world into its secular basis” (Marx 2002: 183), Marx 
similarly argued that the critique of heaven necessarily becomes the critique of Earth.  He 
notes that “Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence”, while 
adding that this is not an individual abstraction, but rather ‘the ensemble of the social 
relations’ (Marx 2002: 183).  The point of emphasis is therefore not enlightenment, but 
social transformation.  
This shift in perspective reflects a new understanding of the essence of religion, 
moving well beyond simply pointing out that Judeo-Christian doctrine is at odds with 
modern science, and particularly an evolutionary account of the origins of human life.  
Marx’s thought on religion signals a progressive development in atheist thought, moving 
from rational-scientific refutation of theology to consideration of religion as a social 
phenomenon, including its sources and its social and political consequences.  It also 
signals a point of divergence among different schools of atheist thought.  The Darwinists 
continued the project of the emancipation of science that originally gave birth to atheism, 
and specifically sought to establish scientific hegemony within the academy and 
employed evolutionary biology as a strategy to this effect (Fuller 2006) while virtually 
ignoring Marx’s more sociological and anthropological brand of criticism.   
Like Marx, Freud described religion as an illusion, and though the specifics of 
this are quite different, these thinkers do share an understanding of the essential value of 
religion to the believer.  Religious illusions, for both thinkers, are in part a mechanism for 
coping with suffering and the harsh realities of life.  Freud located the roots of this 
illusion not in the material conditions of production, but in something much less tangible: 
the human unconscious.  He conceives of the religious believer as a fearful and 
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wondering child; helpless, afraid, and ignorant of the nature of the world, which appears 
before him as a terrifying and threatening place.  He paints a portrait of humans desperate 
for some measure of control over the forces of nature which to them are so terrifying.  
This is only possible if nature is controlled by an anthropomorphic figure who can be 
influenced, and the result is the idea of God, master and creator of all of nature, who can 
be cajoled to prevent volcanic eruptions, droughts, hurricanes, and pestilence, to name 
just a few of his limitless powers (Freud 1989b: 20-21).   
This helplessness experienced by the adult in relation to nature experienced is 
much like the helplessness experienced by the child in relation to his parents (Freud 
1989b: 21).  Putting these two elements together – the helplessness against nature and 
infantile helplessness – we get a picture of religion as  
the system of doctrines and promises which on the one hand explains to 
him the riddles of this world with enviable completeness, and, on the 
other, assures him that a careful Providence will watch over his life and 
will compensate him in a future existence for any frustrations he suffers 
here.  The common man cannot imagine this Providence otherwise than in 
the figure of an enormously exalted father (Freud 1989a: 22).   
Here Freud complements the explanatory view of religion with a psychoanalytic account 
of the adoption of these beliefs.  In this respect he diverges from scientific atheism, which 
is not influenced by humanistic considerations but concentrates entirely on the conflict 
between the factual claims of science and religion.  At the same time, his empiricism and 
derision of non-scientific explanations of reality, including his attitude regarding religion 
as a failed ancient explanation of natural processes analogous to Dawkins’ (2006) God 
Hypothesis – does raise echoes of scientific atheism so clear that it is stunning that the 
contemporary New Atheists utterly ignore Freud’s contribution to atheism.   
While the notion of religion as irrational, infantile wish fulfillment dominates 
discussion of Freud’s work on religion, another crucial aspect of his thought on the issue 
is often overlooked.  This is the place of the adult’s experience of oppression and 
suffering in civilization, that state of affairs that guarantees humans a certain degree of 
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security and protection from harm in exchange for a renunciation of our most anti-social 
instincts and a submission to external authority, which results in a general unhappiness 
(Freud 1989a).  While civilization in any form is bound to result in repression and 
psychic discontent, for which religion is a remedy, the problem is exacerbated by the 
particular configuration of civilization we are presented with, which is characterized by 
exploitation and oppression.  Here a link to Marx emerges, revealing a common 
understanding of the source of religion’s value to the believer.  Like Marx, Freud sees in 
the concepts of God and heaven a means of coping with Earthly injustice through the 
promise of divine justice: “In the end all good is rewarded and all evil punished, if not 
actually in this form of life then in the later existences that begin after death.  In this way 
all the terrors, the sufferings and the hardships of life are destined to be obliterated” 
(1989b: 24). Like Marx, then, Freud directs criticism away from ontological questions of 
God’s existence and toward the social and psychological conditions of life.  
Another pioneer of humanistic atheism is the self-declared anti-humanist, 
Friedrich Nietzsche.  His philosophy rejects any epistemology of transcendence or 
universality.  His famous declaration that “God is dead” (Nietzsche 1974: 167) is not, of 
course, a statement of fact about God’s existence.  Rather, Nietzsche here refers to the 
condition of modernity, characterized by skepticism, transformation, and recognition of 
the possibility of self-determination. That is, the notion of the death of God refers to the 
end of “belief in any sort of absolute centre or unshakable foundation” (Caputo 2007: 
270).  It is a necessary step in the evolution of man, where man is a step between animal 
and Ubermensch, when humanity itself, rather than a distant God, becomes the meaning 
of Earth (Ansell-Pearson 1994: 138).  Here we see a link between Nietzsche and 
Feuerbach’s theory of God as projected alienated humanity.  That is, man cannot become 
Ubermensch – master of himself and creator of his own truth and morality – until God, 
the universalizing and alienating foundation of truth and morality, is ‘dead’.   
Nietzsche takes a position not so alien from scientific atheism to the extent that he 
believes that faith robs people of their own capacity for understanding, instead forcing 
them to rely on the church to explain, and provide meaning to, their existence, deepening 
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their dependence on clergy.  At the same time, he takes a humanistic approach to his 
conception of the suffering that is at the heart of religious belief: “Man shall not look 
around him, he shall look down into himself; he shall not look prudently and cautiously 
into things in order to learn, he shall not look at all: he shall suffer…And he shall suffer 
in such a way that he has need of the priest at all times” (Nietzsche 2003: 177).  He 
describes religion as an illusion constructed as an escape from reality: “it is the 
expression of a profound discontent with the actual…But that explains everything.  Who 
alone has reason to lie himself out of actuality?  He who suffers from it” (Nietzsche 2003: 
137). 
In this sense Nietzsche can be placed in line with Marx and Freud in their 
diagnosis of religion as both an expression of suffering and compensation for it.  This 
idea is expressed most forcefully in his disdain for Christian morality, which for 
Nietzsche is nothing other than a slave morality, with the oppressed living by a moral 
code that legitimates their oppression and encourages their passivity and submission to 
powerful rulers, impeding the progress toward a higher “master” morality of self-
determination (Kaufmann 1974: 371).   This sentiment is voiced by Zarathustra, who says 
he has “often laughed at the weaklings who thought themselves good because they had no 
claws” (Nietzsche 1966:118).  In Nietzsche’s view, “slaves” accept a God of consolation 
and belief in future happiness in the afterlife, which eliminates (or at least tempers) the 
motivation to revolt and seek earthly justice by promising a much more meaningful 
divine justice to come (Salaquarda 1996).  For Nietzsche, then, as for Marx, religion turns 
our attention away from what is really important, which is human social relations, and 
toward the appeasement of a supernatural deity who has the power to end our suffering if 
only we are prepared to submit to his will – which, of course, is really the will of 
powerful clerics.  The biggest difference between these thinkers is perhaps in their 
attitude toward the oppressed.  Marx is clearly empathetic, while Nietzsche derides the 
weak masses beguiled by the Christian slave morality, and Freud is equally contemptuous 
of the majority who are mired in an infantile fantasy and “will never be able to rise above 
this view of life” (Freud 1989b: 22).   
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Two Atheisms: Scientific and Humanistic 
 This brief overview indicates that atheism cannot be reduced to one single all-
encompassing definition. There are actually (at least) two atheisms, one scientific and one 
humanistic.  These atheist ideologies both grow and diverge from Enlightenment 
rationalism, which in turn developed its critiques in response to a contradiction within 
theology arising from the dialectical relationship between religion and science in early 
modernity.  We find, then, that atheism has evolved like a radiating bush, borrowing 
Darwin’s own analogy.  New forms have arisen in response to social upheavals and 
changing conditions of knowledge, with intellectual revolutions in the natural and social 
sciences in the 19th century, and their accompanying political dimensions, producing the 
two major atheist ideologies.   
 The first type, scientific atheism, is defined by its denial of the existence of God 
and its understanding of religion as an ancient myth or superstition that developed in the 
absence of a scientific understanding of the material basis of natural phenomena.  It 
involves a rejection of any truth claims not amenable to rational or empirical verification 
(for example, religious revelation) and a claim that science and reason constitute the only 
legitimate path to knowledge regarding natural processes.  This view may be described as 
scientism, or the idea that science (referring specifically to the natural sciences) sets the 
boundaries for what can be known about reality, and that no aspect of physical or social 
life is outside of its domain (Stenmark 1997).  Scientific atheism therefore places 
emphasis on one major element of the Enlightenment critique of religion, the cognitive 
critique, which situates religion as the binary opposite of science and a contradiction of 
reason.  This strategy seeks to eradicate religious belief through rational-scientific 
critique of its tenets and truth claims, thus ending the ‘darkness’ of religious superstition 
by shining the ‘light’ of reason.   
While these features can all be considered aspects of Enlightenment criticism, 
what makes scientific atheism unique is the role of the concept of evolution in this 
ideology, both in its general influence in the intellectual sphere, and particularly in its 
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Darwinian incarnation.  Indeed, scientific atheism arose in tandem with the defence of the 
theory of evolution by natural selection and against objections from conservative 
religious quarters, and Darwinism became a case for the emancipation of science from 
religious authority.  It thereby coincided with the cause of liberalism, conceived as 
individual freedom as well as the imperative that collective decision making should 
proceed from rational deliberations and examination of scientific knowledge.  The view 
that this system of government would result in greater prosperity for all was based on the 
belief that social progress is contingent on scientific progress. A stronger version of 
scientific atheism, represented by Spencer and influenced by Comte, implies that 
civilization is an evolutionary process driven by science and reason, and that religion is 
therefore an impediment to social progress.  
While a distinction between scientific and humanistic atheism should be 
recognized, these are mutually exclusive lines of criticism.  Indeed, Freud and even 
Nietzsche at moments sound very much like rationalists in their critiques of the dogma of 
faith.  The point is that the humanistic atheists took the scientific position for granted and 
advanced toward a more sophisticated mode of engagement. The irrationality of faith, 
and the limitations and contradictions within modern theology, were only a starting point 
for Marx, Feuerbach, Freud, and Nietzsche, who sought to understand the historical, 
social, and psychological forces that generate and sustain these irrational beliefs.  In so 
doing they turned their attention away from the cognitive critique (since it was taken for 
granted that religions are myths, as in Feuerbach’s notion of religion’s “false theological 
essence”) and toward the two dimensions of Enlightenment religious criticism more 
relevant to the social sciences and humanities: the practical-political and moral-subjective 
critiques. In a certain sense, humanistic atheism is truer to Enlightenment criticism than 
scientific atheism, which focuses on the cognitive critique at the expense of the other two 
approaches.   
Feuerbach and Marx viewed religion as a legitimating ideology for a particular 
social formation and a conservative force quelling the motivation to revolt against earthly 
injustice by promising divine justice. Nietzsche took issue with the Christian “slave 
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morality” that made a virtue out of the submission to powerful rulers. Freud, meanwhile, 
viewed religion as an infantile fantasy, with the figure of God as a benevolent father and 
expression of humanity’s impotence with respect to nature and social injustices.  These 
thinkers positioned religion as a social and psychological phenomenon that responds to 
human experiences, rather than a mistaken pseudo-scientific hypothesis pertaining to the 
natural world.  In this view religion cannot be eradicated with science education, since 
religion is not in the first place an attempt at doing science or explaining nature.  Rather, 
the human experience that is manifest in religious beliefs and practices, and which these 
beliefs and practices in turn legitimate, is the object of criticism.  The vicious circle of 
oppression and legitimation cannot be broken by rational critique, in this view, because 
this does nothing to address religion’s material and social foundations.  Humanistic 
atheism insists that in order for religion to vanish, the conditions of life that sustain it, and 
that it in turn legitimates, must be transformed – hence Marx’s view that the critique of 
heaven must become the critique of Earth. An important implication of this perspective is 
that, because religion is a manifestation of the human experience, it is best understood 
from the perspective of the human sciences, broadly conceived to include the social 
sciences (including psychology) and humanities.  
Aside from their position on the nature and origin of religious beliefs, the major 
distinction between these two ideologies is in their politics.  In scientific atheism, society 
advances in lockstep with science, and this advancement is threatened and limited by 
religious ignorance.  There is no embedded social critique, but rather, an implicit 
assumption that social progress is a fact and that religion is the main obstacle to 
overcome.  Humanistic atheism has a very different perspective, namely, that it is not 
religion, but society itself that is the problem.  Religion is a manifestation of what is 
fundamentally wrong with the social structure.  While it also poses religion as a response 
to existential crisis and individual psychology, humanistic atheism first and foremost 
posits that minimizing suffering and maximizing well-being and fulfillment in life are the 
only thing likely to make religion vanish.  This means that the social order must be 
questioned and transformed, a position that sets humanistic atheism apart from the more 
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conservative laissez-faire liberalism of scientific atheism.  In short, the distinction is this: 
scientific atheism seeks to release modernity from religious shackles, while humanistic 
atheism questions the foundations of modernity itself and seeks to resolve the inequities 
that characterize it.  
 In the 20th century both forms of atheism became highly politicized and were 
involved in major social, political, and cultural transformations. Other kinds of atheism 
emerged and garnered some interest, notably existentialism, which enjoyed a period of 
popularity, but its influence was not as great or as durable as the others. In this period the 
most important strands of atheist thought were scientific atheism and Marxism, or at least 
these were the two that had the greatest impact on society. In terms of the social 
significance of atheism in the 20th century, the major example is the Soviet Union, which 
ostensibly took up Marx’s dictum that religion is an ideology of oppression and class 
society, and thus sought to eradicate it. Interestingly, early Soviet anti-religious activity 
involved a strategy of enlightenment employed primarily through a propaganda campaign 
that focused on rational and scientific proofs against the existence of God (Peris 1998). 
This was the subject of great debate and created divisions within the highest ranks of the 
Communist Party, but generally enlightenment was the favoured strategy, ironically 
defying the Marxian idea that social transformation would make enlightenment on the 
question of religion superfluous. Nonetheless, the purported atheism of the Soviet Union 
was a manifestation and expression of the politicized atheism of Marxism. The project of 
rapid secularization in the Soviet Union was largely a failure and the masses defiantly 
held to their religious beliefs despite their supposed liberation from oppression, a massive 
propaganda campaign, and fear of persecution (Peris 1998; Froese 2004).  It is perhaps 
the connection to the oppression and violence within the Soviet Union and other 
communist nations (particularly China) that has left the Marxist atheist tradition in ruins, 
even if in practice these nations generally did not meet the condition of the eradication of 
oppression which Marx’s theory was predicated upon. In other instances, such as in Latin 
America, religion itself was an emancipative force that united masses in revolution, quite 
the opposite role from that which Marx relegated it to. Religion there was indeed the sigh 
 
 
47 
of the oppressed, but hardly the opium of the people.   
Scientific atheism and its relationship with evolution also played an important 
role in 20th century history.  particularly in the United States, where scientists and 
educators have been defending their practices against attack from religious quarters – 
though the religious would surely also claim to be under siege by science and secularism 
– since John Scopes was prosecuted and convicted in Dayton, Tennessee in 1926 for 
violating a new law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools. This case – 
popularly known as the “Monkey Trial” in reference to the notion that humans and apes 
share common ancestors – famously pitted celebrated defence attorney and avowed 
atheist Clarence Darrow against prosecutor William Jennings Bryan, political populist 
and “America’s foremost champion of Christian government” (Larson 2006: 212). In a 
dramatic twist, Darrow cross-examined Bryan, one of the prosecutors, and the trial 
became a seminal event in American cultural, scientific, and legal history. Darrow’s cool 
(and often scathing) rationalism represented the Darwinist side of the debate, while 
Bryan’s evangelical defence of revealed religion represented the voice of conservative 
Christianity.   
Scopes was convicted of breaking the law, but in the court of public opinion 
Darrow was perhaps the victor, with Bryan repeatedly confounded by Darrow’s questions 
requiring him to defend inconsistencies within scripture.  By the time they got through 
the first few verses of Genesis some newspapers had taken to ridiculing Bryan, though 
his “impassioned objections made anti-evolutionism all but an article of faith among 
conservative American Christians” (Larson 2006: 217).  Obviously both sides claimed 
victory, and the trial had the lasting effect of polarizing both sides of the debate and 
setting the stage for a century of political struggle between religious “creationists” on the 
one hand and scientific rationalists and secularists on the other. This struggle has largely 
played out on the issue of public education, and in 2006 a second “Monkey Trial” took 
place in Dover, Pennsylvania, where this time it was secularists who mounted a 
successful challenge against the teaching of “intelligent design” theory in public schools, 
which the presiding judge ruled was equivalent to religious instruction and thus 
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prohibited from state education by the constitution. Most importantly, it was in this trial 
that atheism and Darwinism were permanently fused in the American context.  Among 
many conservative American Christians, believing in evolution is tantamount to denying 
God, hence the rejection of the theory that constitutes the foundation of the science of 
biology and that, for most people in the Western world and almost all scientists, is simply 
a scientific fact.  
 
The Four Horsemen: Scientific Atheism in the 21st Century 
The Scopes trial was one of the most important events in the politicization of 
atheism (certainly the scientific version). This politicization was, however, largely 
restricted to the United States, where science frequently found itself under attack from 
religion, while in Western Europe scientists faced no similar interference from the church 
or religious activists.  Highly politicized atheism returned with renewed vigor in the 
infancy of the 21st century with the emergence of the New Atheism and its celebrated 
leaders, and an increasingly vocal and radical secular public, particularly in the United 
Kingdom and North America.  This “New Atheism” was new only in the extent of its 
impact in the public sphere, where debates regarding religion and its relationship to 
science suddenly became common features in mass media. Its discourse on science and 
religion, on the other hand, is quite familiar, reflecting the same debates that shaped 
scientific atheism in the 19th century.  
The New Atheists would be at home in the Victorian context from which 
scientific atheism emerged.  Indeed, two of the most famous New Atheists are British, 
and the growing Muslim population in Great Britain and western Europe more generally 
is an important factor in their emergence, though the events of September 11, 2001 and 
their cultural and political aftershocks – most importantly the expanding influence and 
audacity of the Christian Right, dedicated opponent of Darwinism, as well as escalating 
rhetoric and violence from Islamic extremists – are the key factors.  But the social and 
intellectual roots of the movement are found in 19th century England and the debates 
concerning Darwin’s theory of evolution.  Their arguments differ from those of their 19th 
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century predecessors mainly in the sophistication brought to the theory of evolution by 
the Modern Synthesis that united Darwinian natural selection with genetics and 
molecular biology (Larson 2006), and more importantly in the addition of theories 
derived from the emerging fields of evolutionary psychology and neuroscience.  Drawing 
on these new sciences, the New Atheists craft a vision of religion not only as pre-
scientific explanation – what Richard Dawkins (2006) refers to as the “God hypothesis” – 
but as a natural phenomenon.  This means that religion is produced by natural forces 
rather than social forces, and these can be understood by recourse to evolutionary theory, 
applied to both culture and individual psychology.  Their evolutionistic theories treat 
religion strictly as belief – there is little to no accounting of the social nature of religious 
practice.   
 The Atheist Alliance International Convention in September 2007 was a 
watershed event in the recent history of atheism.  It was the first time that the four writers 
who would collectively come to represent an intellectual wave known as the New 
Atheism – that is, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher 
Hitchens – appeared at the same event.  This was the New Atheism as its wave of 
popularity was cresting, with Hitchens publishing his entry in the canon that year, and the 
three others releasing titles the year prior.  The event was co-organized by the Richard 
Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science (RDFRS), and Dawkins took the 
opportunity of their appearances at the convention to bring all these writers together in a 
more informal setting to talk about their views on religion, atheism, and critical responses 
to their work. The conversation was released on DVD by RDFRS under the title The 
Four Horsemen, the moniker that had popularly been applied to these most prominent of 
contemporary advocates of atheism, referring to the infamous Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse of the book of Revelation.    
 Sam Harris has the distinction of publishing the first New Atheism text, The End 
of Faith, in 2004, following it up in 2006 with Letter to a Christian Nation, addressed 
specifically to American Christian fundamentalists. These books are a call to arms for 
what Harris believes is an unavoidable battle: science and reason versus the forces of 
 
 
50 
faith and superstition, with devastating consequences should the former fail.  The End of 
Faith today reads very much like a fevered response to 9/11 in its discussions of the 
West’s engagement with Islam as a clash of civilizations, with one representing 
Enlightenment and moral progress, and the other representing barbarism.  At the time it 
was published Harris held a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Stanford University, 
but no other significant credentials, though he has since completed a PhD in 
Neuroscience at UCLA.  The book defied expectations for a critical work on religion 
from an unknown author by achieving bestseller status and winning the PEN award for 
non-fiction.   
Harris tapped into post-9/11 anxiety concerning Islam and the West’s relationship 
with the Middle East directly and effectively, which perhaps accounts for the unexpected 
and overwhelming success of the book. A good example of his approach is a passage in 
which he warns that, should an Islamist regime gain control of nuclear weapons, “the 
only thing likely to ensure our survival may be a nuclear first strike of our own” (2004: 
129).  The apocalyptic fervour and frequency with which Harris prognosticates on such 
scenarios was no doubt a source of his appeal in a historical and cultural milieu that 
stoked the flames of Islamophobia.  Harris is also a polished writer, skilled at crafting 
seductive arguments for a mass audience amenable to his point of view.  He employs 
limit-case examples of religious extremism as his primary rhetorical technique, exploiting 
his audience’s fears while ostensibly appealing to their rational faculties.  His success is 
therefore not accidental or incomprehensible, though had he written the book a decade 
earlier it likely would have slipped silently into the cracks of bookstore shelves.   
Despite being the first text in the New Atheism ‘canon’ and a bestseller and PEN 
award winner, The End of Faith is not the most important text in this canon, and on its 
own would likely not have initiated the atheist movement that we know today.  That 
distinction clearly belongs to Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, a phenomenal 
bestseller that launched a period of unprecedented mass media attention devoted to 
atheist commentators.  Dawkins is the de facto leader of the New Atheism.  Before 
becoming the world’s most famous and vocal atheist he was an evolutionary biologist 
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who held a professorship in zoology at Berkeley in the late 1960s before taking a position 
as lecturer, and later reader, at Oxford.  Dawkins garnered international recognition both 
inside and outside the academy with the publication of The Selfish Gene in 1976, where 
he sought to explain his gene-centred theory of evolution by natural selection to a mass 
audience.  His ability to clearly convey complicated scientific principles to a general 
audience made him a successful author of popular science, and in 1995 he was awarded 
the first Simonyi Professorship for the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford 
University, a position he retired from in 2008.   
Dawkins’ reputation as a public intellectual, then, was established well before he 
embarked on his new career as advocate for atheism.  He rather suddenly went from a 
mostly gentle defender of science to a fierce critic of religion with the broadcast of a two-
part television documentary in 2006 called Root Of All Evil?  The film follows Dawkins 
in conversation with Islamists and Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem, attending a clandestine 
gathering of atheists in Colorado, and interviewing Ted Haggard, then president of the 
National Association of Evangelicals.1  It was followed by the publication of The God 
Delusion, the success of which ignited a heated public debate about the place of religion 
in the West, and made Dawkins a celebrity.  The book was not an unforeseeable move for 
Dawkins, who had already made attacking “intelligent design” (the ‘scientific’ version of 
biblical creationism) a priority in his public lectures and writings, notably in The Blind 
Watchmaker (1986).  A book attacking religion, the foundation of intelligent design, was 
a logical step given his trajectory.  It stands as the key text of the contemporary atheist 
movement, and was a significant cultural event in its own right.  As of January 2010 the 
book had sold over two million copies in English alone, with many more sold throughout 
Europe (Dawkins himself reported at this same time that the German edition had sold 
over 260,000 copies).2 
The God Delusion is primarily a sustained argument that “God almost certainly 
does not exist”, while also exploring the topics of religion’s harmful social and 
psychological effects, and a Darwinian theory of the origin and purpose of religious 
belief.  Dawkins treats God as a natural entity amenable to scientific investigation, 
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precisely because he adopts a position of scientific materialism, or the view that 
“everything that exists (life, mind, morality, religion, and so on) can be completely 
explained in terms of matter or physical nature” (Stenmark 1997: 24). That is, Dawkins 
believes that anything that exists must exist within nature, and that there is no object of 
inquiry that lies outside the boundaries of science.  What is ostensibly an examination of 
the nature of religious belief, then, is actually a polemic on the merits of the scientific 
method and its universal applicability.  
 In general, the most important theme in Dawkins’ many writings, lectures, and 
films about religion actually has little to do with religion itself; rather, his most pressing 
issue is his vigorous promotion of science and particularly evolutionary theory, with 
natural selection serving as his God-of-the-gaps.  The theme of the 2009 AAI convention, 
presented in conjunction with Dawkins’ Foundation for Reason and Science, was 
“Darwin’s Legacy”, and the presentations as a whole paid little attention to religion and 
instead were geared almost exclusively toward highlighting science’s capacity to produce 
knowledge as well as a sense of wonder (or as Freud would put it, the “oceanic feeling”, 
a distinctly religious sentiment).  Dawkins dogmatically insists that the natural sciences 
are and must be capable of explaining everything.  He sets religion up as the opponent of 
science in the tradition of his 19th century Darwinist forebears, and then attempts (mostly 
in vain) to use science to discredit religious beliefs in his “crusade to use Darwinism as a 
means of dissolving all traditional belief in a purposeful universe” (Bowler, 2003[1983]: 
361).  The goal is ultimately not to clear the way for secularization as such, but to clear 
the way for the continuing scientization of secular spheres and to increase the influence 
of the Darwinian Left.    
Dawkins spelled these intentions out quite clearly in a talk given in 2002 at the 
annual TED lecture series.  Here, several years before writing The God Delusion, he 
reveals his true purpose, which is to attack creationism, as an opponent of evolution, by 
attacking religion: “My approach to attacking creationism is – unlike the evolution lobby 
– my approach to attacking creationism is to attack religion as a whole” (Dawkins, 2002).  
His engagement with religion, then, is in essence an attack on creationism as a rival to 
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evolutionary biology’s account of the origins of life.  There is nothing inherently wrong 
with an attack on creationism using Darwinian theory, since creationism and Biblical 
literalism are, in fact, in conflict with the scientific knowledge on the issue.  Taking this 
approach, however, means that his critiques of religion really only address the most 
literal and fundamentalist kinds of faith. More nuanced (and pragmatic) faith does not 
have the same built-in incompatibility with scientific explanations of nature.  The salient 
point to be gleaned here, though, is that it is not really religion per se that Dawkins is 
interested in.  Rather, it is opposition to Darwinism that concerns him, and it just so 
happens that the strongest opposition to Darwinism comes from religious fundamentalism 
(notably in the United States).  In order to combat his true enemy, creationism, Dawkins 
uses evolutionary theory, and science more generally, in an attempt to undermine the 
foundations of religious belief as a whole.  
 Dawkins is joined in his battle against creationism by his colleague Daniel 
Dennett, Professor of Philosophy and Co-Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at 
Tufts University.  Before becoming known for his atheism, Dennett had achieved some 
success as a public intellectual with such works as Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995) and 
Consciousness Explained (1992).  His foray into the philosophy of religion, Breaking the 
Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, makes the simple argument that religious 
claims should be subject to scrutiny just like any other; hence “breaking the spell” of 
insulation to criticism that religion has cast upon us is his major goal.  This would be a 
very reasonable request but that Dennett adds that religion must be understood as a 
natural phenomenon, and thus, crucially, not a social phenomenon.  Dennett writes, “The 
spell that I say must be broken is the taboo against a forthright, scientific, no-holds-barred 
investigation of religion as one natural phenomenon among many” (2006: 17).  Like 
Dawkins, Dennett’s understanding of religion, and culture more generally, is firmly 
rooted in the natural sciences (particularly Darwinism), explicitly rejecting sociological 
approaches.   
Dennett is the least significant among the Four Horsemen in terms of prominence 
within the New Atheism movement, and he did not achieve the fame enjoyed by his 
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colleagues.  This is perhaps because his entry in the canon is the least impassioned and 
most carefully measured, reflecting the more prudently detached reasoning of a 
philosopher.  He thus stands in stark contrast to the last of the Four Horsemen, 
Christopher Hitchens, whose aggressive attack on religion resonated much more strongly 
with atheists.  Hitchens is something of an outlier in this group, being neither a scientist 
nor philosopher of science.  He was primarily a journalist covering politics, though he 
was also a general critic who wrote on a vast array of topics, from Thomas Paine (2008) 
to Mother Theresa (1995).  As a columnist for major publications like Vanity Fair and 
The Atlantic (among many others), and a regular presence on television talk shows, 
Hitchens was a public intellectual with a significant presence well before the publication 
of God Is Not Great brought him to new heights of international celebrity. The book 
catalogues many of the standard arguments against religion and covers such familiar 
themes as inter-faith violence, religion’s allegedly intractable conflict with science and 
reason, and the barbaric morality and inconsistencies contained within the major 
monotheistic texts.  Hitchens described himself as an “antitheist” (2007a: xxii), believing 
that religious myths are not only untrue, but that their truth is undesirable because it 
would mean that we are all under surveillance by a “celestial dictator” who may punish 
us for the private thoughts we hold, referring to the Orwellian notion of “thought crime” 
in making his case against God.  In 2010 Hitchens was diagnosed with esophageal cancer 
and given a bleak prognosis.  Some wondered whether his views on religion would 
change, or if there might even be a death bed conversion.  Instead, he claimed that “the 
special pleading for salvation, redemption and supernatural deliverance appears even 
more hollow and artificial to me than it did before”.3  He succumbed to the illness in 
2011.   
Together these four thinkers helped to usher in a new era of atheist thought and 
activism.  That it was these four in particular may be somewhat arbitrary, particularly 
with respect to Harris, the only member of this group who was unknown prior to his 
engagement with religion.  But there is no doubt that they galvanized a moribund 
movement, and their success itself is indicative of a generational turn, with many young 
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skeptics finding in them a voice for the expression of views that were previously not 
found in the public sphere.  The following chapter examines their thought in detail, 
revealing that they are not simply critics of religion and superstition, but advocates of a 
systematic form of belief that I call scientific atheism. The Four Horsemen reject (or 
ignore) humanistic atheism because it conflicts with their understanding of religion as a 
substitute for true (scientific) knowledge.  Sam Harris claims that faith is “the licence 
people give themselves to keep believing when reasons fail – faith fills the cracks in the 
evidence and gaps in logic” (2004: 232) and that “faith is nothing more than a willingness 
to await the evidence – be it the Day of Judgment or some other downpour of 
corroboration.  It is the search for knowledge on the installment plan: believe now, live 
an untestable hypothesis until your dying day, and you will discover that you were right” 
(2004: 66).  In these two quotations we see both Dawkins’ “God Hypothesis” and his idea 
of the “god of the gaps”.  Religion for Harris, as for Dawkins, is an explanation of the 
inexplicable, a pseudo-scientific way of filling in gaps in understanding with a 
‘hypothesis’ that needs no verification, and thus their approach falls within the category 
of scientific atheism. But this is only the beginning: the New Atheism, like the historical 
forms of atheism reviewed in this chapter, is not an absence of belief. It is itself a belief 
system, or more precisely an ideology, ostensibly concerned with epistemology but 
essentially political in nature. This ideology is indeed rooted in scientific atheism, but 
updated with respect to developments in science (particularly in the fields of evolutionary 
psychology and neuroscience), and explicitly tailored to the socio-political circumstances 
of the 21st century.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE NEW ATHEISM 
 
The New Atheism has emerged in the wake of a broad acceptance that the naive 
secularization thesis, holding as a universal principle that religion declines as scientific 
modernity advances, is a myth and product of ideology rather than an empirical reality 
(Asad 2003; Berger 1999; Casanova 1994).  The New Atheism’s strategy of aggressive 
confrontation with religious ideas is a tacit recognition of this failure of the secularization 
thesis to come to fruition.  That is, rather than waiting for the natural progress of history 
to unfold, the New Atheism seeks to aggressively push history forward.   
This development in atheism is a product of three major events or trends: (1) the 
rise of young-Earth Creationism and Intelligent Design among anti-evolution Christians; 
(2) 9/11 and its cultural aftershocks; and (3) the influence of ‘relativism’ in two forms 
falling under the umbrella of “postmodernism”, which the New Atheists understand as a 
combination of epistemic relativism and cultural pluralism, manifest in policies of 
multiculturalism in liberal democracies.  These factors refer us to reactions to two very 
different kinds of ongoing threats: one ‘pre-modern’ (in the case of creationism and 9/11, 
which the New Atheists understand as natural consequences of the persistence of pre-
modern forms of religious fundamentalism), and one ‘post-modern’ (in the case of 
epistemic and cultural relativism, which the New Atheists consider responsible for a 
misguided effort toward tolerance that takes the form of multiculturalism).  This chapter 
examines their thought as a response to these perceived threats to modernity and its 
promise of bringing us toward what they consider the highest form of civilization: one 
shaped by science, the engine of progress.  
While the term “New Atheism” is sometimes considered synonymous with a 
group of four main thinkers, I treat it as an intellectual movement for which the works of 
these four serve as a canon, while there are many other thinkers and organizations that 
espouse the same basic ideology. The following chapter examines these related thinkers 
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and organizations, and the atheist movement more broadly, in terms of the ways in which 
they support and challenge the core of New Atheist thought.  Here I focus on the canon, 
constituted by the works of the group popularly known as the “Four Horsemen”. 
 
Science, Modernity, and Secularization: The Ideology of New Atheism 
The New Atheism, I argue, is not an absence of belief or a critique of religion, but 
is itself a belief system, or more precisely, an ideology. By this I do not mean ideology in 
an orthodox Marxian sense of illusory beliefs or false consciousness.  Rather, I mean a 
view of ideologies as “coherent and relatively stable sets of beliefs and values” (van Dijk 
1998: 256) that bracket social cognition, and provide “schematically organized 
complexes of representation and attitudes with regard to certain aspects of the social 
world” (van Dijk 1998: 258). In this view ideology is a schematic or rigid framework of 
preconceived ideas that shape, and thus potentially distort, understanding (Eagleton 
1991).  But as Thompson (1984) argues, ideology refers not only to belief systems.  It is 
also a means of legitimating the authority of this belief system and the group that 
advances it.  Ideology is thus not only about epistemology – what can be known and what 
precisely is known – but also about power.  I thus take ideology to refer to a stable 
structure of beliefs and attitudes that determine how knowledge is constructed and 
interpreted to legitimate a form of authority.   
While Thompson understands ideology as a means to “sustain relations of 
domination” (1984: 4), I take it to apply to any means of legitimating authority that 
follows certain criteria, regardless of whether and to what extent the group advancing it 
actually occupies a position of domination (hence ideology can also be a property of 
subordinate or oppressed groups).  I take these criteria from Eagleton (1991: 5-6), who 
writes, 
A dominant power may legitimate itself by promoting beliefs and values 
congenial to it; naturalizing and universalizing such beliefs so as to 
render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideas 
which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by 
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some unspoken but systematic logic; and obscuring social reality in ways 
convenient to itself.  Such ‘mystification’, as it is commonly known, 
frequently takes the form of masking or suppressing social conflicts, 
from which arises the conception of ideology as an imaginary resolution 
of real contradictions. 
Eagleton notes that a problem with this definition is that not all beliefs we might consider 
ideological are associated with a dominant political power, but again, the “dominant 
power” part here may be excluded and the definition can then apply to any group seeking 
to advance its own interests through advancing a belief system legitimated by these 
means. Crucially, in this understanding of ideology the beliefs that are promoted are not 
necessarily false or illusory, as in the Marxian version.  Rather, any belief system that 
seeks legitimation by these means may be considered ideological regardless of the 
question of their ‘truth’.   
 The New Atheism advances an ideology that meets these criteria.  Its goal is the 
legitimation of scientific authority.  It promotes a belief system characterized primarily 
by scientism, which is the grounding of its epistemology, its critique of religion, and its 
politics.  It naturalizes and universalizes this belief system by equating it with objective 
science and the pinnacle of human intellectual progress, thus representing it as the only 
universally valid one, and further, the outcome of a natural and inevitable process of 
accumulating knowledge and an according restructuring of society.  Like all ideologies, it 
is thus dehistoricizing in its denial that this belief system is specific to a particular time, 
place, and social group (Eagleton 1991: 59).  It denigrates religion, which is the belief 
system it considers its direct antagonist.  It excludes social scientific thought on religion, 
which it considers a rival to its own Darwinian understanding of the origin and function 
of religious beliefs, as well as a direct challenge to scientific authority in the form of 
“postmodernism” and epistemic relativism.  Finally, it obscures social reality in its 
insistence that scientific progress is equivalent to social progress, and that religion is the 
cause of the major ills of modernity, including its new forms of conflict, violence, and 
oppression. The contradiction represented in Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1995[1944]) 
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“dialectic of Enlightenment” – which understands modernity in terms of a tension 
between the quest for emancipation and new forms of oppression that replace ‘Church 
and King’ – is thus resolved by rejecting the idea that such a contradiction exists in the 
first place, and that the only problem with modern society is the stubborn persistence of 
pre-modern ways of thinking, most importantly religion.   
The following sections of this chapter explore these elements of the ideology that 
is “New Atheism”, including its critique of religion, its rejection of the social sciences as 
a rival form of thought, and its political implications with respect to the nature of modern 
societies and the challenges they face.  But first we must identity the belief system it 
promotes, which I have identified above as scientism.    
 For JurgenHabermas, scientism means that “we no longer understand science as 
one form of possible knowledge, but rather identify knowledge with science” (1971: 4).  
This is to say that scientific knowledge is the only kind of knowledge there is.  Mikael 
Stenmark (1997) more precisely outlines a number of different kinds of scientism.  The 
best and most relevant for my purposes is his definition of “epistemic scientism”, which 
is “The view that the only reality that we can know anything about is the one science has 
access to,” and further, that “what lies beyond the reach of scientists cannot count as 
knowledge.  The only sort of knowledge we have is the scientific kind of knowledge” 
(Stenmark 1997: 19).  Like Habermas, Stenmark defines scientism as the reduction of all 
knowledge to scientific knowledge, but adds that scientism is not merely a statement on 
knowledge, but on the nature of reality.  That is, science defines the parameters not only 
of what can be known, but what can be said to exist, or what is real.  Something that is 
now knowable by science cannot be said to exist or to have any basis in reality.   
It is important to be precise about what “science” means here.  I understand 
scientism to refer specifically to the extension of the authority of the natural sciences 
beyond the boundaries of nature.  Scientism in this view is “the attempt to apply the 
methods of natural science to the study of society” (Gorski 1990: 279), or more precisely, 
an attempt to “bring methods, concepts, practices, and attitudes from the investigation of 
the natural world to bear on human activities and institutions” (Olson 2008: 3).  Richard 
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G. Olson suggests that we can speak of scientism when “scientific attitudes, methods, and 
modes of thought are extended and applied beyond the domain of natural phenomena to a 
wide range of cultural issues that involve human interactions and value structures” (2008: 
60), thus adding ethics to the purview of science. 
Scientism, then, involves two major characteristics: first, the view from Habermas 
and Stenmark of scientism as a statement on the limits of knowledge and nature of 
reality; and second, the view from Gorski and Olson that scientism is an extension of the 
authority of the natural sciences, specifically, to non-natural or immaterial social and 
cultural phenomena.  Hence, I define scientism as the view that science is the only 
legitimate form of knowledge; that the domain of knowledge of the natural sciences 
encompasses human behaviour, institutions, and value structures; and that the theories 
and methods of the natural sciences are the best approach to the study of society and 
culture.   
In the case of the New Atheism, where the centrality of Darwinism to atheistic 
thought has never been clearer, we can identify a more specific kind of scientism: 
evolutionism.  Matthew Flamm, himself an atheist writing in the pages of Free Inquiry, 
the magazine of the Council for Secular Humanism, writes that the New Atheism, “while 
similar to that of positivists of previous generations in its scientistic, naturalistic rejection 
of religious claims as knowledge, is grounded in the latest synthesis of multiple scientific 
areas of study, filed compendiously under the heading of ‘evolutionary biology’” (2011: 
23).  Flamm’s point reflects my argument that the New Atheism is scientific atheism 
updated with recent advances in fields closely related to evolutionary biology, 
particularly evolutionary psychology and neuroscience.  I would further argue, however, 
that evolution is not only the basis of religious criticism, but also a vision of the nature 
and historical development of human society and culture.  The scientistic application of 
theories and concepts derived from Darwinian evolution to the social world is the basis of 
the social theory and political science at the heart of the New Atheism.  While scientism 
is their epistemology, then, it is more precisely evolutionism that is their ideology.  It is a 
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vision of the world that is expressed in their views on religion and science, secularization, 
and the nature of modernity.   
The key idea within this ideology is the evolution of society from the pre-modern 
phase of religious superstition to the modern phase characterized by scientism and its 
application to social and political questions and problems.  This involves a teleological 
vision of human progress, with ‘pre-modern’ giving way to ‘modern’ ways of thinking 
and living.  That is, enchantment and superstition are replaced by science and reason.  
From this perspective religion is an obsolete evolutionary adaptation akin to the 
appendix, a vestigial organ of a pre-modern ancestor that stubbornly refuses to go away 
even though it is no longer needed, and indeed, can even cause us great harm.  Modernity 
is that historical period, and social and political structure, that represents the project of 
universalization of scientism.   
The New Atheism, then, should be understood as a vigorous defence of an 
ideological vision of modernity that is grounded in the notions of progress and 
civilization, which in turn are characterized primarily by the spread of scientific 
rationality in social and political institutions, and in the general culture.  It rejects what it 
sees as the pre-modern ways of thinking and living that are characteristic of religion and 
of ‘uncivilized’ societies more generally.  Just as important, however, is its position on 
what it considers to be post-modern epistemology and politics.  The key point is that the 
New Atheists are responding to what they perceive to be a modern crisis brought on by 
two very different challenges to the authority of scientific rationality and the socio-
cultural configuration that is presumed to accompany it.  These challenges are ‘pre-
modern’ religious fundamentalism, and ‘post-modern’ cultural pluralism and epistemic 
relativism.  This latter challenge to modernity is a concern for the New Atheists because 
it not only rejects their claims to universality and objectivity, but in some sense it 
legitimates the first force (‘pre-modern’ fundamentalism) by undermining the rational-
scientific grounding of critique.   
So while the New Atheism claims to be a reaction against pre-modern ways of 
thinking, it is actually more an attempt to deal with a crisis of modernity brought on by 
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what some would call an entry into postmodernity (fundamentalism, not ironically, is also 
a response to this crisis, perceiving pluralism and relativism as a threat to traditional 
values and social structures).  They battle not only competing epistemologies and faith 
systems, but also history itself in their construction of the Enlightenment as the apex of a 
teleological process of social evolution that is still playing out and must be protected.  
Dawkins is a fervent believer in moral progress (or evolution), arguing that there is a 
steady change in social consciousness in a relatively consistent direction in “modern” 
liberal democratic societies (2006: 270).  He does admit that there are challenges and 
interruptions to this progress, but nonetheless believes that progress is inevitable: “Of 
course, the advance is not a smooth incline but a meandering sawtooth.  There are local 
and temporary setbacks... But over the longer timescale, the progressive trend is 
unmistakeable and it will continue” (2006: 271).  Hitchens is more measured in his 
celebration of the ideals of Enlightenment and progress than his New Atheist colleagues, 
noting that “...only the most naive utopian can believe that this new humane civilization 
will develop, like some dream of ‘progress’, in a straight line.  We first have to transcend 
our prehistory, and escape the gnarled hands which reach out to drag us back to the 
catacombs and the reeking altars and the guilty pleasures of subjection and abjection” 
(2007: 283).  While Hitchens problematizes the notion of ‘progress’ here in a way that 
Dawkins never does, it is only problematic for him in practice, not in principle.  He 
presents religion as a pre-modern challenge to be overcome, and devotes the final chapter 
of his treatise on religion to “The Need for a New Enlightenment” (Hitchens 2007).   
  In equating being “modern” with Enlightenment, however, the New Atheists 
ignore some of the most important intellectual developments of the intervening period, 
leaving a bare-boned empiricism bereft of any inkling of real humanist philosophy, and 
substituting the requirements of scientific progress for politics and democratically-
determined ethics. It is because of this strict attachment to a sub-section of Enlightenment 
thought and a general commitment to scientism that we should not equate the New 
Atheism with secular humanism, as many commentators are apt to, or for that matter with 
secularism (indeed, this is the basis of the distinction made in the previous chapter 
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regarding atheist ideologies).  In fact, it is in part a reaction against secularism.  The New 
Atheism is a manifestation of an ideology that takes the form of radical secularism as a 
political doctrine “which is not just about religion and its removal from public life, but 
has a particular vision of the world” (Asad, 2003: 191).  This vision, in short, is a global 
civilization where cultural differences are eroded by the universalization of the scientific 
worldview, and more implicitly, where decisions regarding the common good are best 
made by scientific experts.   
 To understand the New Atheism, then, we must establish its position on 
secularization, a concept at the core of its concerns.  One understanding of secularization 
holds that “the religious beliefs of antiquity irreversibly lost their credibility as scientific 
cosmologies progressively embarrassed them” (Brooke 2010: 105), and thus attachment 
to religious beliefs was bound to fade.  This idea pre-dates social science and originated 
in the Enlightenment, which produced the view that modernization produces a decline of 
religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals (Berger 1999).  This refers to two 
very different processes, and thus the theory of secularization should actually be 
understood as two separate but related sub-theses which posit that secularization is a 
process characterized by (1) a general decline in religious belief and practice, and (2) 
functional differentiation of religious and secular spheres and a concomitant distinction 
between private and public dimensions of life (Asad 2003; Bruce 2002; Casanova 1994; 
Taylor 2007).  It is clear that sub-thesis (1) is not necessary for sub-thesis (2), though in 
traditional formulations of the secularization paradigm in the sociology of religion these 
were seen as complimentary processes, dating back at least to Durkheim (1995[1912]).  
Charles Taylor (2007) has added a third sub-thesis: the “nova effect”, an explosion in the 
possibilities of belief and unbelief in late modernity whereby belief in God is just one 
among many options.  Indeed, many prominent scholars in various fields have in recent 
years weighed in on the secularization debate, resulting in an emerging majority view – 
with some significant exceptions (e.g. Bruce 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2004) – that we 
must begin to speak of a “post-secular” age where religion continues to exert a strong 
influence in public life and co-exists with other forms of belief and ways of life (c.f. 
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Taylor 2007; Calhoun et. al. 2011; Gorski et. al. 2012; Mendieta and VanAntwerpen 
2011).     
The New Atheists do not explicitly address the secularization thesis, but an 
examination of their work reveals that while they obviously support the first sub-thesis 
(decline in belief), they are very much at odds with the next two.  Taylor’s “nova effect” 
is definitely not the type of secularization the New Atheism would endorse, as it implies 
that any kind of belief is possible, and is thus an affront to the foundational premise of 
scientific atheism, which is that only beliefs that are supported by empirical evidence are 
acceptable.  The relationship to the second sub-thesis is complicated because of the 
“deprivatization” of religion and its emergence as a major political force in the late 20th 
century, most clearly exemplified in the Islamic Revolution and the rise of the Christian 
Right, which shook the foundations of the secularization thesis (Casanova 1994).  Even 
where secularism was an important force, the realization came that “a straightforward 
narrative of progress from the religious to the secular is no longer acceptable” (Asad, 
2003: 1), and that religion was in fact growing stronger in some areas of the world.   
This deprivatization led to a unique situation in the history of atheism: suddenly 
atheists were in a certain sense seeking to reverse the process of secularization, or at least 
one aspect of it, the move from public to private.  This is because religion, though still 
considered a private matter of individual choice and belief, was exercising a huge 
influence in the public sphere.  This nominally private status granted it “immunity from 
the force of public reason” (Asad 2003: 8), and in these conditions it flourished.  This is a 
crisis of conflict between the two primary sub-theses of the secularization thesis, which 
the atheist movement views as a danger and as an opportunity.  The New Atheism seeks 
to counter religion’s immunity to critique by bringing it into the public sphere – or at 
least revealing that it was never effectively private – so that it can be subjected to public 
reason, and thereby eradicated.  They want to undermine religious authority through a 
campaign of scientific-rational critique, and enhance the authority of science – the same 
project undertaken by Victorian Darwinists who exercised a campaign for the authority of 
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science in academic institutions (Fuller, 2006), which has now been expanded to a much 
larger scale.   
There is another understanding of secularization beyond the two (or three) sub-
theses typically associated with it that is pertinent to my discussion.  This approach views 
it not only as a theory of a social process bound up with modernization, but more 
importantly, as a political doctrine, rendering its empirical validity irrelevant and pointing 
us instead to questions pertaining to the origins and consequences of secularization as an 
ideology (Szonyi 2009).  Jose Casanova suggests that “theories of secularization double 
as empirically descriptive theories of modern social processes and as normatively 
prescriptive theories of modern societies, and thus serve to legitimize ideologically a 
particular historical form of institutionalization of modernity” (1994: 41).  In his view, 
secularization is a myth perpetuated by Enlightenment thinkers and defenders that “was 
never either rigorously examined or even formulated explicitly and systematically” 
(Casanova 1994: 17).  This is also the view favoured by Asad (2003), who, as noted 
above, describes secularization as a straightforward narrative of progress that, upon 
closer inspection, is more ideology than actual social process.   
The New Atheism might be understood as an expression of this ideology, 
instituting this narrative of progress as historical reality through its discourses regarding 
the universal and emancipative nature of modern scientific rationality and its inherent 
conflict with the pre-modern force of religion.  It thus adopts the ideology of 
secularization to the extent that it is a normative prescription for the development of 
modern societies.  In the ideology of evolutionistic scientism adopted by the New 
Atheists, the theory of secularization is ideological support for a political project, rather 
than a theory of an actual socio-historical process.  Hence, rather than evidence that the 
process of secularization is indeed proceeding as it was once expected, the New Atheism 
is a reaction to the fact that the ideology of secularization has come under threat by the 
deprivatization of religion and the influence of postmodernism in Western scholarship, 
particularly with respect to the social sciences.   
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These two developments indicate to the New Atheists that the second 
secularization sub-thesis – functional differentiation of religious and secular spheres – is 
untenable.  Religion continues to invade the public and political spheres, and criticism of 
this process is undermined by the current liberal imperative for pluralism.  Since religion 
cannot be sequestered within the private sphere, the only option is to eradicate it 
completely.  The New Atheists thus represent the move to a secular world specifically as 
a move to a world where religion simply disappears under the light of science.  Their 
project is to hasten this process; in other words, to defend modernity as a process of 
cultural universalization defined by the authority of scientific rationality in all spheres of 
life, both public and private, and in individual minds.  The strategy is to engage in an 
ideological struggle against the modernity’s antagonists, specifically pre-modern religion 
and post-modern relativism and pluralism, to ensure that the progress of secularization 
continues.  Modernity, for the New Atheists, is co-terminous with secularization, which 
in their view is essentially the progressive universalization of scientism.  We might in 
fact say that what the New Atheists want is not so much secularization, but the 
scientizationof politics and culture.  This means scientization with respect to both 
secularization sub-theses.  That is, the authority of science within political institutions, 
but more importantly, the adoption of a scientistic worldview by individuals to such an 
extent that it becomes culturally dominant.   
While not explicitly addressing a “secularization thesis” as such, we can say that 
the New Atheism neglects the second secularization sub-thesis (functional differentiation 
of secular and religious spheres) in favour of advancing the first (decline of religious 
belief).  In summary, the goal of the New Atheism is not simply to critique religious 
beliefs, but rather, they seek a broad cultural transformation that would see religious 
belief and all other forms of superstition replaced with scientism.  Given this general 
goal, I argue that the new atheist movement adopts three central strategies: (1) to 
discredit claims made by religious texts, institutions, and leaders in areas ranging from 
social history to natural history, and most importantly on the question of the existence of 
God, by way of rational-scientific critique; (2) to persuade others to adopt a worldview 
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defined by scientism and, more specifically, evolutionism; and (3) to build a sense of 
community and a positive collective identity for atheists in order to encourage others to 
“come out” and to create a hospitable environment for atheism to flourish.  These three 
strategies reflect the dimensions of ideology discussed above with reference to Eagleton 
(1991).  These include promoting a belief system that is naturalized, universalized, and 
dehistoricized, and denigrating and excluding challenging ideas and rival forms of 
thought.   
The first two strategies – that is, the negation of the religious worldview and 
construction of an alternative scientistic one – are addressed by public intellectuals such 
as the Four Horsemen, along with an array of supporting figures and organizations (these 
will be discussed in detail in the following chapter).  These two strategies are addressed 
in the following sections, which deal with the New Atheism’s response to the two major 
threats to modernity.  The third strategy refers to social movement activity within atheist 
organizations, which is covered in the following chapter.  Through an analysis of the 
New Atheism’s response to the perceived dual threat to modernity we will arrive at an 
understanding of the ideology that underwrites their thought, which I argue is in essence 
a political ideology that advances a particular vision of the nature of the world and a 
normative prescription for achieving progress toward the highest form of civilization – 
one where science is dominant in epistemology, politics, and ethics.   
This ideology is represented in Figure 1 as a set of binaries that establish its tenets 
through negation and opposition.  These binaries should be understood in terms of their 
relationship to the evolutionism at the heart of this ideology, implying a natural and 
inevitable progression in both the intellectual and social worlds that is driven by science.  
They serve to distinguish modernity from its ‘others’, equating religion, faith, and 
barbarism with the pre-modern, and relativism, multiculturalism, and pluralism with the 
post-modern.  Islam is directly contrasted with modernity in this table because, in New 
Atheist discourse, it embodies both pre- and post-modern otherness.  That is, it is a 
barbaric form of religious faith that threatens western civilization because relativism and 
multiculturalism have rendered the West impotent to defend its values against this foreign 
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intruder. These binaries, and the ideology they constitute, are all interrogated in the 
following analysis of the New Atheism’s defence of modernity, beginning with the first 
strategy of discrediting and denigrating religious beliefs, the pre-modern threat.   
 
Figure 1: Binaries in ideology of New Atheism 
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The Scientific Critique of Religion 
The New Atheism’s critique of religion is predicated on the assumption that the 
purpose of religion is to explain nature (this assumption is not a result of any kind of 
empirical inquiry into religious belief and practice, but is assumed a priori on ideological 
grounds).  Science reveals that it fails in this task, therefore religious belief is irrational.  
These irrational beliefs could develop in the first place because ancient people were 
ignorant of the truths of science and had no alternative explanations.  They are 
maintained in the modern age because of evolutionary processes that have endowed us 
with brains susceptible to supernatural beliefs.  Overcoming these irrational beliefs and 
the cognitive tendencies that allow them to persist, and taking the step toward a higher 
form of thinking characterized by scientific rationality, is the challenge, and promise, of 
modernity.   
 This view is expressed in the following passage from Christopher Hitchens:  
modern/ 
pre-modern 
modern/ 
post-modern 
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One must state it plainly.  Religion comes from the period of human 
prehistory where nobody – not even the mighty Democritus who 
concluded that all matter was made from atoms – had the smallest idea 
what was going on.  It comes from the bawling and fearful infancy of 
our species, and is a babyish attempt to meet our inescapable demand 
for knowledge (as well as for comfort, reassurance, and other infantile 
needs)...All attempts to reconcile faith with science and reason are 
consigned to failure and ridicule for precisely these reasons (Hitchens 
2007: 64-65). 
Here we are offered the theory of religion that characterizes scientific atheism, namely, 
religion as explanation of the mysterious and threatening forces of nature.  Other sources 
of religious belief, such as those offered by the 19th century humanistic atheists (with 
“comfort, reassurance, and other infantile needs” Hitchens echoes Freud), are relegated to 
a brief parenthetical aside, despite their obvious and overwhelming importance.  Religion 
is, rather, a relic of the ignorance of the pre-modern, or pre-scientific, “period of human 
prehistory”.   This is one major idea shared by all the New Atheists, and it is expressed 
most clearly in Richard Dawkins’ description of God as a pseudo-scientific hypothesis.   
Dawkins’ understanding of religion begins with one simple premise: the “God 
Hypothesis”4, or the idea that God is “a scientific hypothesis about the universe, which 
should be analyzed as sceptically as any other” (2006: 2).  He formulates it, on behalf of 
all religions and religious believers, like this: “there exists a superhuman, supernatural 
intelligence who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it, 
including us” (2006: 31).  This hypothesis about the origin of the universe can be 
empirically tested, argues Dawkins: “Either he exists or he doesn’t.  It’s a scientific 
question; one day we may know the answer, and meanwhile we can say something pretty 
strong about the probability” (2006: 48).  Dawkins, of course, deems that the probability 
is exceedingly in favour of non-existence.   
 In the history of atheism outlined in Chapter 1, I discussed Michael J. Buckley’s 
(2004) description of the development of a modern theological conception of God that 
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departed from an emphasis on transcendence and instead described God as a ‘thing’ of 
definite substance and location with a role in nature.  This is clearly the God that 
Dawkins is talking about, but even if we were to base our understanding of religious faith 
on the modern conception of God as an immanent force within nature, Dawkins’ critique 
fails to achieve logical coherence.  This failure might be explained with reference to one 
of Dawkins’ own rhetorical devices, the notion of the “God of the gaps”, or God as the 
explanation used to fill gaps in our understanding of nature.  Modern science has 
achieved impressive results in solving the mystery of nature, though crevices where 
explanations are lacking are still filled with God:  “Creationists eagerly seek a gap in 
present-day knowledge or understanding.  If an apparent gap is found, it is assumed that 
God, by default, must fill it.  What worries thoughtful theologians….is that gaps shrink as 
science advances, and God is threatened with eventually having nothing to do and 
nowhere to hide” (Dawkins 2006: 125).  Dawkins argues that Darwinian evolution forces 
God out of his last refuge – namely, the origin of life – thereby filling in the last major 
gap in our understanding (despite the major issue of how life came to exist in the first 
place – Darwinism is an explanation only for the evolution of existing life forms, not for 
the origin of life). From this follows the conclusion that the God Hypothesis has been 
‘proven’ false, leading Dawkins to proclaim that “God almost certainly does not exist” 
(2006: 158).  A more appropriate conclusion would be that modern science is in conflict 
with a literal interpretation of the biblical account of creation.  Dawkins’ proof that God 
does not exist is predicated upon the assumption that God’s existence is tied to the 
historical accuracy of Genesis.   
 Nonetheless, Dawkins maintains that science and religion are incommensurable 
forms of knowledge with respect to the natural world that are characteristic of distinct 
periods of human history.  This brings us to the heart of the matter: the supposed conflict 
between religion/faith and science/reason, which, he claims, is essentially a conflict 
between ways of thinking that are characteristic of the pre-modern and modern world, 
namely, superstition and rationalism, of which religion and science are just particular 
forms (2006: 67).  His major point of emphasis is not that religion is harmful, but rather, 
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that it is an obstacle to truth and the greatest of the “enemies of reason”.5  The harm that 
religion does is measured by Dawkins not in social, but in intellectual terms: “As a 
scientist, I am hostile to fundamentalist religion because it actively debauches the 
scientific enterprise.  It teaches us not to change our minds, and not to want to know 
exciting things that are available to be known.  It subverts science and saps the intellect” 
(2006: 284).  Note that Dawkins refers specifically to fundamentalist religion, while his 
main problem with “moderate” religion is that it is “making the world safe for 
fundamentalism by teaching children, from their earliest years, that unquestioning faith is 
a virtue” (2006: 286).   
Sam Harris takes precisely the same view of faith as Dawkins, claiming that faith 
is “the licence people give themselves to keep believing when reasons fail – faith fills the 
cracks in the evidence and gaps in logic” (2004: 232), and that “faith is nothing more 
than a willingness to await the evidence – be it the Day of Judgment or some other 
downpour of corroboration.  It is the search for knowledge on the instalment plan: believe 
now, live an untestable hypothesis until your dying day, and you will discover that you 
were right” (2004: 66).  In these two quotations we see both Dawkins’ “God Hypothesis” 
and his idea of the “god of the gaps”.  Religion for Harris, as for Dawkins, is a false 
knowledge claim, a pre-scientific explanation of the inexplicable that fills gaps in 
understanding with a hypothesis that needs no verification.  The remedy to this condition 
is substituting the true knowledge of science, as if the faithful just do not yet know 
enough about science to abandon their false religious ideas, or alternatively, their brains 
have been wired by evolution to accept the God Hypothesis despite evidence to the 
contrary.   
Harris goes to great lengths to argue for the latter view, namely, that religious 
belief is not only a product of ignorance, but that it is a direct result of physical processes 
in the brain, which in turn are a product of evolutionary pressures that have selected 
genes that pre-condition us for religious belief.  Given his interest in neuroscience (or 
alternatively, ideological commitment to scientism), it is not surprising that Harris, 
discussing the nature of religious belief, asks “What neural events underlie this process?  
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What must a brain do in order to believe that a given statement is true or false?  We 
currently have no idea” (2004: 51).  This simple inquiry demonstrates an unwillingness to 
look outside of the natural sciences for an explanation of faith.  He awaits neurological 
evidence to explain how it is that brains are able to manage the trick of reconciling 
illogical beliefs with the demands of reason and logical coherence.  That is, he wonders 
how a brain – rather than a person – manages to combine, or navigate between, these 
ostensibly incommensurable ways of thinking?  The social existence of the person whose 
head houses this brain seems relatively unimportant.   
Addressing this question, Harris suggests that religious belief may be indicative of 
a defect in brain functioning, implying a material distinction between believers and 
rational atheists.  Richard Dawkins suggests as much when he claims that “atheism nearly 
always indicates....a healthy mind” (2006: 3).  Harris goes so far as to equate faith not 
only with ignorance, but with mental illness:  
We have names for people who have many beliefs for which there is no 
rational justification.  When their beliefs are extremely common we call 
them 'religious'; otherwise, they are likely to be called 'mad,', 
'psychotic,' or 'delusional'….it is merely an accident of history that it is 
considered normal in our society to believe that the Creator of the 
universe can hear your thoughts, while it is demonstrative of mental 
illness to believe that he is communicating with you by having the rain 
tap in Morse code on your bedroom window.  And so, while religious 
people are not generally mad, their core beliefs absolutely are….In fact, 
it is difficult to imagine a set of beliefs more suggestive of mental 
illness than those that lie at the heart of many of our religious traditions 
(2004: 72). 
If beliefs persist despite evidence that renders them illogical, then, the only logical 
explanation for this is that there must be some defect in brain functioning or something 
resembling mental illness.  Social and cultural reasons for believing are not explored, or 
even mentioned for that matter.  Though he does admit that religious people are not 
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“mad”, he also suggests that making an exception for religious people in terms of 
madness is just an “accident of history”, implying that religious beliefs are suggestive of 
some kind of mental illness or deficiency.   
Dawkins also grounds his theory of religion in a strictly materialist account of the 
religious impulse experienced by human brains, thus eschewing human thought, agency, 
and culture: “Knowing that we are products of Darwinian evolution, we should ask what 
pressure or pressures exerted by natural selection originally favoured the impulse to 
religion” (2006: 163).  The point is that any social behaviour humans engage in must be 
explained in evolutionary terms, particularly behaviour that has been exhibited by 
humans everywhere and at all times, such as religion: “Universal features of a species 
demand a Darwinian explanation” (2006: 166).  Dawkins’ use of the term “species” here, 
while technically correct of course, is very revealing of the problem with his approach in 
general, which is to view the behaviour of people the way he would any other animal, as 
in his pondering of the evolutionary benefit of a medieval cathedral, which “could 
consume a hundred man-centuries in its construction, yet was never used as a dwelling, 
or for any recognizably useful purpose.  Was it some kind of architectural peacock’s 
tail?” (2006: 164).  Here Dawkins reduces certain (non-scientific) human cultural 
developments and artistic achievements to an ostentatious display that might be 
understood as a kind of “peacock’s tail” to the extent that there must be a sensible 
Darwinian explanation for such apparently nonsensical (i.e. non-adaptive) behaviour.   
Dawkins claims that human culture ‘evolves’ progressively in precisely the same 
way that biological entities evolve; that is, by natural selection: “Fashions in dress and 
diet, ceremonies and customs, art and architecture, engineering and technology, all 
evolve in historical time in a way that looks like highly speeded up genetic evolution, but 
has really nothing to do with genetic evolution.  As in genetic evolution though, the 
change may be progressive” (1989: 190).   The difference is the unit of transmission: in 
biological evolution it is the gene, while in cultural evolution the “meme” (roughly 
analogous to “idea”) is the unit that is negatively or positively selected and transmitted.  
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Memes are the “new replicators”, doing the job of cultural transmission and evolution 
just as genes do the job of biological evolution. 
Dawkins’ theory of religion, bearing these guiding principles in mind, proceeds in 
two steps: biological disposition, followed by memetic transmission.  He insists that 
Darwinism is an “ultimate” explanation of religion, while theories derived from the social 
sciences are only “proximate” explanations.  In his ‘ultimate’, Darwinian view, religion is 
a by-product of evolutionary adaptations: “The religious behaviour may be a misfiring, 
an unfortunate by-product of an underlying psychological propensity which in other 
circumstances is, or once was, useful” (2006: 174).  This is most obvious in the case of 
children, who are hard-wired by genetic evolution to trust the words of their elders, a 
useful adaptation for survival, with the unfortunate by-product being “vulnerability to 
infection by mind viruses” (2006: 176).   These “mind viruses” are ideas or beliefs that 
are transmitted from brain to brain by a process analogous to genetic replication.  The 
most ubiquitous and pernicious of these mind viruses is, of course, the meme for God.  
Dawkins refers to this as the “God virus”, which has been evolving and infecting brains 
for thousands of years – much like a measles epidemic in an elementary school, we are 
led to understand (2006: 194).  Those “faith sufferers” (Dawkins 1995) infected with the 
God virus are harmed by it, yet it has “survival value” because of its psychological 
appeal, which lies in its “superficially plausible answer to deep and troubling questions 
about existence” (Dawkins 1989: 193).  That is, it works as explanation.   
Dennett (2006) supports Dawkins’ by-product theory in his emphasis on the 
importance of the “intentional stance”, or an evolutionarily adaptive proclivity to ascribe 
intention and agency to inanimate objects and natural events.  In this theory, humanity’s 
ancestors – or more precisely, their genes, if we take Dawkins’ (1989) gene-level view of 
evolution – were selected for survival for their tendency to suspect anything and 
everything of being a potential predator, or at least a thing with intention to bring harm.  
This tendency induced caution and therefore enhanced the prospects of survival, but as a 
by-product, it produced organisms that saw consciousness and intention where there was 
none.  This condition, over evolutionary time scales, produced animism among primitive 
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humans, an early precursor to theistic religions. These tendencies presumably remain 
intact today when evangelical leaders in the United States claim that natural disasters are 
a result of insufficient faith and/or God’s punishment for sin.   
The New Atheists have not only a theory of the evolutionary processes that create 
psychological preconditions for religious belief, but also a mechanism for the 
development of different forms of religious belief.  Faith evolves from an abstract 
principle into complex belief systems and religious institutions, and Dawkins goes to 
great pains to argue that these beliefs and institutions must be regarded as the outcome of 
natural processes rather than human agency:  
Organized religions are organized by people: by priests and bishops, 
rabbis, imams and ayatollahs.  But....that doesn’t mean they were 
conceived and designed by people.  Even where religions have been 
exploited and manipulated to the benefit of powerful individuals, the 
strong possibility remains that the detailed form of each religion has 
been largely shaped by unconscious evolution....The role of genetic 
natural selection in the story is to provide the brain...the hardware 
platform and low-level system software which form the background to 
memetic selection.  Given this background, memetic natural selection 
of some kind seems to me to offer a plausible account of the detailed 
evolution of particular religions (2006: 200-201). 
Religious memes, then, have evolved independently of human agents and infect our 
brains, which have achieved a God-ready state by way of a by-product of the 
evolutionarily adaptive proclivity of children to trust the authority of their elders and to 
impute intentionality and design to inanimate objects.  He throws in the idea of 
“memeplexes” – “cartels of mutually compatible memes” – to explain the process by 
which “a religion becomes organized, elaborate and arbitrarily different from other 
religions” (2006: 201).  That he considers differences among religions to be “arbitrary” 
betrays an indifference to the history of religion and its social and political nature.   
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Daniel Dennett is a champion of Dawkins’ meme theory, which he applies in his 
discussion of the taboo against a rational-scientific investigation of religion, claiming that 
this taboo can be understood as a kind of evolutionary adaptation.  That is, the taboo is 
really a meme-complex of prohibitions and defences.  For example, we have internalized 
the idea that it is “impolite” to question a religious person about the nature of their beliefs 
too strongly, and the religious person in turn has been taught that such questioning is 
insulting or disrespectful, and possibly even inspired by Satan himself (Dennett 2006: 
206-207).  Though he doesn’t explicitly use the term “meme” in this discussion, there is 
no mistaking what Dennett is talking about when he says of this process, “What a fine 
protective screen this virus provides – permitting it to shed the antibodies of skepticism 
so effortlessly!” (2006: 207).  Using Dawkins’ language, Dennett suggests that faith is a 
“virus” (meme) that has evolved immunity to “antibodies” (rational-scientific 
skepticism).  Dawkins himself simply states that the meme for blind faith “secures its 
own perpetuation by the simple unconscious expedient of discouraging rational inquiry” 
(Dawkins 1989: 198).   
Hitchens, who is not a scientist or philosopher of science, does not seek to 
advance a materialist explanation of the origins of religious belief derived from 
evolutionary biology and neuroscience, though he does defend these efforts (2007: 165).  
For Hitchens, the notion of the ignorance of ancient people is enough to explain where 
religion comes from.  Religion fulfilled a thirst for knowledge that could not otherwise be 
quenched, until modern science came along and made it, and those whose understanding 
of the world is based on it, irrelevant in a world characterized by scientific skepticism and 
constant questioning: “The person who is certain, and who claims divine warrant for his 
certainty, belongs now to the infancy of our species.  It may be a long farewell, but it has 
begun and, like all farewells, should not be protracted” (2007: 11).  While Hitchens does 
not develop a Darwinian theory of religion, then, there is an evolutionistic essence to this 
argument, which posits that humanity has evolved beyond religion, and that those who 
claim certainty for their religious beliefs represent a lower stage in our evolution.   
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In general, the scientific critique of religion advanced in the New Atheism is 
informed by the ideology of scientism at its core.  More specifically, evolutionism 
provides the foundation of the critique, positing that religion is a vestige of cognitive 
processes determined by evolution, and a pre-modern, pseudo-scientific explanation of 
nature that continued to fill gaps in our understanding in the modern period, though those 
gaps are shrinking.  The New Atheism’s critique is distinguishable from 19th century 
scientific atheism only in the greater sophistication brought to it by the theories and 
technologies of the nascent disciplines of evolutionary psychology and neuroscience, 
which purport to explain the mechanisms that drive religious belief.  Further, we find in 
the case of Dawkins and Dennett that the critique of religion is motivated by a desire to 
defend Darwinism against its critics, again mirroring the scientific atheism of the 
19thcentury, which I have argued was in fact driven by a desire to defend evolution 
against religious critics.   Indeed, Dawkins spelled these intentions out quite clearly in a 
talk given in 2002 at the annual TED lecture series.  Here, several years before writing 
The God Delusion, he reveals his true purpose, which is to undermine creationism, as an 
opponent of evolution, by attacking religion: “My approach to attacking creationism is – 
unlike the evolution lobby – my approach to attacking creationism is to attack religion as 
a whole” (Dawkins 2002).  His engagement with religion, then, is in essence an attack on 
creationism as a rival to evolutionary biology.  In order to combat his true enemy, 
creationism, Dawkins uses evolutionary theory, and science more generally, in an attempt 
to undermine the foundations of religious belief as a whole.   
The preceding review illustrates the exclusivity of the theories and methods of the 
natural sciences in their critique, and utter indifference toward knowledge on religion 
developed in the social sciences.  William Stahl (2010: 102) notes that the New Atheism 
makes the assumption that “religion can be abstracted and reduced to cognitive beliefs 
separated from culture.  Sociologically, this is a one-dimensional and impoverished 
understanding of religion...Religion also involves experiences, rituals, traditions, and 
community, which for many groups are far more important than beliefs.”  The New 
Atheists, he writes, “accept the fundamentalists’ self-understanding and assume that it 
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can adequately describe all religion” (Stahl 2010: 102).  The view of religion taken by 
fundamentalists that Stahl refers to is precisely that of the New Atheists, namely, that 
religion is an explanation of where the universe came from and how humanity came to 
be.  In taking fundamentalism as the essence of all religion, the New Atheism reduces all 
religion to beliefs about the nature of reality.  This generalization is only possible in 
wilful ignorance of, and ideological opposition to, the vast reserves of empirical and 
theoretical work on religion in the social sciences and humanities, which demonstrate the 
centrality of practice, ritual, and community.  The rejection of social scientific 
understandings of religion is one aspect of the New Atheism’s rejection of the social 
sciences more generally.  This rejection is rooted in the scientistic belief that the natural 
sciences, and specifically Darwinism, are all that is needed to understand the psychology 
and social world of human beings.  Further, the New Atheism tends to equate the social 
sciences with “postmodernism” and the flourishing of pluralism and relativism in late 
modern culture.  The account of religion discussed here, then, is only one example of an 
ideological system that includes as one of its goals the institution of sociobiology as a 
replacement for the social sciences and humanities.  
 
Science and Civilization 
 The New Atheism’s position on the ‘post-modern’ threat is best understood 
through an examination of its discourse on Islam, the ‘other’ of enlightened modernity.  
For the New Atheism, Islam represents both types of threats.  As a religion founded on 
faith it is a ‘pre-modern’ threat to scientific modernity, and it illustrates the progressive 
evolution of human societies, with Islamic societies representing barbarism and the West 
representing civilization.  But it also represents the ‘post-modern’ threat in the sense that 
the New Atheists believe that epistemic relativism and cultural pluralism have 
paradoxically rendered the West incapable of effectively dealing with the threat posed by 
radical Islam – and religion more generally – to its core liberal values.  Islam is also 
represented as a threat to the West’s very existence in Harris’ scenario of a “diabolical 
clockwork” consisting of blind faith in the tenets of an inherently violent religion coupled 
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with the availability of weapons of mass destruction, which together constitute “a recipe 
for the fall of civilization” (Harris 2004: 26).   
 Islam, indeed, is the most important element in the New Atheism’s construction 
of an ideal of Western civilization.  This should be understood in light of their 19th 
century intellectual heritage.  I refer in particular to that century’s dominant ideas 
regarding the relationship between evolutionism and social development – in other 
words, the theory of the progress of civilization.  We might understand this in terms of 
the “comparative method” in anthropology, which was the practice of studying how 
civilization evolves over time by looking at different groups in the present that are at 
different stages in this process (Stocking, 1968: 75).  Study of the cultures of ‘savages’ 
was believed to offer a window into history, a glimpse of a previous stage of ‘civilized’ 
European culture, as it was believed that all groups follow a similar path of development 
since they are determined by a common human nature, a view that predated Darwin but 
was buttressed by his insights.  The concept of “unilinear evolutionary progress whose 
eventual goal was perfection and whose highest present manifestation was western 
European society” led to the inference that “the various societies coexisting in the present 
represented the various stages in this sequence” (Stocking, 1968: 26).  A further and 
necessary consequence of this theory was the view that “the normal course of human 
social development... in the case of savages had for some reason stopped short” 
(Stocking, 1968: 27), leading to speculations regarding the reasons for this that in many 
cases culminated in the construction of cultural and racial hierarchies.   
 We see precisely the same line of thought in the New Atheism.  Consider, for 
instance, Sam Harris’ view that the Islamic world is a “civilization with an arrested 
history”, explaining that “It is as though a portal in time has opened, and fourteenth-
century hordes are pouring into our world” (2004: 107).  His “portal in time” is in no way 
different from the comparative method of 18th and 19th century anthropologists and their 
view that social development is unevenly distributed among different cultures and ethnic 
groups. Stocking notes the importance of the concept of evolution in the construction of 
European supremacy: “The assumption of white superiority was certainly not original 
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with Victorian evolutionists; yet the interrelation of the theories of cultural and organic 
evolution, with their implicit hierarchy of race, gave it a new rationale” (1968: 122).  
Richard Dawkins’ own amalgam of organic and cultural evolution (the latter represented 
in his meme theory) reflects these Victorian efforts at establishing the supremacy of 
European civilization.  While not founded in essentialist doctrines of race, Dawkins’ 
cultural evolution implies a hierarchy of civilization with the West on top because it 
recognizes the epistemic authority of scientific rationality.   
For Harris, Islam and the global population of Muslims constitute modernity’s 
Other.  All followers of this religion are indicted equally on the basis of the contents of 
the Koran.  Taking the view that “not all cultures are at the same stage of moral 
development” (2004: 143), Harris concludes that Islam and its followers are in fact frozen 
in history, and that Islamic societies are “societies whose moral and political 
development...lags behind our own” (2004: 145).  This view is central to the ideology of 
modernity that the New Atheists embrace, which involves a path of development from 
barbarism to civilization, represented by the Middle East and the West in the New 
Atheism’s own “comparative method”. A teleology of morality is implied here, with all 
societies evolving toward an ultimate end-state civilization, and some lagging behind in 
their progress.    
The subtext, of course, is the imperative to shape the world according to western 
culture: “We are at war with Islam...It is not merely that we are at war with an otherwise 
peaceful religion that has been ‘hijacked’ by extremists.  We are at war with precisely the 
vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran” (2004: 109).  Harris seems 
less inclined to declare war against Christianity or Judaism, which he considers relatively 
more benign, while he believes that “Islam, more than any other religion human beings 
have devised, has all the makings of a thoroughgoing cult of death” (2004: 123).  So 
completely are Muslims consumed by the Koran, according to Harris, that they wilfully 
accept their own oppression as mandated by it: “At this point in their history, give most 
Muslims the freedom to vote, and they will freely vote to tear out their political freedoms 
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by the root.  We should not for a moment lose sight of the possibility that they would 
curtail our freedoms as well, if they only had the power to do so” (2004: 132).   
Dawkins’ views on the relationship between ‘Islam’ and ‘civilization’ are made 
clear from the opening frames of his television documentary Root Of All Evil?, which 
features footage of people being carried into ambulances on stretchers intercut with 
images of Arab people in military fatigues loading machine guns, with Dawkins’ voice-
over narration:  
There are would-be murderers all around the world who want to kill you and me, 
and themselves, because they’re motivated by what they think is the highest 
ideal.   Of course politics are important.... But as we wake up to this huge 
challenge to our civilized values, don’t let’s forget the elephant in the room: an 
elephant called religion (Dawkins and Kidd, 2006). 
While Dawkins does not target Islam specifically in The God Delusion, he has addressed 
this religion in his numerous interviews and public lectures.  Perhaps most telling is a 
controversy that erupted in 2012 over Dawkins’ repeated use of the term “barbarians” in 
comments made about Muslims on Twitter.  In one tweet that garnered a great deal of 
attention, Dawkins revealed that he has never read the Koran, and in the next sentence 
referred to Islam as the “greatest force for evil today” (Dawkins Twitter March 13 2013).  
He was subsequently taken to task by commentators in The Guardian (Greenwald 2013), 
Salon (Lean 2013), and Al-Jazeera (Hussain 2013), who took the opportunity to make 
note of a rising Islamophobia among the New Atheists, particularly Dawkins and Harris, 
pointing to recent tweets and blog posts indicating that the tone of discourse had become 
more hostile and the views advanced more intolerant.  After a library in Timbuktu was 
destroyed by Islamic extremists, Dawkins tweeted: “Like Alexandria, like Bamiyan, 
Timbuktu’s priceless manuscript heritage destroyed by Islamic barbarians”, and 
subsequently defended his use of the term (Gryboski 2013b).  Not long after this incident 
Harris wrote a blog post explaining his support for ethnic and religious profiling by 
airport security, arguing that “We should profile Muslims, or anyone who looks like he or 
she could conceivably be Muslim, and we should be honest about it” (Harris 2012). 
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Harris and Dawkins have recently made many similar statements, with Dawkins being 
particularly frank in scornful tweets about ‘barbaric’ Islamic societies.   
Like both Harris and Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens believed that religion is a 
threat to civilization (i.e. the West), and that among all religions none is a greater threat 
than Islam.  Examples of how religion stunts the progress of civilization abound in God Is 
Not Great, along with an analysis of contributing factors.  The most important of these is 
the concept of faith and the imperative that it not be questioned by its practitioners, and 
that it be respected by those outside the religion.  Hitchens explains:  
All religions take care to silence or to execute those who question 
them...It has, however, been some time since Judaism and Christianity 
resorted openly to torture and censorship.  Not only did Islam begin by 
condemning all doubters to eternal fire, but it still claims the right to do 
so in almost all of its dominions, and still preaches that these same 
dominions can and must be extended by war.  There has never been an 
attempt in any age to challenge or even investigate the claims of Islam 
that has not been met with extremely harsh and swift repression (2007: 
125).  
This passage, in striving to demonize Islam by contrasting it with more ‘civilized’ 
western monotheism, wilfully ignores ongoing attempts at censorship by Christians in the 
United States who objection to the teaching of evolutionary biology and the mere 
mention of homosexuality in public schools.  Hitchens also disingenuously signals that 
condemning doubters to hellfire is a characteristic unique to Islam.  The Vatican’s official 
position is that eternity in hell awaits those who fail to accept Christ as saviour, while 
American Christians focus much of their attention in public discourse on sin, Satan, and 
final judgment.   
 The Muslim world is represented as the Other of the modern – and purportedly 
mostly secular – West.  Discussing the reasons that the West is secularizing, Hitchens 
explains that “The availability and accessibility of well-produced books, cassettes, and 
DVDs, emphasizing the triumphs of science and reason, is a large part of this success.  
 
 
83 
And so, of course, is the increasingly clear realization, on the part of civilized people, that 
the main enemy we face is ‘faith-based’” (2007a: xxv).  Besides a proud defence of the 
scientific atheist movement, this is a claim that an escalating clash of civilizations is 
pushing people to choose a side between “reason” and “faith”, which actually seem to be 
equivalent to “West” and “(Middle) East”.  That is, “civilized people” here means the 
white Western world, while the Islamic world is a faith-based “enemy”.  This dichotomy 
reflects Hitchens’ general tendency to represent global politics in the black-and-white 
terms of a struggle between courageous heroes and evil villains.   
Hitchens explains what he believes to be the major obstacle in this struggle 
between the forces of reason and faith within the West. Discussing the infamous incident 
of the publishing of cartoons depicting Mohamed in a newspaper in Denmark and the 
wave of protest and violence it spawned, resulting in many major news agencies refusing 
to reproduce the images, Hitchens blames the mass media’s capitulation to the protesters 
on fear and relativism: “To the ignoble motive of fear one must add the morally lazy 
practice of relativism: no group of nonreligious people threatening and practicing 
violence would have been granted such an easy victory, or had their excuses – not that 
they offered any of their own – made for them” (2007: 281).  This is one example among 
many criticisms in Hitchens’ work of a postmodern cultural climate where matters of 
faith are beyond question.   
 Here we arrive at the crux of the matter: the New Atheism’s rejection of a liberal 
politics of tolerance, represented by policies of multiculturalism, and in academic circles 
by a ‘post-modern’ epistemology of relativism.  Grace Davie (2004: 78) explains the 
challenge postmodernity introduces to the theory, and doctrine, of secularization:  
...the secular certainties (science, rationalism, progress, etc.), the 
erstwhile competitors of religious truth, are themselves under attack... 
No longer is it assumed that a secular discourse will gradually 
overcome a recognizable and unified religious alternative.  Instead, 
both secular and religious thinking will evolve, as multiple groups of 
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people find their own ways forward and creeds (both secular and 
religious) to live by in the early years of the 21st century. 
Here Davie expresses the view that Taylor (2007) would articulate as the defining 
characteristic of our “secular age”, namely, that secularism does not mean the hegemonic 
triumph of scientific rationality over religion, but rather, that secular and religious ways 
of living co-exist and evolve into novel forms in late modern society.  The New Atheism 
is a reaction against precisely this kind of secularism, where science loses its footing as 
the bedrock of secularization, and truth and meaning are permanently contested and 
socially constructed fields.  This kind of secularization is therefore undesirable, and the 
New Atheism thus advocates not secularization, but the scientization of society and 
culture.   
 Davie suggests that in Europe there have been two religious responses to the 
challenge presented by the uncertainty of post/late modernity, two forms of religious life 
that have been able to prosper: New Age and fundamentalism.  New age spiritualities 
have “adapted most easily to the flux of late modernity”, while fundamentalism involves 
“tightly bound groups” that “provide havens for those people that find it difficult to live 
with change and uncertainty (the hallmarks of postmodernism)” (2004: 78).  I posit that 
the New Atheism is another such response, and the scientistic belief system it promotes 
answers uncertainty with absolutism.  My view is supported by William Stahl, who 
argues that “both the New Atheism and fundamentalism are attempts to recreate authority 
in the face of crises of meaning in late modernity” (2010: 97), and that both are involved 
in a “quest for certainty, for an authoritative foundation that can ground a normative 
order” (2010: 101).   
 The ground for this normative order is scientism.  Harris has gone so far as to 
claim in his book The Moral Landscape that the study of ethics falls within the domain of 
the natural sciences, and advances in evolutionary psychology and particularly 
neuroscience allow scientists to “determine” proper values (Harris 2010).  The grounding 
for this normative order is perceived to be threatened by “postmodernism”, which is 
equated with epistemic relativism, a product of developments in the social sciences and 
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humanities in the late 20th century.  Because the social sciences are perceived as the 
grounding of relativism – and thus represent a rival form of thought that must be 
excluded and denigrated, according to Eagleton’s (1991) definition of ideology – the 
New Atheism targets this segment of the academy for attack.  The strategy is to argue for 
sociobiology as a replacement for the social sciences, which Darwinism has made 
redundant.  This is the view (in-)famously advanced by Harvard entomologist E.O. 
Wilson in his 1975 book Sociobiology, which argues that the social sciences should be 
considered an undeveloped branch of evolutionary biology.   
Richard Dawkins enthusiastically agrees.  On the very first page of The Selfish 
Gene, Dawkins laments that “Philosophy and the subjects known as ‘humanities’ are still 
taught almost as if Darwin had never lived” (1989: 1).  In another revealing passage, he 
ponders the potentially limitless scope of natural selection: “The laws of physics are 
supposed to be true all over the accessible universe.  Are there any principles of biology 
that are likely to have similar universal validity?” (1989: 191).  This presumed universal 
validity extends beyond the natural world and into the social world, where Dawkins’ 
meme-based theory of religion emerges as a speculative translation of evolutionary 
biology into cultural theory.  This leap in logic is an extension of the ideological view 
that “Darwinism is too big a theory to be confined to the narrow context of the gene” 
(Dawkins 1989: 191), and is indicative of his general contempt for the social sciences.   
The explanations of religion provided by the social sciences, Dawkins (2006) tells 
us, are “proximate”, and not “ultimate” explanations.  Only the Darwinian explanation 
ultimately arrives at the truth about where religion comes from, and it involves an 
application of the theory to two things: our brains and the genetic evolution that gave rise 
to them, and ideas which exist outside of these brains in a meme-pool which is also 
subject to the process of natural selection.  He does deal very briefly with “proximate” 
explanations (i.e. those that lie outside of the province of the natural sciences and are 
therefore inferior to “ultimate” explanations) in the final chapter of The God Delusion, 
where he notes that “Religion has at one time or another been thought to fill four main 
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roles in human life: explanation, exhortation, consolation and inspiration” (2006: 347), 
but like Hitchens, he considers these minor and relatively insignificant factors.   
Daniel Dennett is Dawkins’ closest ally among the Four Horsemen on the matter 
of sociobiology.  Dennett is even more explicit about his support for Darwinistic 
interpretations of socio-cultural phenomena and his portrayal of the social sciences as an 
antagonist to scientific truth.  This is clear when he writes, “Anyone who tries to bring an 
evolutionary perspective to bear on any item of human culture, not just religion, can 
expect rebuffs ranging from howls of outrage to haughty dismissal from the literary, 
historical, and cultural experts in the humanities and social sciences” (Dennett 2006: 
259).  Like Dawkins, he dismisses the “proximate” explanations of religious belief, 
which are symptoms of a “disorder often encountered in the humanities and social 
sciences: premature curiosity satisfaction” (Dennett 2006: 103).  This “disorder” is 
demonstrated when questions regarding origins are “left unexamined by people who lose 
interest once they have found a purpose or function for religion that strikes them as 
plausible” (2006: 102).  The purposes Dennett cites are comfort, explanation, and 
cooperation, and with that he perfunctorily summarizes, and dismisses, the social 
scientific understanding of religion.  Instead, Dennett supports Dawkins’ evolutionistic 
theory of religion, explaining its general nature as a by-product of adaptive 
characteristics, with meme theory explaining the particularities.  Also like Dawkins, 
Dennett believes Darwinism is sufficient to explain social and cultural phenomena more 
generally, claiming that “in principle the process of natural selection is substrate-neutral” 
and that evolution will occur wherever the conditions of replication, variation, and 
differential fitness (or competition) are met (2006: 341).  In organic evolution the 
substrate for natural selection is the unit of the gene, organism, or group (Dawkins 
favours a gene-centred view), and in cultural evolution the substrate is ideas.   
The New Atheism, certainly as represented by Dawkins and Dennett, might be 
understood as a manifestation of a resurgence of sociobiology in recent decades. 
Sociobiologists like Wilson, Dawkins, and Dennett who invoke evolution by natural 
selection as a universal explanatory framework, effectively “challenged the basic 
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assumption on which the social sciences of the twentieth century had been built: the 
rejection of biology as a determinant of human behaviour” (Bowler 2003: 360).  In 
essence, then, “The project of sociobiology, so clearly set out by Wilson, is to render the 
social sciences unnecessary” (Rose and Rose 2010: 112).  Sociobiology is a foundational 
element in the project of scientific hegemony, demanding that “only genetic causes of 
behaviour should be taken seriously, and it is therefore presented in metaphors which rule 
out human freedom, presenting people, along with other animals and plants, as machines” 
(Midgley 2002: 151).  It thus seeks to render the social sciences redundant.   
Dawkins has recently become more assertive in this regard, particularly on social 
media, where he tends to express his views most frankly.  In response to tweets he 
received accusing him of racism for comments about Muslim “barbarism”, Dawkins 
wrote: “So many people incapable of drawing an elementary distinction: between racism 
and INSTITUTIONAL racism. Probably studied sociology” (Dawkins Twitter May 24 
2013).  If his contempt for sociology were not clear here, it is abundantly clear in a re-
tweet of a comment made by one of his followers, a sign of a view he supports: 
“@RichardDawkins be fair, sociology allows McDonald’s to get a slightly more educated 
staff pool” (Dawkins Twitter May 24 2013).  When another Twitter user made the 
obviously problematic claim that one cannot by definition be racist or sexist against white 
men because they are the group holding power, Dawkins responded with: “Really? By 
whose dictionary? Certainly not the Oxford Dictionary. Dictionary of sociology 
perhaps?”  Finally, Dawkins notably offered a blurb for Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont’s 
(1998) Fashionable Nonsense, an extended critique of the social sciences and humanities 
that equates them with postmodernism, relativism, obscurantism, and of course, general 
nonsense.  This was a follow up to Sokal’s infamous hoax publication in the journal 
Social Text that instigated the “science wars” of the 1990s (Ross 1996).  On the back 
cover Dawkins is found saying that “the hoax was earnestly needed and richly justified”.  
There is no longer any ambiguity with respect to his disdain for sociology, which he 
equates with relativism and a general distortion of scientific truth.   
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The salient point here is that the rejection of the social sciences is more precisely 
a rejection of relativism.  Replacing the social sciences with sociobiology is in fact an 
endorsement of absolutism, with the natural sciences providing ‘ultimate’ knowledge 
with respect to questions and issues that, from a sociological standpoint, have no clear 
answer and are not reducible to a single all-encompassing explanation.  The epistemic 
relativism attributed to the social sciences is an obstacle to the scientific critique of 
religion.  The social sciences are therefore reduced to an undeveloped branch of 
evolutionary biology, subsumed to what Dawkins (2006) considers the “ultimate” theory 
of natural selection, which Daniel Dennett views as a theory of such vast scope that it 
transcends disciplinary boundaries, “promising to unite and explain just about everything 
in one magnificent vision” (1995: 82).   Sociobiology not only undermines the social 
sciences, but also provides a ‘scientific’ theoretical framework for the New Atheism’s 
views on socio-cultural evolution, explaining differences between the West and its Others 
as a matter of more or less advanced stages of progress, which is stunted as a function of 
the relative influence of religion.   
The epistemic relativism that threatens the scientific critique of religion is 
intimately wedded to cultural relativism, the primary object of the New Atheism’s 
political critique.  We see the two converge in Dawkins’ analysis of the main obstacle to 
the critique of religion: the cultural imperative to respect individual beliefs, no matter 
how they accord with science or reason.  The two sources of this imperative are the 
demand for respect for private faith, which is supported by a climate of epistemic 
relativism, and the development of a political culture that has abandoned the universal as 
a guiding principle in favour of multiculturalism and cultural relativism, which embraces 
diversity in pluralistic societies.  These are both grounded in the same general principle, 
which is that no one has a monopoly on truth and morality, a position Dawkins attributes 
to a general tendency to embrace a diversity of perspectives and to accept all cultures, 
ways of thinking, and ways of living as equally valid – in other words, relativism.  In the 
New Atheism discourse these are characteristics of a ‘postmodern’ liberalism that 
emphasizes pluralism and tolerance of difference.  This is in contrast with the ‘modern’ 
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liberalism Dawkins favours, which is essentially an appeal to scientific authority as an 
absolute foundation for decision making, regardless of cultural considerations.    
Dawkins sees the Western liberal world wading into the waters of relativism, and 
his concern with religion is more fundamentally a fear that science is losing its place as 
the pillar of modern society and engine of progress. Further, he seems disturbed that 
rationalism is being replaced in politics with a pluralistic embrace of diversity to such an 
extent that it becomes impossible to take a position on anything, with liberalism rendered 
entirely ineffectual:  
The same tendency to glory in the quaintness of ethnic religious habits, 
and to justify cruelties in their name, crops up again and again.  It is the 
source of squirming internal conflict in the minds of nice liberal people 
who, on the one hand, cannot bear suffering and cruelty, but on the 
other hand have been trained by postmodernists and relativists to 
respect other cultures no less than their own.  Female circumcision is 
undoubtedly hideously painful....and one half of the decent liberal mind 
wants to abolish the practice.  The other half, however, ‘respects’ ethnic 
cultures and feels that we should not interfere if ‘they’ want to mutilate 
‘their’ girls (Dawkins 2006: 328). 
Liberals, Dawkins argues, have lost their original guiding impetus of rationalism and 
empiricism after being “trained” by “postmodernists” to embrace cultural relativism.  
This makes it difficult to take a firm position on cultural practices such as female genital 
mutilation, which should naturally offend the liberal mind as a barbaric violation of 
human health and dignity.  Cultural relativism, if it defends irrationalism, is an affront to 
the notion of universal human rights, and the only answer to this problem is to return to 
rationalism and empiricism, to reason and scientific evidence, as the basis of politics (if it 
ever was in the first place – Dawkins’ Enlightenment utopia only ever existed in his own 
mind).  Dawkins, then, takes the same position on the ‘problem of tolerance’ that Sam 
Harris takes: both want to rescue liberalism from a descent into the abyss of relativism, 
which neutralizes our capacity to respond to the challenge religion poses to civilization.  
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Here the ‘pre-modern’ and ‘post-modern’ threats to modernity and the project of 
secularization converge.   
The New Atheism’s position on this perceived crisis within liberalism and 
modernity were summarized in a revealing Los Angeles Times piece by Sam Harris 
entitled “The End of Liberalism”.  It is worth quoting here in some detail (my italics): 
Increasingly, Americans will come to believe that the only people 
hard-headed enough to fight the religious lunatics of the Muslim world 
are the religious lunatics of the West. Indeed, it is telling that the people 
who speak with the greatest moral clarity about the current wars in the 
Middle East are members of the Christian right, whose infatuation with 
biblical prophecy is nearly as troubling as the ideology of our enemies. 
Religious dogmatism is now playing both sides of the board in a very 
dangerous game.  
While liberals should be the ones pointing the way beyond this 
Iron Age madness, they are rendering themselves increasingly 
irrelevant. Being generally reasonable and tolerant of diversity, liberals 
should be especially sensitive to the dangers of religious literalism. But 
they aren’t. 
The same failure of liberalism is evident in Western Europe, 
where the dogma of multiculturalism has left a secular Europe very 
slow to address the looming problem of religious extremism among its 
immigrants. The people who speak most sensibly about the threat that 
Islam poses to Europe are actually fascists.  
To say that this does not bode well for liberalism is an 
understatement: It does not bode well for the future of civilization.6 
To summarize, Harris’ view is that the “dogma of multiculturalism”, with its emphasis on 
tolerance of diversity, constitutes a “failure of liberalism” by rendering it incapable of 
addressing the threat “our enemies” (that is, Muslims) pose to “civilization”.  Perhaps 
most striking in this passage is that Harris attributes the greatest “moral clarity” on the 
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issue of Islam to European fascists and the Christian right.  These are the people who, by 
his own admission, share his perspective on how to approach the “looming problem” 
immigration of Muslims poses to civilized Europe.  In a similar vein, Dawkins, in 
reference to a ruling by the European court against crucifixes in public school 
classrooms, wrote on his website, “If I thought the motive was secularist I would indeed 
welcome it. But are we sure it is not pandering to ‘multiculturalism’, which in Europe is 
code for Islam? And if you think Catholicism is evil . .” (Dawkins 2009b).  Dawkins 
interprets the ruling as being motivated by a multiculturalist accommodation of Islam – 
which is much more “evil” than Catholicism – rather than secularism.  
Harris argues that religious “moderates” – that is, non-fundamentalists – and 
liberals who preach tolerance and respect of difference, “provide the context in which 
scriptural literalism and religious violence can never be adequately opposed” (Harris 
2004: 45), a view shared by all the Four Horsemen.  Harris insists that science and reason 
alone can rescue humanity from an accelerating descent into apocalyptic global conflict: 
“Only openness to evidence and argument will secure a common world for us” (2004: 
48).  This is an implicit rejection of pluralism and the accommodation of cultural 
diversity.  In contrast, Harris advocates a model of politics based on the authority of 
scientific rationality, where democratic consensus is mediated by science and its 
‘experts’.  Tolerance of beliefs that contradict scientific knowledge simply does not fit 
into the worldview of someone who suggests that “Some propositions are so dangerous 
that it may even be ethical to kill people for believing them” (Harris 2004: 52-53).   
This is an extreme example of what TalalAsad refers to as “the violence of 
universalizing reason” (2003: 59) at the heart of liberalism.  This violence occurs because 
“to make an enlightened space, the liberal must continually attack the darkness of the 
outside world that threatens to overwhelm that space” (Asad, 2003: 59).  A menacing 
outside is constructed, against which the enlightened space is contrasted and defended, 
and they exercise different types of violence: “Violence required by the cultivation of 
enlightenment is therefore distinguished from the violence of the dark jungle” (Asad, 
2003: 60).  That is, the former is justifiable in the name of progress, while the latter is the 
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violence of terror and ignorance.  Asad argues that liberal violence is not the “necessary 
unfolding of an Enlightenment essence”, but rather it is “just a way some liberals have 
argued and acted” (2003: 60).  
The New Atheists are just the kind of liberals he refers to.  This liberalism is 
characterized not by freedom and diversity, but rather by a specific worldview and mode 
of social organization that its supporters believe they have a duty to bring to bring to 
others (or impose on them by force, if necessary), justified by the ideals of progress and 
civilization.  In their view, political decisions must be made through a process of 
deliberation under the auspices of scientific authority.  Neither governments, nor 
individuals or groups whose politics are informed by identity or cultural traditions, have 
the right to supersede the authority of science and reason in matters involving the public 
good.  Perhaps the best example of this is Dawkins’ (2006) view that socialization of 
children in any religious tradition constitutes child abuse because the child is not yet 
capable of deciding for themselves, through reason, what to believe.  Dawkins thus 
argues that those guilty of religious indoctrination of their children should, perhaps, lose 
their parental rights and have their children taken from them by the state, acting in the 
name of ‘reason’.  Dawkins’ version of liberalism clearly would not grant individuals the 
freedom to practice cultural traditions.  In his world freedom would be constrained to 
beliefs and practices that meet the requirements of rationality and empirical verifiability – 
anything that lies outside of this realm can be understood as “indoctrination”.  We should 
be careful, then, not to interpret the New Atheists’ advocacy of liberalism as support for 
individual freedom and participatory democracy.  It is, rather, a statement on the 
cognitive, moral, and ultimately political authority of science and its expert practitioners.   
There is a corollary here to the religious revival of the late 20th century.  Terry 
Eagleton suggests that “The recent religious resurgence is distinctive not just because it is 
everywhere on the rise, but because it often takes a political form…. postmodernity is the 
era in which religion goes public and collective once again, but more as a substitute for 
classical politics than a reassertion of it” (2009: 44).  Fundamentalist forms of religion, 
Eagleton argues, set out to transform the world rather than take refuge from it – this 
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corresponds with Eisenstadt’s (1999) view of fundamentalism as both a utopian belief 
system and a social movement with aspirations for profound social transformation.  They 
are political, or “antipolitical” in their desire to substitute politics with “culturalism” 
taking the form of religion (Eagleton 2009: 42-43). This is exemplified most clearly in 
the Islamic revolution, which instituted the Koran as the unquestionable source of 
political authority, leaving no room for democratic deliberations. The Christian Right is 
also effectively anti-political to the extent that political and ethical principles are derived 
exclusively from the Bible, which is interpreted by religious authorities, leaving no room 
for democratic deliberations among citizens. The New Atheism follows a similarly anti-
political fundamentalist logic, but rather than substituting culture for politics, they wish to 
substitute science for politics.  In so doing they reject deliberative democracy, which is 
subject to non-scientific cultural influences, in favour of scientific authority.  
Indeed, the sociobiology that informs the New Atheism’s understanding of 
religion, culture more generally, and the social world, is in essence a political program 
for enhancing the power and influence of science.  This is the view expressed in biologist 
Richard Lewontin’s critique of Edward O. Wilson’s book Sociobiology, in which he sees 
“a vision of neurobiologists and sociobiologists as the technocrats of the near future who 
will provide the necessary knowledge for ethical and political decisions in the planned 
society…Sociobiology is basically a political science whose results may be used, 
eventually, as the scientific tools of ‘correct’ social organization” (Lewontin 1977: 16).   
Lewontin’s critique of Wilson effectively captures what I consider the political 
science at the heart of the New Atheism.  Sociobiology is a ‘scientific’ approach to 
politics and social problems that is effectively depoliticized to the extent that it is 
presented as an objective science, and thus stands outside the realm of democratic 
deliberations because its politics do not rely on consensus of opinion, but simply 
scientific fact.  The New Atheism, then, is effectively a political ideology disguised as 
disinterested scientific inquiry, which in turn is how their views are naturalized and 
universalized.  Its attack on religion, and on the social sciences and humanities, is 
effectively a statement on the nature of modern society and a defence of an evolutionistic 
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vision of progress.  Its Darwinistic ‘social theory’ carries an imperative for the correct 
mode of social organization, and appropriate systems of belief.  While Asad (2003) 
describes secularism as a “political doctrine” that sets up the conditions for a secular 
democracy, the New Atheism’s ideology of scientism and secularization is essentially 
anti-democratic and authoritarian in its insistence on relegating not just cognitive, but 
also moral and political authority, to science and its practitioners.   
 
Conclusion 
 The New Atheism is much more than an assault on religion.  Indeed, this assault 
is only one element of an ideology with the goal of legitimating scientific authority.  
Returning to the dimensions of ideology identified above, the New Atheism promotes its 
own belief system (scientism/evolutionism) that is essentially political in nature, 
naturalizes and universalizes these beliefs by equating them with objective science and 
‘natural’ laws determining the course of history, denigrates challenging ideas (religion), 
excludes rival forms of thought (social sciences/humanities), and obscures social reality 
by making religion a scapegoat for social problems at the expense of a careful 
examination of the structure of modern society, insisting instead that submission to the 
authority of science is the solution to these problems and the only path to civilization. 
This secular ideology can be understood as a secular fundamentalism, constructing a 
modern utopia (as opposed to anti-modern religious fundamentalisms) founded on the 
universal authority, and inherently progressive nature, of science. Like other 
fundamentalisms, New Atheism is a totalizing ideology that seeks to universalize its 
particular belief system, presenting it as an essential truth and the only path to legitimate 
knowledge.   
The belief system the New Atheism promotes is different from 19th century 
scientific atheism only in the greater sophistication brought to evolutionism by the 
nascent disciplines of evolutionary psychology and neuroscience.  Like other thinkers in 
this tradition, the scientific critique of religion is only one element in the promotion of a 
vision of the world, how it should be, how we determine how it should be, and who has 
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the authority to say so.   For the New Atheism, this vision is, in a word, scientism.  The 
19th century split in atheism is represented today by a group that has appropriated the 
term ‘atheism’ as a synonym for scientism and a Darwinian view of human nature and 
society.  This is an extension of the view of some Victorian Darwinists who 
manufactured the idea of an inevitable and eternal struggle between religion and science 
“to provide a world-historic pretext for Darwin’s challenge to religious control over all 
levels of education, even in nominally secular countries” (Fuller, 2008: 87).  This false 
notion of the enduring and intractable conflict between the epistemologies and 
institutions of religion and science – referred to by some historians of science and 
religion simply as the “conflict myth” (Lindberg 2010) – is today wielded by the Four 
Horsemen for the polemical purpose of advancing the 19th century view that “Moderns, 
who by definition possess science, must therefore reject religion and magic. A cultural 
evolution has occurred, and there is no looking back” (Segal 2004: 135).   
 The New Atheism’s critique of religion, then, is a manifestation of its defence of a 
teleological vision of modernity as a universal unfolding of history from pre-scientific 
barbarism to scientific civilization.  This, again, is tied to a politicized understanding of 
evolution as a social process, with all cultures at various stages of evolution toward a 
singular civilization driven and defined by scientific rationality.  This view of social 
evolution as a progressive scientization of socio-political institutions is thus an instance 
of secularization as political doctrine, in which modernity is understood as a project of 
universalizing scientism and the emerging authority of scientific experts.  These views on 
the nature of modernity and civilization arise most clearly in the New Atheist discourse 
on Islam, with Islamic societies represented as “backward” and “uncivilized”, and the 
presence of Muslims in the west a threat to progress.  Islamic civilizations serve as the 
Other of enlightened modernity, a notion employed in portraying the advanced status of 
western secular-liberal society. Cavanaugh (2009) notes that this is a typical ideological 
function of transcultural and transcultural conceptions of religions as sets of truth claims, 
like that the New Atheism advances.  
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 The New Atheism’s promotion of its own ideology, rooted in a defence of its 
vision of modernity, was analyzed in this chapter in terms of two major strategies that 
amount to attacking its ‘pre-modern’ and ‘post-modern’ rivals, religion and relativism.  
These strategies involve ideological action, or promoting and attacking various sets of 
beliefs in the public sphere.  The third strategy adopted by the New Atheism is something 
quite different. It involves building a sense of community and a positive collective 
identity to create a hospitable cultural environment for atheism to flourish.  In this respect 
the New Atheism is not only an intellectual current, but also a social movement that – 
like other forms of fundamentalism – seeks to shape the world according to its belief 
system and set of essential truths (Eisenstadt 1999).  The following chapter examines the 
social movement aspects of New Atheism, including its conflicts with other elements 
within the atheist and secularist movement, particularly groups that aim at more explicitly 
political goals at the expense of the New Atheism’s goal of broad cultural transformation 
and the promotion of scientism as a belief system.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ATHEIST MOVEMENT 
 
The Atheist Movement(s): An Analytical Framework  
The New Atheists defend a particular vision of modernity, the enemies of which 
are ‘pre-modern’ superstition and ‘post-modern’ relativism.  The unexpected appearance 
of these enemies has in their view derailed the process of secularization, and they set out 
to combat each with the rhetorical tools of science and reason. Their aggressive and 
uncompromising approach, a product ultimately of frustration at a failed vision of 
modernity and secularization and reaction to perceived challenges to scientific 
hegemony, has brought the secularist movement unprecedented attention.  It has also 
created a rift within the movement, which had heretofore been constituted by atheism and 
secular humanism, which have historically been considered roughly interchangeable 
positions and collections of individuals under the banner of “freethinkers” (Jacoby 2004).  
That is, humanists could generally be considered to be atheists and vice versa, though 
these two groups might choose to emphasize different things (non-belief in God for the 
latter, humanistic ethics for the former).   
Today new tensions are emerging between these groups, with those scientific 
atheists represented and influenced by the New Atheists continuing on the path of the 
dialectical development of atheism (discussed in the first chapter), and many secular 
humanists ready to move beyond the religion/science dichotomy and focus on basic 
underlying values and social issues that their movement should strive to represent and 
fight for (for example, science-driven policy decisions and social justice).  This chapter 
analyzes the emergence of the New Atheism as a sub-group within an already existing 
freethought movement, which I take to be comprised of organizations defined by any one 
or more of atheism, secularism, rationalism, and humanism (I will sometimes refer to this 
movement simply as the “atheist movement”, which I use as inclusive of these terms). It 
examines the New Atheism’s goals and strategies in relation to the ideology that 
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underwrites it, as well some recent and ongoing tensions between atheists and secular 
humanists that arise from the engagement in identity politics. Specifically, the former 
group emphasizes difference and their minority status, while the latter seeks assimilation 
and cooperation with groups – possibly including religious groups – that share their 
concerns regarding science education and social issues.   
 It should be noted at the outset that calling atheism a “movement” is somewhat 
controversial. In his analysis of the New Atheism phenomenon, William Stahl puts it 
bluntly: “Atheism is not a social movement” (2010: 97). In general, scholars studying 
atheism have made scant reference to the notion of social movements, with the singular 
exception of Richard Cimino and Christopher Smith (2007, 2010), and even they argue 
that it is better understood as a subculture than a social movement. I argue that recent 
events indicate that the associations of people Cimino and Smith (2007) refer to 
collectively as “freethinkers” – i.e. atheists, rationalists, secularists, and humanists – must 
be treated as a social movement, but we must be specific about what type of movement it 
is. We must also be specific about which group we are referring to, because I will argue 
that within this group of freethinkers there are sub-groups with fairly distinct goals, 
ideological groundings, and strategic orientations. The analysis is complicated by the fact 
that there is considerable overlap between these groups. Doubtless many individuals 
would identify with all three. I believe that it is possible, however, to identify various 
distinctions regarding goals, strategies, and ideology that compel us to recognize at least 
three sub-groups as relatively distinct elements within the freethought movement. These 
include secular humanists, new (scientific) atheists, and libertarian rationalists.  My 
primary task is to understand the phenomenon of the New Atheism. I will therefore 
emphasize this ideological subset of the movement in my analysis, but this phenomenon 
can only be understood in relation to and in distinction from the other groups that oppose 
each other in some important ways. 
While atheist and secularist organizations have been around for some time, the 
New Atheist movement is new, even though it has emerged within the structure of 
existing social movement organizations, such as the Council for Secular Humanism and 
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its parent organization the Center for Inquiry (CFI), and Atheist Alliance International 
(AAI). While I will refer to other organizations in this analysis (Table 1 lists these 
according to their major focus), I focus on CFI and AAI because they are the 
organizations the New Atheists have been most active in. The Four Horsemen famously 
all delivered presentations at the 2007 convention of the Atheist Alliance International. 
The 2009 edition of the AAI convention was co-organized by the Richard Dawkins 
Foundation for Reason and Science (RDFRS). In this instance Dawkins was not just an 
influential figure and celebrity speaker, but actively involved as an organizer and 
movement leader.  AAI and particularly CFI are the organizations where the presence of 
these four has been felt most strongly (aside from RDFRS, of course). Because of their 
strong presence and influence within CFI and AAI, these are the organizations I have 
chosen as the focus of my research.  
Traditionally the atheist/secularist movement has addressed one element of the 
secularization thesis, while the New Atheism addresses the other.  These two sub-theses 
posit that secularization is a process characterized by (1) the differentiation of religious 
and secular spheres and the concomitant distinction between private and public 
dimensions of life, and (2) a general decline in religious belief and practice (Asad, 2003; 
Bruce, 2002; Casanova, 1994; Taylor, 2007). In its emphasis on church-state separation 
(in recent years manifest most conspicuously in legal battles regarding creationism vs. 
evolution in public education), civil liberties, and protection for atheists from 
discrimination, the freethought movement has traditionally addressed the first sub-thesis 
through instrumental political action that can take the form of lobbying government, 
organized protests and demonstrations, and lawsuits (Cimino and Smith 2007).  
American Atheists, for instance, was founded by Madalyn Murray O’Hair in 1963 
in the wake of her constitutional challenge to religious instruction in public schools, and 
thus was born of a particular instance of instrumental legal-political action (LeBeau, 
2003). Today its mandate is “Supporting civil rights for atheists and the separation of 
church and state” (American Atheists 2013), a conspicuously political goal.  The Secular 
Coalition for America website explains that the group’s purpose is to “formalize a 
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cooperative structure for visible, unified activism to improve the civic situation of 
citizens with a naturalistic worldview”, and that it is located in Washington, D.C. “for 
ready access to government” in their lobbying efforts to represent the views of atheists 
(Secular Coalition 2013). The Freedom From Religion Foundation, an American 
secularist group founded in 1976, is guided by the primary goal of “protecting the 
constitutional principle of the separation of church and state” (Freedom from Religion 
2013), a political goal that involves lobbying efforts and lawsuits against government 
agencies and public institutions.  Examining the mandates and activities of these 
organizations, we see that the freethought movement as a whole has traditionally had 
clear political goals and has essentially acted as a movement for secularism as 
differentiation (i.e. the first sub-thesis) or at best to promote the civil rights of atheists, 
who in their view constitute a marginalized and even oppressed segment of American 
society.   
 
Table 1. Movement organizations 
 
Atheist Secularist Humanist Rationalist 
Atheist Alliance 
International 
Freedom From 
Religion 
Foundation (US) 
American Humanist 
Association 
Center for Inquiry 
(US) 
Atheist Alliance of 
America  
Secular Student 
Alliance (US) 
Humanist Canada Centre for Inquiry 
Canada 
American Atheists Canadian Secular 
Alliance 
 Richard Dawkins 
Foundation for 
Reason and Science 
(international) 
Military Association 
of Atheists and 
Freethinkers (US) 
Secular Coalition 
for America 
  
 
 
The New Atheists’ effort to change people’s beliefs and to convince them of the 
superiority of their particular ethico-epistemic system places attention on the second 
 
 
101 
secularization sub-thesis (encouraging the abandonment of religious belief) and exhibits 
greater concern with cultural beliefs and values than politics (the first secularization sub-
thesis, differentiation of public/secular and private/religious spheres, is more clearly a 
political process).  They therefore eschew instrumental legal and public political pursuits, 
and focus attention on the second secularization sub-thesis.  Toward this end, they pursue 
a goal of broad cultural transformation, arguing that religion cannot be simply pushed to 
the private sphere, but rather, religious beliefs must be destroyed and replaced with 
scientific rationality in the name of progress.   We can thus distinguish the New Atheist 
movement within the previously existing freethought movement on the basis of this 
distinction: the former is primarily a cultural movement while the latter is a political 
movement.   
In taking this view I am drawing primarily on Alberto Melucci’s (1989; 1996) 
pioneering work on contemporary movements that direct action outside the formal 
political system, and adopt “cultural” goals like collectively constructing identity, 
transforming representations of cultural groups and minorities, and challenging dominant 
values. Melucci’s work was part of the “new social movements” paradigm that emerged 
mostly outside of the American context in the 1990’s.  It sought to develop a new 
framework for research on identity-based movements that resisted explanation within the 
framework of the existing structure-based approaches of resource mobilization (Tilly 
1978) and political process (McAdam 1982).  These understood social movements as 
collective action directed at the state on the part of actors sharing a common structural 
location, and thus a common disenfranchisement.  These approaches focused on class as 
the condition giving rise to collective action, while tending to neglect the key problems of 
identity and ideology, resulting in a “structural bias” (McAdam 1994) and the 
presumption of “an already-existing collective actor able to recognize the opening of 
political opportunities and to mobilize indigenous resources for political purposes” 
(Polletta and Jasper 2001: 286).  The “new” social movements in question – primarily 
identity-based ones such as the women’s movement and the gay rights movement – 
involved actors sharing a common identity but no common structural location (Johnston 
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et. al., 1994).  Hence, a new paradigm emerged that offered something more than the 
existing “utilitarian economic models” (W. Gamson, 1992: 53) that tended to neglect the 
subjective dimensions of identity and meaning.   
Melucci (1996) argued precisely that the locus of social conflict has shifted from 
class to questions of meaning and identity, and that state-centred approaches could not 
sufficiently account for the distinctly non-political goals and targets of emerging forms of 
collective action.   These new movements did not express themselves through political 
action, but rather, “raised cultural challenges to the dominant language” (Melucci 1995: 
41).  Melucci defines the political (in relation to social movements) narrowly as 
interaction between actors within the formal political system of governance and state 
authority.  Much action in new social movements is not ‘political’ in this sense, even if it 
clearly has political implications in a more expansive understanding of the concept, and 
the social and cultural problems addressed by this action cannot be resolved at the level 
of the state.   
In the new social movements paradigm, groups with no clear political goals (i.e. 
influencing government authorities) can be considered social movement actors on the 
basis of strictly cultural goals, such as promoting a particular idea or worldview 
(Staggenborg, 2008). Perhaps most significantly, movements can transform cultural 
representations and social norms in terms of how groups see themselves are how they are 
seen by others (Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 284). This can be an enormous achievement for 
a social movement, with a signature example being the gay rights movement, which 
succeeded in bringing about cultural transformation by constructing and promoting 
identity and challenging conventional assumptions and biases outside of the formal 
political system.  That is, the movement was not directed at the state, but rather, 
addressed homophobia in society.  Indeed, for new social movements, ideology and 
collective identity construction are the most important elements of collective action 
(Melucci 1989; McAdam 1994).  In this view, successful movement outcomes are not 
limited to legislative and policy changes achieved through direct interaction with the 
state, but rather, cultural impacts on their own can be considered successful outcomes, 
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regardless of whether they result in state action, and identity may be a worthwhile goal in 
itself (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; W. Gamson 1998).   
Many have pointed out that identity construction is not exclusive to new social 
movements, but an important element of movements historically, including the labour 
movement (Calhoun, 1993; W. Gamson, 1992; Tilly, 1988), and that any self-defining 
group by definition makes a collective identity claim (Hunt et. al., 1994).  I therefore 
choose not to use the term “new” social movements, but rather, I will refer to these 
identity- and ideology-based movements as “cultural” movements, in contrast with the 
“political” movements that direct action toward the state, as in the instrumental, rational-
actor models (i.e. political process and resource mobilization theory).  Here I do not mean 
to make a rigid distinction between cultural and political spheres of social life and action, 
but rather, these terms distinguish different types of social movement goals and activity 
for analytical purposes.  I thus offer the following definitions: Political movements 
involve instrumental action aimed at the state with the goal of legislative and policy 
change. Cultural movements involve constructing and defending shared identities, as well 
as ideological action aimed at society with the goal of transforming beliefs and values.   
The distinction between these two types of movements is summarized in Table 2.  
It is formulated in relation to Melucci’s model of the three dimensions of movement 
activity that together comprise its “action system”, with collective identity emerging from 
the process of negotiating tensions regarding orientation to the action system: 
Individuals or subgroups contribute to the formation of a ‘we’ (more or 
less stable and integrated according to the type of action) by rendering 
common and laboriously adjusting three orders of orientations: those 
relating to the ends of the actions (the sense the action has for the 
actor); those relating to the means (the possibilities and the limits of the 
action); and finally those relating to relationships with the environment 
(the field in which the action takes place).  The action system of a 
collective actor is thus organized along a number of polarities in a state 
of mutual tension.  The collective actor seeks to give an acceptable and 
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lasting unity to such a system, which is continuously subject to tensions 
because action has to meet multiple and contrasting requirements in 
terms of ends, means, and environment.  Collective mobilization can 
occur and can even continue because the actor has succeeded in 
realizing, and in the course of the action continues to realize, a certain 
integration between those contrasting requirements.  This ‘social 
construction’ of the ‘collective’ through negotiation and renegotiation is 
continually at work when a form of collective action occurs.  A failure 
or a break in this constructive process makes the action impossible 
(Melucci 1995: 43-44). 
 
Table 2.  Characteristics of political and cultural movements 
 Political Movements Cultural Movements 
General orientation formal and restrictive informal and expansive 
Goals (ends) legal and policy change 
changing norms, values, 
beliefs 
Strategy (means) instrumental action ideological action 
Target (field) state civil society 
 
A collective actor, then, is defined in terms of a common orientation to an action system, 
which includes three elements: the desired goals of the action (ends), the strategies by 
which they might be realized (means), and the environment or field within which the 
action is carried out, and where and to whom it is directed (that is, the target of the 
action).  Table 2 outlines a distinction between general orientations to the action system 
in political and cultural movements.  Political movements are more formal and restrictive 
in their approach: their goals involve specific legal and policy changes, they take an 
instrumental approach to realizing these goals, and the target of action is the state, with 
action aimed within the formal political system.  Negotiation of the action system within 
a political movement will involve different approaches to these specific dimensions of the 
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actions system – that is, differences in terms of what specific laws of policies should be 
instituted or challenged, what type of instrumental action is required (e.g. a protest, a 
lawsuit, and so on), and what specific state authorities should be targeted – but they will 
concur in terms of the general political orientation.  Cultural movements, meanwhile, are 
more informal and expansive: their goals involve changing norms, values, and beliefs in 
society in general, and their means of doing so involve ideological action through public 
advocacy and promotion (e.g. protests, books, videos, websites, and so on).  Again, while 
there will be debate on specifics, a cultural movement will agree on the general 
orientation to the action system.   
 This perspective involves a more expansive definition of social movements than 
those of the political process and mobilization school.  David Snow (2004: 11) provides a 
suitably expansive definition, writing that social movements are “collectivities acting 
with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational 
channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is 
institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world 
order of which they are a part”.  The key concept here is authority – both cultural and 
political movements involve challenges to authority, whether institionalized (for 
example, in the state) or based in dominant cultural norms, beliefs, and values.  
Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) argue that we need such an expansive definition because 
domination is not organized around one source of power (i.e. the state), but rather, there 
are multiple sources of power in society, both material and symbolic.   In this view, 
collective actors need not challenge the state to be considered a social movement, but 
rather, sustained challenges to “cultural systems of oppression and authority” can be 
understood as movement activity (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 79).  These authors 
propose a “multi-institutional politics” approach that recognizes both political and 
cultural dimensions of social movements that challenge power and authority from 
multiple sources.  They thus support Melucci’s critique of state-centred models and his 
expanded framework for analyzing movements with non-political goals and targets.  
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 I want to argue that the atheist movement, and more specifically the New 
Atheism, can be understood within this framework.  As I suggested above, the New 
Atheism was a novel development within the atheist movement, which had focused on 
the political goals of secularism and civil rights for atheists before the Four Horsemen 
came forward with a radical program of public attacks on religion and a substitute 
worldview defined by scientism.  The New Atheism challenges the moral authority of 
religion by attacking its intellectual authority, arguing for the epistemic superiority of 
science over ‘religious’ forms of knowledge. The conflict between groups advocating for 
scientific rationality as a form of authority on the one hand, and those advocating for 
religious and traditional authority on the other, is a political conflict that is being played 
out in the cultural arena as a dispute over ‘true’ knowledge and values.  The New 
Atheism positions itself and its ideology of scientism as an alternative to religion, which 
is represented as a cultural system of oppression and authority (the New Atheism’s 
challenge to religious authority, and desire to replace it with scientific authority, was the 
theme of the previous chapter).  It might therefore be considered a social movement, 
following the definitions of Melucci (1989, 1996), Snow (2004), and Armstrong and 
Bernstein (2008) discussed above. More precisely, it is a cultural movement that targets 
civil society, with the goal of changing beliefs and values, and uses a strategy of 
ideological action that takes the form of public advocacy and science education.  It is thus 
an example of the type of movement that challenges dominant cultural “codes” rather 
than state authorities, institutions, or policies (Melucci 1996).  
 As I argued above, the New Atheism was a novel development within the atheist 
movement that shifted the focus from instrumental legal-political action to broad cultural 
transformation.  This process can be understood in terms of Melucci’s (1989) notion of a 
“latency” period that characterizes the emergence of some new social movements.  This 
is the period before a movement becomes visible or highly organized and politically 
active, defined by the development of ideology and collective identity.  An example of 
this is Christian Smith’s study of the Latin American liberation theology movement, 
which he argues is different from traditional social movements (e.g. labour) in that “its 
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first task and goal was the institutionalization of novel symbolic and ideological forms in 
a relatively inhospitable, self-reproducing institutional structure” (1991: 55), the 
institutional structure referred to here being the Catholic Church. In this phase of 
movement emergence, dialogue is directed internally, with the priorities being ideological 
development and finding a structural location within which the movement can grow.  In 
the liberation theology movement, this location was the church, an obviously natural 
development given its origins.   
The parallels between the liberation theology and new atheist movements in their 
latency phase are evident in Smith’s description of the initial task of the former: “The 
first analytic problem faced by the liberation theology activists...was not the mobilization 
of a powerless, excluded group for noninstitutionalized methods of political action.  
Rather, the first problem was essentially that of organizational takeover and validation of 
a new worldview.  The original problem was not how, as excluded ones, to constrain the 
state, but how to develop, diffuse, and institutionalize a new form of consciousness in the 
Church” (1991: 56).  Similarly, the new atheist movement emerged within the 
freethought movement and had to first succeed as a movement-within-a-movement, 
establishing and promoting its own specific ideology within the extant institutional 
framework. It found a home within secularist organizations such as the Center for Inquiry 
(CFI) and Atheist Alliance International (AAI). These organizations, of course, were not 
exactly hostile to this new movement, but the rise of the New Atheism was also not 
uniformly welcomed, and there was considerable debate within the pages of Free Inquiry 
(CFI’s flagship periodical) regarding its merits and potential impacts on the movement, 
with CFI founder and former Chair Paul Kurtz (2008) notably critical of their “militant” 
approach, which he felt undermined the goal of promoting humanist ethics that 
constituted his vision for the organization. Nonetheless, due to the New Atheists’ 
phenomenal publishing successes, intellectual capital, and celebrity status (particularly in 
the cases of Dawkins and Hitchens), they proved extremely effective mobilizers and thus 
were able to supplant humanism and secularism and institute scientific atheism as the 
dominant ideology within the freethought movement.   
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Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical perspective employed in this analysis.  It begins 
with the latency phase, characterized by the development of ideology and collective 
identity construction.  The result of this period was the establishment of the New Atheism 
as the dominant discourse within the movement and a new emphasis on its cultural goal 
(relating to the first secularization sub-thesis) of disseminating the scientific atheist 
worldview. However, this did not completely erase the movement’s more traditional 
political goals (relating to the second secularization sub-thesis) of functional 
differentiation of religious and public spheres, and civil rights for atheists, even if this 
goal received less attention after the success of the New Atheism made the movement 
more ambitious in believing broad cultural transformation was possible.  The result of 
this latency period was a division of the movement into two streams, represented in 
Figure 2 as a division in terms of cultural and political goals.   
These two streams are a product of different responses to the perceived failure of 
secularization: one responds one responds by more aggressively attacking religion and 
fighting for cultural transformation, while the other seeks to carve out a niche within that 
culture using instrumental legal-political strategies aimed at protecting civil rights, as 
well as maintaining established political secularism.  These two responses are represented 
in Figure 2 as strategies based on ideological action and instrumental action, respectively.  
Relating these responses to the three dimensions of a movement’s action system 
(represented in Table 2), the cultural side of the movement employs the ideological 
strategy of public advocacy, the target of which is civil society, toward the goal of 
ideological validation and universalization.  Thus, for the cultural element of the atheist 
movement, ideological action is aimed primarily at its own validation rather than toward 
other instrumental purposes.  This can cross over into political goals, which the New 
Atheism has done in also embracing the goal of functional secularism, but the more 
substantive goal of transforming beliefs and values is the heart of this movement.  The 
political side of the movement, meanwhile, employs instrumental strategies (such as 
protests, rallies, petitions, legal action) aimed at the state with the primary goal of 
maintaining established functional secularism. There are therefore two distinct 
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orientations with respect to the action system within the atheist movement, which are 
represented by the cultural and political elements or sub-movements.   
 
Figure 2: Development of the atheist movement  
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freethought movement.  This should be expected given that cultural and political goals 
are not mutually exclusive or isolatable categories, but rather, identity and cultural 
processes are always involved to some extent in strategy, interest, and politics (Polletta 
and Jasper 2001).  While the creation of a collective identity is a significant cultural 
impact regardless of whether it contributes to political goals (W. Gamson 1992), Mary 
Bernstein (1997; 2002) argues that collective identity construction may be only an initial 
phase of movement activity, and once established identity is often “deployed” as a 
strategy for instrumental political purposes.  In Bernstein’s “political identity” model, 
identity is not strictly a cultural matter or a tool for recruitment, but rather, “expressions 
of identity can be deployed at the collective level as a political strategy, which can be 
aimed at cultural and/or instrumental political goals” (2008: 281).  Both the cultural and 
political dimensions of the atheist movement deploy a political identity, but disputes 
concerning the nature of this identity, and the goals toward which it is deployed, reveal 
deep divisions.  
Bernstein’s concept of “political identity” is a general approach to understanding 
the deployment of identity toward particular ends.  I add two more specific categories of 
political identity, which are represented in Figure 2 as distinct categories within the 
sphere of political identity strategy.  These are “resistance identity” and “project 
identity”, concepts drawn from Manuel Castells’ (2004) work on contemporary or ‘new’ 
social movements (i.e. identity-based movements) that emerge in the information age.  
Castells’ categories of identity, I argue, can be understood as distinct political identity 
strategies that reflect different kinds of movements or movement goals.  Resistance 
identity is “generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions devalued and/or 
stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival 
on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions 
of society” (Castells 2004: 8).  Identities for resistance emphasize the formation of 
communities and forms of collective resistance against oppression.  Project identity is 
“when social actors, on the basis of whatever cultural materials are available to them, 
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build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the 
transformation of overall social structure” (Castells 2004: 8).   
One example Castells gives to illustrate the difference is when feminism moved 
from resistance against oppression and protecting women’s rights to challenging 
patriarchy, and thus the entire structure of society.  This was in effect a transition from a 
resistance identity to a project identity, or from defending a marginalized group’s place 
within society to challenging the structure of the society that produces this 
marginalization.  The other major example Castells discusses is religious fundamentalism 
and the evangelistic drive to convert the entire world to a particular faith, which involves 
the construction (and deployment, in Bernstein’s terms) of a collective identity 
“expanding toward the transformation of society as the prolongation of this project of 
identity” (2004: 10).  This second example obviously resembles the New Atheist 
movement and the desire to eliminate supernaturalism and ‘convert’ the world to 
scientism.  The New Atheism, then, is in effect a project identity that mirrors the 
Christian Right in some respects, while providing its own alternative vision of the new 
society it wants to build.    
Identity deployment as movement strategy is not necessarily the same thing as 
identity politics, which TeemuTaira (2012: 102) defines in the context of the New 
Atheism as “empowering strategies and procedures which are based on differentiating a 
group from others on the basis of their socially constructed identity”.  This kind of 
identity politics involves self-representation as a marginalized or oppressed minority, and 
this is precisely where the matter becomes contentious in the case of the atheist 
movement.  The New Atheism favours a goal of cultural universalism, and therefore 
represents atheism as the emergent mainstream position, as opposed to atheists as a group 
that must be differentiated from the rest of society.  Their approach is to emphasize how 
atheism is a ‘positive’ worldview and that atheists are good, moral people.  Hence, the 
“political identity” they construct is not based on minority status, but rather, the view that 
atheists are representative of an emerging cultural transformation that will reach all 
sectors of society – indeed, this is demanded and expected by the evolutionistic ideology 
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of progress they ascribe to.  Political identity in this approach is thus a strategy for 
changing the dominant culture’s perception of atheism, which in turn is a step toward 
ideological validation, which is also an effort to persuade others to adopt their ideological 
perspective.   
The New Atheism therefore involves construction of a project identity, a political 
identity strategy aimed at broad social and cultural transformation.  However, another 
element within the movement that takes a more political approach favours 
minority/identity politics as an identity strategy aimed at improving their status within 
society, with the idea being that gaining recognition as an excluded minority is a pathway 
to a stronger voice in politics, mirroring the strategies and demands of the civil rights 
movement.  The group within the movement that emphasizes the political goals of 
combating oppression of atheists and resisting organized religion’s infiltration of the 
political system – that is, the movement as it was structured before the New Atheism 
emerged – therefore adopts an identity of resistance that seeks to strengthen the place of 
non-believers within society’s institutions, rather than seeking a cultural transformation.   
To New Atheists who desire universalization of the scientific atheist worldview, 
the engagement in identity politics necessarily condemns atheists to the fringes, a 
permanent minority rather than the presumptive heir to hegemonic authority.  Sam Harris 
and Christopher Hitchens have been the most vocal critics of this strategy among the 
New Atheists.  Harris objects even to the use of the term “atheist” to describe their 
movement, as he feels that theirs should be the default position, and that it is 
supernaturalists who require a term to denote their deviation from it (AAI 2007), while 
Hitchens has expressed the opinion that self-representation as an oppressed minority is 
both a tactical error and a misrepresentation of the trend of history, which points to 
secularization (Four Horsemen DVD).  Identity and the issue of minority discourse, then, 
is where cultural and political dimensions of the movement clash.   
Even among those who are not opposed to engaging in identity politics, there are 
tensions regarding what shape that should take. This tension is expressed in the ongoing 
debate regarding strategies of “confrontation” versus “accommodation”, with advocates 
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of the former seeking to mark clear lines of difference between themselves and religious 
groups and individuals, and the latter willing to overlook differences on the question of 
God in order to cooperate with those who share the ultimate goals of secularism, the 
emancipation of science from religious and political spheres, and basic social justice 
concerns. I will argue that this tension exists primarily between atheists and secular 
humanists, and results from the influence of the scientific and humanistic types of 
atheism that were discussed in Chapter One.   
It is not only atheists and secular humanists who are sometimes at odds, since the 
matter is complicated by the rise of another group in its latent phase: the libertarian 
rationalists. They embrace the New Atheism’s confrontational stance as well as an 
emphasis on difference rather than assimilation when it comes to identity construction. 
Their goals, however, are political rather than cultural: they supplant the New Atheism’s 
goal of ideological universalization with the political goal of secularism, and supplant the 
New Atheism’s liberalism with radical individualism and economic libertarianism. 
Indeed, these self-declared libertarians appear at least as concerned with separation of 
economy and state as they are with separation of church and state. The new atheist 
movement, then, is caught between two sub-groups in the freethought movement it 
resides in: secular humanists who seek assimilation and cooperation with like-minded 
groups on matters of science and social justice, and libertarian rationalists who are more 
interested in individual and economic liberty than promoting the growth of scientific 
atheism (though they do share most of the key features of that ideology). How tensions 
between these groups are resolved, or at least managed, will determine the future 
evolution of the new atheist movement and the freethought movement as a whole.   
 To understand the implications of these developments we should return to 
Melucci’s model.  For Melucci, the collective is socially constructed through negotiation 
of the action system, which includes goals, strategies, and the target of action (as outlined 
in Table 2).  That is, collective identity for a social movement actor is the expression of a 
negotiated construction of the action system.  He writes, “Collective identity takes the 
form of a field containing a system of vectors in tension” (Melucci 1995: 50).  I would 
 
 
114 
alternatively say that collective identity is a dynamic field of tensions relating to the 
action system.  Melucci argues that in situations of crisis or intense conflict when these 
tensions are too great to negotiate a common orientation to the action system, which 
means that the collective actor cannot define itself or its purposes, it must restructure its 
action according to new orientations.  In effect this means a new latency phase, which is 
why Figure 2 is represented as a feedback loop, with latency not necessarily producing 
consensus but possibly a perpetual latency.  If this process fails a breakdown occurs, 
making action impossible and potentially leading to a fragmentation of the movement.   
 The atheist movement can be understood within this framework, and the vectors 
in tension in this case are threatening a failure in the process of identity construction and 
a breakdown of the movement.  These tensions, I argue, may be understood as a complex 
field of mutual tensions with respect to the action system that represent three sub-groups 
within the movement that are motivated by distinct ideological groundings.  I refer to 
these groups as new atheists, secular humanists, and libertarian rationalists.  I do not want 
to suggest that individuals within the movement can be clearly distinguished along these 
lines.  However, I do argue that these are the three major ideological groupings in the 
movement, and that leaders in particular can be positioned more or less within these 
categories, with some overlap in some cases.   
Table 3 outlines the defining characteristics of these three groups, including the 
type of atheism, and their goals and strategies.  It also includes the nature of the political 
identity they work to construct, which is categorized according to either “deconstructive” 
or “category-supportive” approaches (Gamson 1995), or alternatively, “distinction” and 
“assimilation” (Ghaziani 2011).  Finally, these groups are categorized in terms of their 
politics and their basic ideological grounding, which I will argue is the ultimate source of 
the divisions – manifest in identity and strategy debates – that are compelling a 
restructuring of the action system, and threaten a failure or breakdown of the movement.  
Armstrong and Bernstein (2008: 80-81) argue that once we recognize that not all 
movements target the state or seek entry into a single polity, questions about why actors 
make the decisions they do about targets, goals, and strategies – that is, orientation to the 
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action system – become more interesting.  These questions are especially interesting for 
non-political movements or those that combine political and cultural elements.  In the 
case of the atheist movement, I argue that the answer to these questions lies in ideology, 
which is the basic motivation for action and its structuring logic.   
 
Table 3: Characteristics of movement sub-groups 
 
 New Atheists Secular Humanists Libertarian 
Rationalists 
Atheism scientific humanistic scientific 
Goals cultural cultural/political political 
Strategy ideological ideological/instrumental instrumental 
Political 
Identity 
category-
supportive 
deconstructive category-supportive 
Politics liberal liberal libertarian 
Ideology scientism secularism individualism 
 
My analysis of the ideologies at work in the atheist movement proceeds in two 
steps.  In Melucci’s model collective identity is the expression of a collectively 
negotiated orientation to the action system.  Identity construction and negotiation is 
contested and emerges out of interactions and adjustments on the “three orders of 
orientations” outlined in Table 2, which in turn is informed by a basic ideological 
grounding, and thus we have three “sub-groups” defined by three ideological groundings 
collectively constructing and negotiating the action system.  These three groups, and their 
ideological approach to the three orders of orientation, constitute a field of mutual 
tensions with regard to the action system that is shaping movement dynamics, with the 
New Atheism an increasingly marginalized approach that has given way to more 
distinctly approaches.  This field of tensions, manifest in the debates on identity, can be 
understood through debates on strategy, since strategy choices and debates are also 
statements about identity (Melucci 1996, Polletta and Jasper 2001).  This analysis of 
strategy debates further reveals distinct underlying ideological motivations.  My strategy, 
then, is to begin with examining processes and projects of collective identity 
construction, and then work backward to see what this reveals about orientation to the 
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action system in terms of strategy and goals, which in turn allow us to identify the 
distinct ideological groupings that give rise to these different approaches.   
The rest of the chapter therefore deals with identity construction (the next section) 
and identity strategy (the following section).  This in turn will allow for an analysis of 
current dynamics shaping movement development, and the possibility of a failure or 
breakdown, as groups united only by their lack of religious belief struggle to maintain 
cohesion in the face of deep divisions in their politics.  I argue that the ideological 
tensions at the heart of the movement, represented in the distinct approaches to political 
identity and expressed in debates on strategy and minority discourse, are much more than 
simply a division between cultural and political approaches.  The libertarian rationalists – 
what I call the Atheist Right – make consensus even more difficult because it differs from 
both the New Atheism and secular humanism with respect to the action system and 
ideological grounding.  Concomitantly, the response to the Atheist Right and to certain 
instances of social conservatism within the movement on the part of atheists expressing a 
desire to direct movement activity toward “social justice” introduces another layer of 
complexity.   
These developments are driving another latency period, which is why Figure 2 is 
represented as a feedback loop.  This new latency period, characterized by intense and 
diversifying ideological conflicts, may lead to restructuring, or to movement failure or 
fragmentation.  Many movements face the problem of “identity correspondence” – the 
alignment of individual and collective identities – particularly those where members 
cannot be expected to share an extant collective identity derived from being commonly 
situated structurally (Snow and McAdam, 2000). Atheists are united ideologically rather 
than structurally, and thus the atheist movement is particularly vulnerable to fission 
produced by ideological disparities, but the outcome of these processes remains unclear.   
 
The Moral Minority: Constructing Community and Identity 
 Alberto Melucci writes, “a certain degree of emotional investment, which enables 
individuals to feel like part of a common unity, is required in the definition of collective 
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identity. Collective identity is never entirely negotiable because participation in collective 
action is endowed with meaning but cannot be reduced to cost-benefit calculation and 
always mobilizes emotions as well” (1995: 45).  The “common unity” Melucci refers to 
is simply a more precisely stated version of “community”, an essential ingredient of any 
collective definition of identity and approach to action.  Mobilizing actors requires 
emotional investment in the cause and in the collective one is asked to be part of.  For 
some movement participants, community and a sense of belonging are all they really 
want (this is the case for some members of atheist organizations, as we will see in the 
next chapter).  But even for movements with instrumental goals, community is a crucial 
building block in the construction and later deployment of political identity (Berezin 
2001).  Identity, then, can never be purely instrumental or strategic.  There must be real 
emotional investment to mobilize participants to act, particularly in the case of “new” or 
identity based movements where participants do not share a structural location and must 
do more “identity work” to form the bonds of community (Einwohner et. al. 2008).   
 The present analysis of collective identity thus begins with community building 
projects that address precisely the requirement of emotional investment in the definition 
and construction of identity.  In the case of the atheist movement, this emotional 
investment involves addressing alienation and the desire to belong by emphasizing the 
potential for atheists to “come out” and find others like themselves with whom they can 
share their concerns and frustrations.  These community building efforts and other 
projects of identity construction at the same time are intended to counter the stigma 
against atheism (particularly in the United States) as an a-moral, or immoral, worldview, 
and by extension, against atheists as people without morality.  These projects thus reject 
the claim that morality is derived and maintained from religion, and emphasize morality 
in representations of atheists.  While this is intended to create the emotional investment 
that forms the bonds of community by appealing to atheists’ desire for self-validation, it 
is also an important element of the movement’s political identity strategy, which 
represents atheists specifically as an essentially good, but socially marginalized or 
stigmatized minority.  Indeed, the more emotion-based efforts at representing atheist 
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identity that are crucial in early community building stages have largely been superseded 
by more instrumental or strategic definitions and deployment of identity; specifically, 
representations of atheist identity now involve minority discourse and an entry into 
identity politics.  This move is a source of contention in the movement, and the political 
identity strategies being deployed, and debates concerning these strategies and 
representations of identity, will reveal tensions that point to the movement’s ideological 
foundations.   
 
Community: Get on the Bus 
The atheist movement in the past decade was bookended by two of the largest and 
most significant single instances of activism in its history: the Godless Americans March 
on Washington on November 2, 2002, and the Reason Rally, also held in Washington on 
March 24, 2012. The Godless Americans March was a protest, orchestrated by American 
Atheists, against the “increasing infringement of religion in governmental affairs” 
(Murphy 2002).  The Reason Rally was sponsored by many of today’s most prominent 
freethought organizations, including CFI and the Richard Dawkins Foundation.7 Both 
these major events were aimed at the same purpose: bringing a hitherto unrecognized 
identity group into focus and mobilizing participants for an emerging social movement.  
 Commenting on the gay and lesbian movement, Suzanne Staggenborg observes 
that the construction of community and collective identity can be a goal in itself or a step 
toward more instrumental goals: 
In some instances, activists aim to empower constituents with a sense of 
collective identity and to create a shared community before they can 
engage in more instrumental action.  In other instances, the goal is to 
transform the values, categories, and practices of mainstream culture 
rather than to win specific policy changes, and activists may focus on 
developing community and collective identity among gays and lesbians 
by emphasizing their uniqueness and differences from the mainstream 
culture (2008: 100). 
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In the case of the atheist movement, construction of community and identity are goals in 
themselves for some, and for others they are constructed strategically to be deployed 
toward instrumental ends. I will here examine some campaigns aimed at building 
community and identity, and the ways that this identity is being deployed by those with 
political goals.  
An early campaign aimed at community building was initiated by Richard 
Dawkins through his Foundation for Reason and Science (RDFRS), and it represents the 
first instance of New Atheist activism. It was called the Out Campaign, officially 
announced by RDFRS in July 2007 (Dawkins, 2007). The problem facing the atheist 
movement, he argued, is that much of the atheist population regrettably remains “in the 
closet” and thus “a major part of our consciousness-raising effort should be aimed, not at 
converting the religious but encouraging the non-religious to admit it – to themselves, to 
their families, and to the world” (Dawkins, 2007). Exhorting atheists to “come out”, then, 
was the purpose of the Out Campaign, and Dawkins notes that this involves an “obvious 
comparison with the gay community” (Dawkins, 2007). Dawkins and his collaborators 
created a website and a campaign logo – a red “A” – that was printed on t-shirts and 
buttons to be worn by atheists to announce their beliefs and state their “atheist pride” 
(Out Campaign, 2013).   
This campaign encouraged people to come out of the closet and get on the bus 
with their fellow atheists, so to speak. This metaphor was taken to a more literal place 
with the emergence of the Atheist Bus Campaign (ABC), the most visible and highly 
publicized campaign by the atheist movement to date and an excellent example of the 
scope and significance of the movement.  It began in 2008 when ArianeSherine, a 
comedian and writer for The Guardian, blogged about seeing buses in London carrying a 
Bible quotation and a link to a web page that threatened eternal torment in hell for non-
believers.  Concerned about a message “advocating endless pain for atheists”, Sherine 
proposed running an advertisement carrying the slogan, “There’s probably no God. Now 
stop worrying and enjoy your life (Sherine, 2008)”.8 Encouraged by the overwhelming 
response to the idea on her blog, she partnered with the British Humanist Association 
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(BHA), which solicited donations, and raised 140,000 pounds, enough to buy 
advertisements on 800 buses in 26 cities and towns throughout the UK, which went up 
early in 2009 (Butt, 2009).  
The success of ABC was a watershed moment for atheist activism. Hanne 
Stinson, a representative of the British Humanist Association, offered this rationale for 
the campaign: “We all, whether we have religious or non-religious beliefs, have a right to 
be heard, and no one particular set of beliefs has any more right to influence the public 
debate than any other. The message isn’t aimed at people with religious beliefs – it’s 
aimed at atheists and agnostics” (Butt, 2009).  In other words, the campaign was aimed at 
non-believers in order to tell them that they were not alone, to demonstrate that there is a 
community of others who share their point of view.  Sherine articulated the same 
sentiment in an interview on the CBC Radio program Q:  
I think atheists, because we don’t see each other very much, we don’t 
get together, we don’t have a community in the same way as religious 
groups do. You don’t really know how many people feel this way[...]So 
it seems to be this kind of underground thing, and then you see all these 
thousands and thousands of atheists coming out going, you know, I’m 
so relieved that so many people feel the way I do (Ghomeshi, 2009). 
Again, the ideas of community and “coming out” are conveyed here.  The ABC campaign 
was an effort toward constructing community and building recognition and legitimacy for 
the atheist identity, more so than an attempt at conversion to atheism.   
The spectacular success of ABC in the UK inspired freethought groups elsewhere 
to participate, bringing the campaign to Canada (Toronto was the first city outside of the 
UK to adopt it), the United States, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Croatia, where ads were removed after one 
day as a result of public complaints (Atheist Bus Campaign, 2009).  Most recently, the 
Atheist Foundation of Australia launched a series of bus advertisements to coincide with 
the 2012 Global Atheist Convention in Melbourne, this time carrying a memorable quote 
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from Woody Allen: “If God exists, I hope he has a good excuse” (Atheist Convention, 
2012).  
The success of ABC, and concomitantly the success of the new atheist movement 
more generally, were possible only because of the internet, which, coupled with the 
attention brought to atheism by the publishing success of the Four Horsemen, constitutes 
a “cultural opportunity” (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995) for the emergence of a new 
identity group. Atheists have traditionally had little access to mass media, but the internet 
allowed geographically dispersed atheists to communicate and organize, as in the case of 
ABC. Today atheist groups make extensive use of blogs, discussion forums, podcasts, 
meetups, and so on as a way to build community – atheists even have their own social 
networking website, modeled after Facebook, called “Atheist Nexus”, which has just 
under one thousand groups engaged in the project of community-building (Atheist Nexus, 
2013).  Given its transnational and geographically dispersed nature, the atheist movement 
is of necessity largely an online community, with local groups often quite small (Cimino 
and Smith, 2012).  The internet adds a dimension of accessibility vastly greater than that 
offered by traditional print media, and introduced CFI and other atheist groups to 
countless more potential members who were inspired to seek them out after the New 
Atheists made religion, science, and atheism matters of intense public debate.   
 While virtual communities are crucial to everyday involvement in atheism, 
periodic physical gatherings continue to serve the important function of affirmation of the 
collective as well as reinforcing ties that were forged online through face-to-face 
interaction.  Beyond meetings of local chapters of freethought organizations, there are a 
number of annual conferences and conventions hosted by major organizations.  The most 
significant of these has been the AAI Annual Convention, which in 2007 featured the 
Four Horsemen, a moment that signalled the dawn of a new era in the atheist movement.  
Melbourne, Australia has become the site of the largest annual gathering of atheists in the 
world, hosting a Global Atheist Convention in 2010 that attracted over 2500 people, with 
the 2012 iteration looking to build on that number.  There are also a number of annual 
celebrations and rituals observed and practiced by many atheist groups.  These include, 
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for example, Darwin Day, which is held on February 12 (Darwin’s birthday) and 
celebrates science and humanity through a recognition of Darwin’s contribution to human 
knowledge (Darwin Day, 2013).  Individuals and local groups are left to celebrate as they 
wish (normally this involves lectures, discussion, and parties), though the foundation’s 
website does offer templates of e-cards that can be sent to family and friends to mark the 
occasion. Carl Sagan Day was created by CFI in 2009 and uses the occasion of Sagan’s 
birthday, November 9, to “honor Carl Sagan and celebrate the beauty and wonder of the 
cosmos he so eloquently described” (Center for Inquiry, 2012).  CFI also created 
International Blasphemy Rights Day (Center for Inquiry 2011)as an element of its 
broader Campaign for Free Expression (Center for Inquiry 2013).  Since 2009, it has 
been celebrated annually on September 30th to mark the anniversary of the publication of 
cartoons depicting Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten that led to 
rioting among offended Muslims in 2005. It involves exhibiting explicitly blasphemous 
contemporary artworks in a celebration of freedom of speech.9  In a similar vein, CFI’s 
Toronto branch hosts a monthly “God-Awful Comedy Show” where local comedians 
invoke the spirit of George Carlin and Bill Hicks to poke fun at the irrationality of 
religious belief, and in the process cement bonds among non-believers.  
 
 
Identity: Good Without God  
Up to this point, I have examined two elements of the latency phase of social 
movement emergence: the development of ideology and validation of a worldview 
(covered in the previous chapter), and community building (the corollary of mobilization 
in political process theories).  Closely related to the latter is the defining characteristic of 
the latency period: collective identity construction (Melucci, 1988, 1989).  This involves 
basic identity-related self-examination, addressing the questions, “who are we?” and 
“how do we define ourselves?”.  In the political identity (Bernstein 2008) framework that 
I am employing, however, we must understand these questions and the way they are 
addressed in terms of their relationship to more instrumental questions like “what are our 
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goals?” and “how do we achieve them?”.  The OUT Campaign is both an exercise in 
community building, and also a project of collective identity construction.  It is modeled 
after that of the gay and lesbian movement, which proved successful at bringing LGBT 
people “out of the closet” and bringing them together in visible groups where they could 
not only feel like members of a community, but also empowered rather than isolated and 
vulnerable (D’Emilio, 1983).   
The efforts toward community building and constructing a positive image of 
atheists that we see in campaigns like OUT and Out of the Closet reflect the importance 
of morality in movement recruitment.  Pinel and Swann (2000) argue that social 
movement participation is a kind of “self-verification”, a confirmation of a particular 
conception of self through a collective identity that affirms and verifies it, a process that 
Snow and McAdam (2000) refer to as “identity seeking”.  Jesse Smith’s (2011) research 
on atheist groups in Colorado found that morality is an essential component of individual 
atheist identity.  More specifically, confirmation of the idea that belief in God is not 
necessary to be a moral person is important to atheists because a common charge against 
atheism is that it is morally bankrupt and leads to nihilism (e.g. McGrath, 2006).  Smith 
also found that morality was central to these atheists’ rejection of theism, and that 
emerging atheists “began to construct a cognitive and symbolic boundary between 
morality and religion, and asserted themselves as moral individuals against what they 
increasingly viewed as a false connection between being religious and being moral.  They 
each in some way observed – and criticized the idea – that people need religion to be 
moral and good” (2011: 224).  We should thus expect individual atheists to seek 
movements and embrace collective identities that verify this self-conception. Crucially, 
atheists have not advanced a coherent conception of morality on which they agree. That 
is, precisely what kind of morality they embrace is mostly left unstated, and indeed there 
is considerable debate within the movement regarding whether being an atheist involves 
adherence to particular ethical precepts (economic justice is one very contentious issue). 
What they clearly want to express, and what they can all agree on, is the idea that one can 
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be “good without God” – that is, the idea that religion has no monopoly on morality – 
even if what exactly constitutes being good is unclear.  
Richard Dawkins evidently also recognized the importance of morality and thus 
initiated the “Non-Believers Giving Aid” (NBGA) (2013) campaign in an effort to 
combat negative stereotypes and construct a positive identity for atheists, particularly 
those who are just starting to realize that they are atheists and are looking for validation 
of their rejection of the presumed connection between religion and morality.  NBGA is a 
disaster relief fund collecting donations to be distributed to non-religious humanitarian 
aid organizations.  Spear-headed by RDFRS, it involves 22 participating organizations, 
including AAI, FFRF, and BHA.10  The atheist movement, then, provides moral 
validation for non-believers who seek it primarily by constructing a collective identity 
that emphasizes generosity and altruism.  
The “Out” slogan and logo are now entrenched in movement discourse and have 
reappeared recently in other forms. In October, 2010, the Freedom From Religion 
Foundation (FFRF) launched its “Out of the Closet” campaign. This was an effort to 
humanize atheists in the United States by demonstrating that “Freethinkers are your 
friends, neighbors, relatives, colleagues, the person who opens the door for you at your 
grocery store, a parent at your playground” (Freedom from Religion, 2011a). FFRF 
designed billboard advertisements that featured a photo of a local atheist along with a 
“freethought testimonial” that makes “an affirmative statement about being a freethinker” 
(Freedom from Religion, 2011b), and a short self-description. People were invited to 
design their own ads through the FFRF website, which provided a template and the 
opportunity to upload photos.  FFRF then selected from among these user-created ads to 
create the actual billboards, and leaving the rest up on the website.11  There are a number 
of similar campaigns, including one underway by CFI Canada they call “Good and 
Godless”. It invites people to submit one-minute videos to their YouTube channel Think 
Again! TV where they explain what they do for charities, non-profits, or society, and 
ending with the statement, “That is why I am good without God.”  
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 The OUT campaign was Richard Dawkins’ first attempt at establishing atheism 
not just as an intellectual trend, but also a social movement. Dawkins encourages the 
public expression of atheist pride, much in the vein of gay pride, noting that atheists are 
more numerous than people realize, particularly among the “educated elite” (2006: 4).  
The OUT Campaign was thus designed for a practical purpose beyond community 
building: it was the beginning of a political project. Dawkins emphasized the numbers of 
“closeted” atheists because he believed that, should they “come out” and organize, they 
would constitute a powerful political bloc.  He gives the example of Jewish influence on 
American politics to suggest what atheists might be capable of, since atheists are far 
greater in number (Dawkins 2006: 44), and argues that atheists should represent 
themselves as a minority subjected to prejudice and discrimination, citing the example of 
George H.W. Bush’s infamous declaration that atheists cannot be true patriots and should 
not even be considered American citizens because America is one nation under God 
(Dawkins 2006: 44).  He thus takes atheism in two directions simultaneously, arguing for 
cultural transformation (i.e. the universalization of the ideology of scientific atheism) 
while also deploying a political identity toward the instrumental goal of formal 
recognition by state authorities of atheists’ minority status.  This presumably would give 
atheists a stronger voice in legislative and policy decisions, but would also undermine the 
cultural goal of ideological dominance.  The development of a minority identity in the 
U.S. and elsewhere has been one of the major projects of the atheist movement in recent 
years.  Minority discourse in the atheist movement is driven by morality and the notion 
that one can be “good without God”.   
The movement is evolving, of course, and has expanded its aims. New debates 
concerning goals and strategies have come with this.  After atheists “come out” and begin 
constructing a positive, morality-based collective identity, some major questions emerge: 
what kind of status should they seek?  What kind of influence should they exert, and who 
should be influenced?  Do they want to effect broad social change or do they simply want 
to find their own niche within the existing social structure?  These sorts of questions are 
essential to any social movement (particularly identity-based movements), and in the case 
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of atheism they have proven particularly contentious.  There are some who seek to 
continue in the footsteps of the LGBT movement by following up on the coming out and 
community-building phase – that is, the latency phase – with an effort to construct a 
minority identity that is recognized by authorities and the general public in order to first 
gain protection against discrimination, and then reach a step further and use this status to 
gain influence in the public sphere and over state authorities. We should understand this 
as an instrumental political identity strategy, with cultural effects of the movement only a 
step toward political goals.   
Community building by the freethought movement reached its zenith in the single 
largest and most significant instance of atheist collective action to date, the Reason Rally, 
billed as “the largest secular event in world history” (Reason Rally 2013b).  An estimated 
20,000 freethinkers (Fearnow& Woods 2012) gathered at the National Mall in 
Washington, D.C. on March 24, 2012 with the intent “to unify, energize, and embolden 
secular people nationwide, while dispelling the negative opinions held by so much of 
American society” (Reason Rally, 2013b). What was particularly striking about this event 
was that it signaled a decisive shift in emphasis in atheist discourse, with a lineup of 
speakers headlined by Richard Dawkins moving away from discussing the moral 
character of atheists to focusing on the status of atheists in American society.  David 
Silverman, President of American Atheists, declared: “We are here to deliver a message 
to America. We are here and we will never be silent again” (Winston 2012).  The “come 
out” message was repeated by a number of speakers, with Silverman offering reassurance 
to “closeted atheists” that “you are not alone”.  Fred Dewords, national director of the 
United Coalition of Reason, borrowed another slogan from the gay movement 
(substituting “godless” for “queer”) in leading the crowd in a chant of “We’re here, were 
godless, get used to it” (Aratani 2012).  The Reason Rally is a clear sign that the atheist 
movement is a sustained and organized movement geared toward the establishment of a 
new minority group – or more precisely, recognition of an existing but previously 
dormant one – in American society.  This is a very significant development.  
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The engagement in minority politics is a contentious issue and the idea is rejected 
by, among others, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens. Indeed, these authors do not 
believe that atheists require a social movement at all. In the original filmed Four 
Horsemen discussion, Hitchens argued for the right of non-believers to express being 
offended by certain religious doctrines while warning against “being self-pitying or 
representing ourselves as an oppressed minority” (Four Horsemen 2007).  At the 2007 
AAI convention, Harris criticized the idea of an atheist minority and even the use of the 
term “atheist” to describe themselves, arguing that “We’re consenting to be thought of as 
a cranky subculture that meets in hotel ballrooms” (Atheist Alliance 2007).  He thus 
condemned the movement’s employment of a “subcultural identity strategy” that mirrors 
evangelicals’ self-representation as an “embattled minority” (Cimino and Smith 2007).  
He argued, instead, that atheists should consider themselves the mainstream, or at least 
the emergent mainstream, since scepticism and rationalism should be the default 
positions, while engaging in minority politics marginalizes the atheist viewpoint.  Harris’ 
view here is consistent with the project of cultural transformation that characterizes the 
New Atheist discourse and distinguishes it from movement sub-groups that use minority 
discourse as a political identity strategy aimed at realizing instrumental goals.   
It should be noted, however, that Dawkins is considerably less discerning in his 
strategy and supports just about any kind of collective action by atheists. He endorses 
both minority politics and tackling discrimination while also arguing for the near-
universality of the scientific worldview in the modern world.12  Others in the freethought 
community are similarly divided on the question of whether atheism simply means a lack 
of religious belief or involves a set of ‘positive’ beliefs (i.e. affirmation of certain 
principles rather than strictly negation). For example, D.J. Grothe, former host of Point of 
Inquiry and now President of the James Randi Educational Foundation and host of its 
podcast For Good Reason, insists that “atheism” means nothing other than not believing 
in God, and argues that atheism is not a civil rights issue, rejecting the strategy of 
minority politics (Grothe and Dacey 2004). PZ Myers, on the other hand, defines atheism 
as “a positive explanation of the world based on scientific thinking...When I talk about 
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atheism I’m using a loaded word that has a lot of other content” (TV Ontario 2011) and 
exhorts atheists to “take pride in what you do believe, not what you deny” (Myers 2011).   
Despite the disagreements, minority discourse and political action are cemented 
as a central aspect of the atheist movement. This was made abundantly clear at the 
Reason Rally, where it was the prevailing theme.  The claim to being an “oppressed 
minority” that Hitchens warned against has now been embraced by the movement’s 
mainstream. Despite Hitchens’ reservations, many American atheists do report 
experiencing exclusion and outright discrimination (Cragun et. al. 2012), and thus 
legitimately fear the social consequences of revealing their beliefs.  Research on public 
perception of atheists has consistently found that they are among the least-trusted people 
in the United States (Bainbridge 2007; Cragun et. al. 2012; Gervais et. al. 2011; Edgell et. 
al. 2006; Swan and Heesacker 2012).  One major study found that Americans are 
significantly more accepting of Muslims and homosexuals than they are of atheists, and 
argued that atheists constitute an “Other” in American society, a symbolic boundary 
setting the terms for cultural membership and morality (Edgell et. al. 2006).   
Some recent highly-publicized incidents highlight both discrimination against 
individual atheists and their increasing willingness to speak publicly about it as well as 
engage in legal action.  In 2008 a soldier named Jeremy Hall filed a lawsuit against the 
United States Department of Defense for an unconstitutional violation of his religious 
freedom – in his case, freedom to have no religion (Bannerjee 2008).  Hall accused the 
U.S. military of being a “Christian organization” with a pattern of discrimination against 
non-Christians.  He claimed that he received death threats from other soldiers, and that he 
was denied promotion because of his refusal to participate in group prayer.  Hall was 
joined by another plaintiff, the Military Religious Freedom Foundation (2013), which 
was founded to protect non-believing members of the Armed Forces from discrimination.  
In 2012, a sixteen-year-old Rhode Island high school student named Jessica Ahlquist 
successfully mounted a legal challenge to have a Christian prayer plaque removed from 
the wall of her school auditorium on the grounds that it told her, an atheist, “You don’t 
belong here” (Goodnough 2012).  The heavily Catholic population of her city responded 
 
 
129 
with outrage, sending her online threats and protesting at school board meetings, while a 
State Representative called her an “evil little thing” (Goodnough 2012).  A representative 
of the Freedom From Religion Foundation said it had been a long time since she had seen 
“this level of revilement and ostracism and stigmatizing” (Goodnough, 2012).   
One recent case provided material validation for atheists’ claims to suffering 
discrimination.  In 2011 the Center for Inquiry filed suit against Wyndgate Country Club 
in Rochester Hills, Michigan after it cancelled a CFI event that featured Richard Dawkins 
as a speaker.  The grounds of the suit were breach of contract (CFI had rented the club’s 
convention space) as well as violation of federal and state civil rights laws.  The club’s 
reason for cancelling the event was that “the owner does not wish to associate with 
certain individuals and philosophies”, specifically citing Dawkins’ recent appearance on 
The O’Reilly Factor and his discussion of atheism and religion on that program.  After a 
successful out of court settlement, CFI claimed that this was “the first time federal and 
state civil rights statutes have been successfully invoked by nonbelievers in a public 
accommodations lawsuit”, while CEO Ronald Lindsay said, “as this country now rejects 
discrimination based on race, sexual orientation, and religion, so must we reject just as 
strongly discrimination against those with no religion” (Fidalgo 2013).  The case appears 
to indeed have been a landmark legal victory in the atheist movement’s quest to establish 
itself as a minority group requiring protection under civil rights laws.   
 Discrimination against atheists (or at least a perception of discrimination) is not 
restricted to the United States.  In 2011 CFI Canada brought its ABC campaign to 
Kelowna, British Columbia. Buses scheduled to carry the advertisements were found in 
the transit yard with the ads professionally removed, an evident statement of protest from 
a driver or another transit employee (CBC News, 2011).  CFI used this incident to frame 
its “Good Without God” campaign. Claiming that the Kelowna incident indicated that 
more needed to be done to “advance the public image of our community”, the Good 
Without God campaign, like the Out campaigns of FFRF and RDFRS, combats perceived 
stigma by emphasizing the moral character of atheists. This incident, then, was taken as a 
“cultural opportunity” (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995) to represent atheists as an 
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“embattled minority”, a strategy which has had a “tonic” effect on secularist identity 
(Cimino and Smith, 2007).  
The most vocal proponent of minority discourse and identity politics in the atheist 
movement is perhaps Free Inquiry editor Tom Flynn, who has argued within the pages of 
his magazine for several years that the movement should adopt the tactics and rhetoric of 
the gay and lesbian movement in an effort to destigmatize atheism.  Indeed, he believes 
that the primary goal of the movement at this point should be to tackle the “antiatheist 
bigotry” which is analogous to the antigay bigotry exposed and confronted by the LGBT 
movement (Flynn, 2008).  He notes that even if we take the lower estimates of the 
number of “explicitly secular and nonreligious people” (he offers a figure of 10%), that 
number “will empower us to operate on the same scale as America’s most visible and 
respected activist minorities” (Flynn, 2006: 17). Flynn argues that atheists are on the 
verge of a “breakthrough moment” similar to those experienced by gays and lesbians, and 
also African-Americans and Hispanics, when their populations reached similar numbers 
(Flynn, 2006: 16). At the Reason Rally, Paul Fidalgo, a spokesman for CFI, echoed these 
sentiments by stating, “We have the numbers to be taken seriously”, and “We’re not just 
a tiny fringe group” (Aratani, 2012).   
Note in these various statements the comparisons not just to other minorities, but 
to the discrimination and even persecution experienced by these minorities.  The same 
sentiment is expressed by PZ Myers, who, in an article on the RDFRS web site, declares 
that, “we are staking out a place in the public discourse and openly discussing our 
concerns, rather than hiding in fear of that old Puritan scowl. We will not go back in the 
closet” (Myers, 2007).  Several atheist organizations make minority discourse their 
primary concern.  The Military Association of Atheists and Freethinkers represents non-
believers serving in the U.S. Armed Forces, a sphere where atheists are particularly 
stigmatized, even by American standards.  This group’s web page asserts in its 
introductory message that “nontheists are the last unprotected minority” (Military 
Atheists 2013). American Atheists’ mission statement reads: “Supporting Civil Rights for 
Atheists and the Separation of Church and State” (American Atheists 2013).  This 
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organization demanded a public apology from Billy Ray Cyrus for his “bigoted slur” 
against atheists in an interview in GQ magazine (American Atheists 2011a).   
Despite the clear differences in attitudes toward atheism in Canada versus that of 
the highly religious United States, Canadian atheism has also embraced minority politics 
and the discourse of persecution.  In March 2013 CFI Canada released an internet video 
(ThinkAgainCFI 2013) addressing the Canadian government’s announcement of the new 
Office of Religious Freedom.  In the video CFI spokesperson Justin Trottier asks the 
Office of Religious Freedom to include atheists in their mandate, arguing that “all over 
the world, atheists, agnostics, rationalists, and secularists are subject to hatred, 
intolerance, and persecution for their minority religious identity.”  While Trottier’s 
discussion was focused primarily on persecution of atheists in non-western contexts – 
particularly Islamic countries – the claim that atheism constitutes a minority religious 
identity was advanced in no uncertain terms.  The video includes a clip of Canadian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird speaking about the Office and its position that 
“we don’t see agnosticism or atheism as being in need of defence the same way 
persecuted religious minorities are”, underscoring Trottier’s argument that atheists in 
Canada need to make a stronger claim for recognition as a minority in need of protection.   
Many atheist groups, then, encourage self-representation as a minority excluded 
by mainstream society, and thus become an in-group that finds its identity “not within but 
against” (Cimino and Smith, 2007: 420) – that is, not in traits they share in common 
internally, but in the perception of discrimination and a common enemy.  This is in 
contrast to the New Atheists’ view of a group of enlightened individuals united by a 
scientistic worldview, or for that matter Paul Kurtz’s vision of a group united by a 
common humanistic epistemology and ethics. These trends support Cimino and Smith’s 
argument that the failure of naturalism and scientific thought to become dominant over 
supernatural explanations of reality – which was assumed by many “progressive 
secularists” throughout the 20th century to be the inevitable course of history (2007: 408) 
– has led these movements to shift their strategy.  Rather than assuming that 
secularization was the inevitable and natural trend of history, “the question of how 
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secularism can survive and even thrive in a religious society has become pressing for 
atheists and secular humanists” (Cimino and Smith, 2007: 408).  The new strategy, in 
answer to this pressing question, is the construction of a subcultural identity in order to 
find a place in American society.  Cimino and Smith identify three strategies aimed at 
realizing this goal: (1) creating a niche for secular humanism among irreligious people; 
(2) mimicking various aspects of evangelicalism in defining themselves; and (3) making 
use of minority discourse and engaging in identity politics (2007).  The project of 
ideological universalization, taken for granted for much of the 20th century as the 
inevitable course of history, has to a large extent been abandoned in favour of defensive 
strategies aimed at securing a location in the religious landscape.  
This defensive strategy, as I have illustrated, involves an instrumental political 
identity approach modeled on the gay and lesbian movement. The links to this movement 
are very clear in the examples that I have cited of efforts to combat the perceived stigma 
associated with the label “atheist” and to foster the notion that atheists constitute a 
hitherto unrecognized minority subject to similar forms of prejudice and discrimination.  
The dynamics at work within these identity movements are similar in many ways.  The 
issue within the gay and lesbian movement most pertinent to atheists’ current situation is 
the frequent and ongoing debates over the question of a strategy of “assimilation” versus 
one of “distinction” (Ghaziani, 2011) or alternatively “separatism” (Gamson, 1995).  
Amin Ghaziani (2011) argues that gay politics has generally moved from a very 
subversive and confrontational style that sought to highlight differences to a more 
conservative approach that emphasized things like marriage and adoption, serving in the 
military, and employment discrimination. 
These strategic differences indicate a tension between those who seek to maintain 
boundaries and a clear minority identity, which in turn is their source of political power, 
and those who want to break down boundaries to demonstrate that these differences are 
socially constructed rather than essential, and thus that gays should have the same rights 
and privileges as anyone else (Bernstein, 1997; Gamson, 1995; Ghaziani, 2011).  Joshua 
Gamson (1995: 391) refers to these as “category-supportive political strategies” versus 
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“deconstructive cultural strategies”. The former emphasizes difference and the power that 
can come from recognition as a distinct minority that must be protected, while the latter 
emphasizes assimilation.  The atheist movement is now faced with very similar questions 
and a very similar division, though it is further complicated by a series of divisions or 
tensions between and within various groups that reflects the dynamics involved in the 
emergence of a new or latent movement within the structure of an existing movement 
with its own tensions and internal debates.  These tensions are best exemplified by an 
ongoing debate concerning strategies that are generally referred to as “confrontation” and 
“accommodation”, which are analogous to Gamson’s “category-supportive” and 
“deconstructive” strategies. Examining these tensions regarding goals and strategies will 
in turn tell us much about the complex and evolving nature of atheist identity, since in the 
theoretical framework that I have adopted, goals, strategy, and identity are inextricably 
linked and mutually dependent, and indeed, internal disagreements over goals and 
strategies are in fact statements about identity (Polletta and Jasper, 2001).   
Ideological Divisions and Movement Dynamics  
 The atheist movement today is defined by a set of tensions: between atheists and 
humanists, between libertarians and liberals, between Social Darwinism and social 
justice, and between those who advocate a “confrontational” approach to religion with 
the goal of eradicating it and those favouring an “accommodationist” position that 
involves working with religious groups that share the goals of supporting science, 
secularism, and social justice. I will argue that these tensions in terms of politics, goals, 
and strategies should be understood most fundamentally in terms of the historical 
development of distinct scientific and humanistic atheist ideologies and how these 
ideologies inform and shape practices within social movement organizations. But more 
proximally, we can understand them in relation to movement dynamics, with tensions 
arising due to the fact that the movement is comprised of sub-groups that follow different 
trajectories out of the latency phase and develop as cultural or political movements. We 
have seen this division manifested in the debates concerning identity construction. I turn 
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now to current debates concerning strategy that, when considered in relation to identity 
and goals, reveal the foundational ideological tension at the heart of atheism.  
The New Atheists’ strategy of confrontation and polarization is reflective of their 
view of religion and science as dichotomous terms and their desire to validate their own 
ideology. For Dawkins, the strategy is to destroy the “God virus” by injecting our culture 
with a strong dose of the evolutionism “meme”.  The intention seems mainly to be to 
mobilize inactive non-believers and to address those on the fence who might have some 
sense of religious belief but not a strong attachment to it by polarizing the two sides and 
forcing them into choosing one.  Moderate positions are increasingly abandoned or 
viewed as untenable by both atheists and devout Christians, who are bound up in a 
dialectical relationship that propels them to further polarized extremes. Smith (1998) and 
Cimino and Smith (2007) illustrate how extreme elements of the religious and non-
religious each portray themselves as an “embattled” minority set against a dominant 
Other. This is typical of movements that employ a strategy of difference and construct 
identity by maintaining social, cultural, and political boundaries, emphasizing differences 
between dominant and minority groups (Taylor and Whittier, 1992: 111).   
This, again, is reflective of the positions Ghaziani (2011) refers to as “us versus 
them” and “us and them” in relation to the gay rights movement and its debates regarding 
identity strategies focusing on “distinction” versus “assimilation”.  A similar tension on 
questions of strategy and identity exists in the atheist movement between atheists and 
secular humanists, who “often contrast their positive system of ethics and values...with 
the more reactionary and hard-line stance atheists take in defending and promoting non-
theism” (Cimino and Smith, 2007: 410).  For their part, new atheists have an interest in 
maintaining a tension with society (rather than assimilating into it) in order to strengthen 
a worldview (Borer, 2010).  The New Atheists are less compelled toward pragmatism 
precisely because their goals are more cultural than political.  That is, the validation of a 
worldview is in and of itself the goal of the New Atheism, and maintaining a tension with 
‘outside’ perspectives is thus crucial to their strategy.  Philosopher and humanist 
Matthew Flamm writes in the pages of Free Inquiry that “the new atheists engage 
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contemporary religious sensibilities after the manner of glib scientists, less interested that 
such engagement produces in dissenters the urge for dialogue than in the fact that it 
clearly lays down lines of difference” (2011: 24).   
For the secularists engaged in a political struggle for the differentiation of 
religious (private) and secular (public) spheres, meanwhile, a pragmatic approach that 
involves building political power is paramount.  This tension is further reflective of the 
division in atheist thought in the 19th century discussed in the opening chapter.  The New 
Atheists, as scientific atheists, ascribe to a worldview where science and only science can 
provide the foundations of knowledge and social organization, and thus any ‘competing’ 
claims (i.e. ‘memes’) must be discredited and discarded. For others who are more 
concerned with protecting the rights of individual atheists than promoting a worldview, 
minority politics and maintaining strict lines of difference are key.   Accordingly, these 
groups adopt the strategy of “confrontation”. The secular humanists within the movement 
are less inclined to attack religious beliefs and more interested in issues like education, 
inequality, and environmental sustainability, and are open to forging pragmatic alliances 
with other groups – including religious ones – that share similar views on these issues. 
They thus adopt the strategy of “accommodation”. While confrontation and 
accommodation are instrumental approaches to achieving particular goals, they are also 
statements about identity, constituting “identity strategies” (Bernstein 2002).   
We could understand the division within the movement to this point in terms of 
identity and strategy, since accommodation corresponds to “assimilation” and 
confrontation corresponds to “distinction”.  But the matter is complicated by the fact that 
among those favouring the “confrontation” approach, there are further tensions in terms 
of movement goals and the underlying ideologies and political motivations that shape 
them.  Hence, we cannot simply equate these strategic approaches with atheism or secular 
humanism – the divisions run deeper than this.  To this point, I have argued that divisions 
within the movement are grounded in the question of goals (i.e. whether the movement is 
a political or cultural one, and what the corresponding aims are) and strategy (i.e. 
distinction versus assimilation, or alternatively, confrontation versus accommodation).   
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While the division on the question of strategy is fairly clear, on the question of goals the 
division is not rigid.  New atheists and secular humanists have goals that are cultural and 
political – indeed, in the theoretical framework I am employing the cultural and political 
dimensions are essentially inextricable – but I believe that we can say that the New 
Atheists’ goals are primarily cultural (i.e. scientific hegemony, proselytizing for 
evolutionism as an alternative to religious belief), and that the goals of secular humanists 
are primarily political (i.e. secularism as social differentiation, church-state separation, 
etc.).  There is, however, another group that introduces a further division within the group 
favouring confrontation, on the basis of ideology. This group is the libertarians. The 
following section examines ongoing debates within the movement regarding these 
strategic orientations and their broader implications.  
 
 
Confrontation vs. Accommodation 
 The most interesting development at the Council of Secular Humanism’s October 
2010 conference to celebrate the 30th anniversary of Free Inquiry was the articulation of 
two contrasting viewpoints in a panel discussion called “Science and Religion: 
Confrontation or Accommodation?” (Council for Secular Humanism 2010).13  Four 
speakers, two arguing for each side, discussed their views on the relationship between 
science and religion and how atheists should engage with religion in the public sphere.  
The speakers on the “confrontation” side were biologist and blogger PZ Myers and 
physicist Victor Stenger. Arguing for the “accommodation” viewpoint were Eugenie 
Scott, director of the non-profit National Centre for Science Education (NCSE) and Chris 
Mooney, a science journalist and regular host Point of Inquiry.   
 Myers’ blog, Pharyngula, is known for attacking not only religion, but almost 
equally proponents of “a more accommodating atheism” (Cimino and Smith 2012: 21).  
On this blog he has argued that the purpose of the movement is precisely to attack 
religious beliefs: “we’re in the business of telling believers that their most cherished 
fantasies are lies”. He therefore favours the “evangelical” (Cimino and Smith 2007) and 
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confrontational approach employed by the New Atheists, who treat religions as a set of 
truth claims that are vulnerable to competing scientific claims.  Indeed, Myers set the 
confrontational tone at the beginning of his presentation by declaring that “this is a real 
battle that we’re fighting in this country”.  He clearly identified himself as a “new 
atheist” and accepted the reputation for militancy that comes with the label while 
claiming that they “didn’t start the war” and that blame should be laid “on the backs of 
the religious zealots who have been poisoning the minds of the young for a long, long 
time.”  His entire presentation rested on the premise that the existence of God is a 
falsifiable scientific hypothesis.  This serves as a useful marker to erect boundaries 
between the in-group and out-groups, and indeed Myers’ primary goal seems to be 
establishing and maintaining distinction and a strong and clear sense of identity: “what I 
personally feel is an important goal is for atheists to acquire an identity, that one of the 
things we have to do as a group is recognize that we’re all in this together... We cannot 
cooperate and work with other groups if we do not have our own identity as a unique 
group.”  Myers represents a group seeking to maintain a clear boundary and reinforce 
difference and conflict, a manifestation of the scientific atheist commitment to the notion 
of religion and science as dichotomous terms as well as a strategic choice based on the 
assumption that an aggressive tone is effective in attracting new members and that a 
distinct minority identity is a path to political power. Stenger essentially reiterated similar 
arguments and ventured to offer hope that science can win the war against religion in the 
near future and that “in perhaps another generation Americans will have joined Europe 
and the rest of the developed world in shucking off the rusty chains of ancient 
superstition”, a comment that drew vigorous applause from the audience and remains in 
line with the New Atheists’ progressive and evolutionary view of history.  
 Eugenie Scott offered a very different perspective.  She explained that in her role 
as director of NCSE, her goal is promoting science, not attacking religion, which can 
actually be an impediment to this goal.  This is a major departure from the scientific 
atheist position, which she said fails to engage in the kind of cross-cultural critique of 
religion that would offer greater understanding.  These reductionist accounts of religion, 
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she argued, mistakenly posit that religion is essentially a pseudo-science (i.e. the “God 
Hypothesis”) and fail to appreciate that “because Christianity is not primarily about 
explaining the natural world it is not necessarily antithetical to science.” Her position that 
religion is not pseudo-science, but rather addresses everyday concerns people have 
related to survival and suffering that cannot be addressed by science, is tantamount to 
humanistic atheism.  
Chris Mooney expressed similar concerns about the reductionist theories and 
aggressive tactics employed by Myers, repeating arguments previously made in a number 
of writings (e.g. Mooney 2010) and conference presentations about a view of religion as a 
social and psychological phenomenon intimately associated with identity and politics. He 
began by claiming that the confrontational approach is exemplified by the New Atheists, 
who he has compared to religious fundamentalists in setting up a “false dichotomy” 
(Mooney and Kirshenbaum 2009) that alienates many “moderate” believers who might 
otherwise be sympathetic to science and secular values, which in his view are really what 
the movement should be about.  He therefore advocates abandoning an aggressive 
strategy of confrontation and argumentation in favour of mobilizing the “pro-science 
moderates” and supporting religious scientists as chief messengers for reaching out to the 
“anti-evolution crowd”.  The New Atheism, he suggests, “flies in the face of this, since it 
is often about attacking and alienating the religious moderates” (Mooney 2010: 7).  He 
offered the example of Francis Collins, an evangelical Christian who is also an eminent 
scientist and advocate of evolution and stem cell research, as someone atheists should 
support.  Myers’ response was to refer to Collins as a “clown” because of his religious 
beliefs.  The audience responded much more to the contempt and ridicule offered by 
Myers and Stenger than the decidedly more measured presentations given by Mooney 
and Scott. The “clown” remark drew applause and cheering, while the response to 
Mooney’s discussion of survey research and reasoned strategic positions was quite tepid 
in comparison.  
CFI is not the only organization where the “accommodation versus confrontation” 
debate has emerged.  In July, 2011, American Atheists filed a lawsuit against the World 
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Trade Center Memorial Foundation, New York City, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and 
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, among others, for displaying a 17-foot-tall cross of 
steel beams at the National September 11 Memorial and Museum on the grounds that it 
violated the U.S. Constitution and civil rights law (Gootman 2011).  In an apparent 
response to criticism for their position on this sensitive issue, the group issued a 
statement on their website titled “Now Is Not The Time For Atheists to Back Down” 
(American Atheists 2011b): 
There are those who are adamant that we should be non-aggressive, 
respectful and tolerant of those who hold religious beliefs and that we 
should not be outspoken....While some may choose to remain silent or 
non-confrontational, there are a growing number of us who have 
decided that the time has come to no longer sit back and let the 
theocrats run the show. 
This statement implicitly addresses the confrontation/accommodation debate – and 
further, a division within the movement – by referring to two groups divided in terms of 
their focus on “tolerance” or being “outspoken” and “confrontational”.  In November 
2010, Chris Mooney and David Silverman, president of American Atheists, debated the 
future of the movement in terms that essentially mirrored the Council for Secular 
Humanism conference panel in pitting “moderate” against “militant” atheism (Isaak 
2010).   
 These debates points to a tension between atheism and secular humanism within 
the movement, with some humanists dismayed by the ascendency of “militant” atheism 
(Cimino and Smith 2010).  As early as 2006, the year of publication of The God 
Delusion, there were concerns about both the tone and content of the emerging discourse.  
For example, Free Inquiry columnist Julian Baggini (2007) argued for a more moderate 
approach in an article entitled “Toward a More Mannerly Secularism”. Another Free 
Inquiry columnist criticized the idea that religion is an “outmoded method of 
explanation” that can be eradicated by presenting people with better theories, sardonically 
dismissing this view in arguing that “Megachurches will not empty out when the faithful 
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learn the secrets of the atom” (Hoffman 2006: 47).  The most vocal critic of the New 
Atheism within CFI has been the organization’s founder, Paul Kurtz, a philosopher and 
self-described secular humanist. Kurtz resigned from his position as Chair of CFI and 
editor-in-chief of Free Inquiry in 2010. By his account, he was effectively terminated by 
the Board of Directors in a “palace coup” (Hagerty 2009).After a prolonged period of 
publicly criticizing the direction it was taking as a result of the influence of “militant 
atheists” (Kurtz 2008: 6). His views on the matter fueled a debate with Tom Flynn in an 
episode of Point of Inquiry titled “Secular Humanism versus... Atheism?” (Isaak 
2009b).The interview involved a discussion of the supposed rift within the movement 
between secular humanists and atheists, and the idea that some who identify as secular 
humanists and want to advance the cause of reason, science, and church-state separation 
want to avoid the label “atheist”.  Flynn denied any tension between the two and sought 
to reconcile the positions by arguing that atheism is “an essential starting point” or basic 
epistemological foundation for secular humanism.  Kurtz, by contrast, insists that “you 
can be a secular humanist and not an atheist” and makes a distinction between secular 
humanism, which is a “positive” philosophy, and atheism, which is “negative” (Isaak 
2009c).   
 Flynn’s denial of tensions is unpersuasive, as intra-movement tensions have 
dominated movement discussions for well over a year. Susan Jacoby is a well-known 
secular activist, author, and speaker who once served as program director for the New 
York branch of the Center for Inquiry. She notes a distinction between “secular 
humanists” and “secular conservatives”, which expresses itself within the movement as a 
division between “humanists” and people who call themselves “skeptics”, with 
epistemological skepticism carrying none of the moral imperative of duty to others that 
might be claimed by humanism (Jacoby 2012).  We might alternatively think about this 
distinction in the terms outlined in the debate between Flynn and Kurtz, and consider 
what relationship there might be between the division between atheism and humanism, 
and between those Jacoby refers to as “secular humanists” and “secular conservatives”.  
Jacoby’s distinction implicitly identifies secular humanism with liberalism. Who, then, 
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are the “secular conservatives” she speaks of?  While I cannot say precisely who and 
what she was referring to, I will say that there is an identifiable group within the atheist 
movement who clearly seek to sever the connection between humanism, atheism, and 
social justice that constituted the grounding for humanistic atheism. These are the 
libertarians, and they introduce a complication to the divisions between secular 
humanism and atheism that Kurtz and Flynn discussed. That is, the libertarians combine 
the New Atheists’ confrontational approach with the secular humanists’ instrumental 
goals of political secularism, all while carving out their own ideological space and 
constructing a version of scientism that includes radical individualism as a central tenet.  
 
The Atheist Right: Social Darwinism versus Social Justice 
The growth of the right wing of the atheist movement, though still in an early 
latent phase, is a remarkable development. It emerges in the subtext of movement 
discourse, such as a CFI blog post by current President and CEO Ronald Lindsay (2012a) 
criticizing Chris Mooney’s most recent book about the workings of the “Republican 
brain” (Mooney 2012). Lindsay here calls into question our understanding of the terms 
“liberal” and “conservative”, particularly the mutual exclusivity of stereotypically liberal 
and conservative views. For instance, he takes issue with the presumed correspondence 
between conservatism and climate change skepticism, thereby critiquing the notion of a 
tension between conservatism and supporting science, and brings up the trope of Soviet 
communism to argue that proceeding leftward we also see rejection of science that 
conflicts with ideology (it is worth noting that atheists notoriously get frustrated by those 
who point out a connection between atheism and 20th century totalitarian political 
movements, yet Lindsay employs the same tactic in his critique of the Left). He also 
objects to Mooney’s inference that liberals are more “open-minded” than conservatives 
by nature, and argues that there is no inconsistency in being a humanist and a Republican 
(Lindsay 2012a).  
Lindsay is opposed to government intervention in the economy to ensure a more 
egalitarian distribution of wealth because it removes incentives to individuals to 
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“innovate” and “take risks”, and claims that humanism has no problem with “significant 
disparities in income and wealth” (Lindsay 2012b). Lindsay’s political views, like many 
libertarians, seem to lie somewhere outside of the traditional left-right spectrum (i.e. 
economic libertarians align with the extreme Right on taxation and government 
regulation of the economy, but might adopt progressive positions on social issues like 
sexuality and gender equality, education policy, and environmental stewardship, with the 
caveat that they are opposed to state support and regulation in all these cases).  What is 
quite clear is that Ronald Lindsay is not an advocate for the Left, and his writings suggest 
that movements for economic justice are irrational, while the current system, with its free 
market and “incentives” for “innovation”, is inherently rational and therefore just.  His 
leadership of CFI is the clearest sign of contemporary atheism’s departure from its roots 
in social justice movements and ideologies as it moves away from humanism and 
embraces something like Ayn Rand’s vision of atheistic individualism.  
 Individual rights concerning free speech is a common theme in Free Inquiry and 
Point of Inquiry. One striking example is Wendy Kaminer’s (2010) critique of the Left 
and the culture of political correctness for censoring ideas that might be deemed 
offensive, citing the example of a Harvard law student who was reprimanded for writing 
in an email that she is open to the possibility that African Americans are, on average, 
genetically predisposed to be less intelligent.  The author points to the Left wing of the 
academy and certain “anti-libertarian trends on campus that are anathema to reason” 
(Kaminer, 2010: 14) as the cause of this censorship and assault on individual liberty and 
freedom of inquiry.   
The rhetoric of “freedom” and “responsibility” is not restricted to free speech and 
a sense of duty to truth.  Economic freedom has become a major topic of conversation, 
sometimes overshadowing discussion of science and religion.  For example, Frank 
Pasquale (2010b), in an article titled “The Quintessential Secular Institution”, argues that 
we should celebrate corporations as the most substantially secular institutions in human 
history, and that we should not over-generalize in our descriptions of them (i.e. they are 
not all rapacious or greedy or destructive).  TiborMachan argues that “everyone has the 
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inalienable right to private property”, and that nobody has the right to make demands on 
anyone else’s property or wealth (2011a:13).  He equates state support for victims of 
natural disasters and illness with “penalizing” or “fining” other individuals, which is a 
violation of their right to private property.  He further argues that the notion of “surplus 
wealth” is a “myth” because we cannot determine what constitutes a surplus here.  His 
reasoning is that someone who has a lot of wealth may be “powerfully enriched, 
psychologically, by holding onto wealth beyond what others may consider reasonable” 
(2011a: 13) – in other words, they enjoy being wealthy. It is notable that Machan, an 
emeritus member of the Philosophy Department at Auburn University, has described Ayn 
Rand as “a writer with powerful philosophical ideas”, and her novel The Fountainhead as 
“inspiring”, “a literary masterpiece”, and “the American novel of the twentieth century” 
(Machan 2011b).   
Science writer Michael Shermer, publisher of Skeptic magazine and monthly 
columnist for Scientific American, makes regular appearances on Point of Inquiry.  He is 
a libertarian and a Darwinist who has written books on evolutionary theories of morality 
(2004) and religious belief (2011), as well as “evolutionary economics” (2009), arguing 
that the free market is a natural reflection of innate human motivations related to 
economics and justice, concluding that a free-market capitalist system thus has an 
inherent “morality” derived from nature.  In a 2009 POI appearance, he argued for the 
abolition of state support for the unemployed: “How do I know that they can’t actually 
earn that money?  Maybe they just don’t want to, they’d rather not work” (Isaak 2009a). 
In this same interview, he also defends increasing wealth disparity as a symptom of a 
healthy economy, claims that individuals in the West are responsible for their own 
circumstances and that poverty is a result of making poor decisions, and argues for Ayn 
Rand’s contemporary relevance.   
Shermer’s interviewer, D.J. Groethe (the original host of POI), notes during the 
discussion that many of the “big guns” in the movement are libertarians, lending credence 
to the notion that the members of the supporting cast I have just introduced represent the 
views held by some lead players. For instance, Tom Flynn (2011) has compared social 
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welfare programs to Ponzi schemes, and I have already discussed Ronald Lindsay’s 
views on atheism’s relationship to politics and economics.  These Darwinists clearly 
espouse scientific atheism, and indeed, their views are antithetical to humanistic atheism 
with its concerns regarding alienation, oppression, suffering, and struggle for social 
justice.  The tension between atheistic individualists and more moderate liberal humanists 
is evident in a recent issue of Free Inquiry centred on the theme of activism in secularist 
organizations. It featured articles from members of various organizations offering 
examples of people “who are living the values of secular humanism” by collectively 
engaging in community service and volunteer work, and organizations that believe that 
“secular humanism is a way of living that compels them to stand up and become part of 
their communities, encourages them to offer their hands to strangers, and inspires them to 
do what they can to improve the lives of their fellow human beings” (Becker 2012: 20). 
Lauren Becker’s introductory article comes with the following Note From the Editor 
(Tom Flynn):  
Several articles in this section take a strong position in favor of shared 
charitable or social-service work as a platform for secular humanist 
activism. It is not the intent of Free Inquiry or the Council for Secular 
Humanism to advocate this variety of activism for all.  We recognize 
that some readers will...find the idea at odds with their understanding of 
secularism as an individualistic and cosmopolitan framework that 
encourages men and women to connect to the highest levels of society 
as directly as possible, relying on their community of belief for nothing 
that does not immediately concern their life stance. (Flynn 2012b). 
The authors in this issue offer stories of how they and others in their respective 
groups were inspired by humanistic concerns to collectively engage in charitable work to 
help others. This type of activity is evidently so contentious within the atheist movement 
that the pieces required a disclaimer noting that they did not represent the official position 
of CFI. Ronald Lindsay’s column arguing that humanism is not mutually exclusive to 
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being a Republican (discussed above) also appeared in this issue, providing stark contrast 
to the pieces arguing for a conception of secular humanism rooted in social justice.   
Not long after the publication of Tom Flynn’s comment comparing social welfare 
programs to Ponzi schemes, Texas Governor Rick Perry – a devout and very right-wing 
Evangelical Christian supported by the pious Tea Party – garnered some attention for 
making a similar analogy concerning Social Security during his ill-fated campaign for the 
Republican Presidential nomination (Calmes& Pear, 2011). This apparent irony points us 
to some interesting facts and questions emerging from the rise of libertarianism to a 
position of power and influence within the atheist movement.  While critics have 
frequently labelled the New Atheists “fundamentalists” in their own right, they are very 
different politically from the Christian fundamentalists to whom they are so frequently 
compared.  The rise of the libertarians brings new resonance to the comparison between 
atheists and religious fundamentalists because they share so much politically.  In their 
opposition to state intervention in socio-economic life (particularly in social welfare), 
their support for neoliberal capitalism, and their view that individuals bear responsibility 
for their own problems and the problems facing the world, these groups are united.  
While the New Atheists are sometimes described as “fundamentalists” (e.g. McGrath 
2006) to the extent that their worldview is shaped by scientism and they reject all other 
claims to knowledge (i.e. they are fundamentalists with respect to epistemology), they 
bear little similarity to the religious variant politically.  The libertarians, on the other 
hand, have a good deal in common with Christian fundamentalists in terms of their 
position on the state and the market. Just as there are liberal Christians and a Christian 
Right, there seem to be both liberal atheists and an atheist Right.   
Given the significant degree of correspondence between libertarians and Christian 
fundamentalists on matters of social justice and inequality, we might ask whether the 
New Atheists have more in common with libertarian atheists or with liberal Christians.  
While the New Atheists are scientistic in their epistemology and Darwinian in their views 
of human nature, their politics are generally liberal.14  Unlike many of their 19th century 
predecessors, they do not reason through Darwinism to arrive at the conclusion that the 
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welfare state is an unnatural and hence undesirable construction (though they do have 
very specific ideas about decision-making authority), and they do not advocate cutthroat 
socio-economic policies in an effort to allow the fittest to flourish while the less fit are 
weeded out (this is not to say, of course, that they are fundamentally opposed to 
capitalism).  Indeed, Sam Harris argues that the libertarian view that individuals bear full 
responsibility for their own circumstances is founded on “flagrantly irrational ideas about 
the human condition” held by people who “seem to feel responsible for their intellectual 
gifts, for their freedom from injury and disease, and for the fact that they were born at a 
specific moment in history” (Harris 2011).  Social Darwinism is, however, not too far 
from the anti-state, laissez-faire position of the libertarians, for whom Darwinism has 
been translated into ideological fodder for free-market capitalism through the rhetoric of 
freedom, individual rights, and human nature (Michael Shermer’s “evolutionary 
economics” [2009], with its theory of the “invisible hand” of natural selection regulating 
the market, could be described as evolutionistic neoliberal apologetics).  The Christian 
Right has similarly translated Christianity into ideological fodder through essentially the 
same rhetoric, substituting a religious vision of human nature for a scientific one while 
holding the same basic tenets.  Though the foundational principles are different – i.e. 
Darwinism versus Christianity – the ideological upshot is the same, at least with respect 
to social inequality and the responsibilities of the state.   
The controversy over the notion of “social justice” within the atheist movement is 
so intense that the most recent event of significance at the time of writing has been the 
emergence of a group calling themselves “Atheism+”, which means atheism plus social 
justice. It was formed by several self-described feminist atheists15 in response to specific 
perceived misogyny within the atheist community.  According to the group’s website, 
“Atheism Plus is a term used to designate spaces, persons, and groups dedicated to 
promoting social justice and countering misogyny, racism, homo/bi/transphobia, ableism 
and other such bigotry inside and outside of the atheist community” (Atheism Plus 2013).  
At this point the group has no discernible goals beyond this mandate and has not yet 
engaged in any action other than creating a website, which is still under construction and 
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currently contains only a short FAQ about the group and a discussion forum (which is 
already very active). Examining the blogs written by the founders of the group, however, 
indicates that they very clearly embrace the scientism that the movement is grounded in, 
as well as a confrontational approach to religion.  And yet, they claim that “there is a 
sizable contingent of atheists who agree that a desire for social justice connects to their 
atheism in a meaningful way” (Atheism Plus 2013).   
Atheism+ has been criticized by a number of prominent movement leaders 
(including no less than Richard Dawkins and Ronald Lindsay), and discussion forums of 
atheist web sites in recent months have hosted intense, in many cases hostile, debates 
concerning the relationship between atheism and responsibilities toward social justice.  
The debates concerning Atheism+ point to major disagreements over the nature and 
limits of atheism as an identity and as a movement.  Perhaps the most important thing 
that we can learn from the emergence of Atheism+ and the reaction to it is that the 
historical division in atheist thought, ostensibly epistemological but more essentially 
political in nature, still resonates today. Atheism+ does not distinguish itself from other 
atheist groups epistemologically (they don’t voice any opposition to scientism, a 
confrontational approach to religion, or a minority identity). Rather, the distinction is 
essentially political.  The contemporary atheist movement, then, reflects the division that 
emerged in the 19th century between a scientific atheism rooted in liberal individualism 
and a humanistic atheism rooted in social justice.  
This group is in a very early stage of development and it remains to be seen 
whether it can be considered an emerging latent movement, or a temporary response to a 
specific internal issue.  With 2810 registered members and a total of 93830 posts to the 
site’s discussion forum as of October 16, 2013 (Atheism Plus 2013), it is not insignificant 
and clearly speaks to the concerns of many atheists.  What we can say is that Atheism+ 
illustrates the difficulty in maintaining cohesion within a movement comprised of 
individuals united only by shared identity rather than a shared structural location.  The 
debates concerning minority politics, strategies of accommodation and confrontation, and 
the connection (or lack thereof) between atheism and social justice, are all instances of 
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identity work, and these tensions must be reconciled – if not fully overcome – for the 
movement to work in a united fashion to achieve its goals (which themselves are also up 
for debate).  Atheism+ explicitly distinguishes itself from humanism and makes atheism 
specifically the core characteristic of the group, so in effect it introduces a further 
complication and shows the movement becoming more and more internally divided and 
makes identity work more and more difficult. It remains to be seen if sufficient work can 
be done to overcome these differences and keep the movement from splintering into a 
number of politically divided factions.  Because atheism is not an identity related to some 
fixed characteristic (e.g. race, class, sex), but rather an achieved identity that must be 
collectively constructed, this movement is particularly susceptible to factionalism.   
 
Conclusion 
The situation facing the New Atheism is this: liberal, Left-leaning Christians are 
targeted for attack by the New Atheism because of a disagreement on the matter of a First 
Cause even though their basic political orientations are similar, while libertarian atheists 
– ostensibly allies of the New Atheists – are inclined to denounce Left-wing socio-
economic policies as much as irrational religious dogma.  In fact, it’s difficult to 
determine which they find more objectionable, or indeed which is of greater interest or 
more closely related to their goals, given that Free Inquiry and Point of Inquiry have in 
recent years featured many libertarian critiques of taxation and state welfare programs, 
and conversely, defences of corporations and the free market.  This puts the libertarians at 
odds politically with both new atheists and secular humanists.  The thing that unites them 
all is that they favour a scientific view of the universe over a religious one and reject the 
existence of god(s), but divisions in terms of movement goals and strategies, and the 
ideologies that underwrite them, run deep.  The secular humanists recognize the political 
common ground with liberal Christians, while the New Atheists ignore this commonality 
because their attention is focused on other differences (i.e. religion/science), and the 
libertarians are on different ground altogether.   
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New Atheists, secular humanists, and the Atheism+ movement are similar in their 
basically liberal political orientation.  The New Atheists are positioned somewhat further 
to the right than secular humanists on social issues because of their lower tolerance for 
religious groups.  Libertarian atheists, on the other hand, somewhat ironically share more 
common ground with fundamentalist Christians on economic issues and even on the 
question of the individual’s relationship to the state and to society.  Since New Atheists 
and secular humanists share a roughly similar political orientation, the divisions between 
them must be with respect to goals and strategy – i.e. how best to realize a desirable 
political vision – which are informed by ideology and carry implications for the 
construction and expression of collective identity.  It also requires a decision regarding 
which is the greater priority: social justice and welfare, or scientific hegemony.  This is 
the question facing the new atheists – and here I refer not to the leaders of this sub-group 
(who are staunch in their position of difference) but rather to the many movement 
participants who identify with them or were drawn to the movement in the first place 
through their work – as they determine whether they should side with the secular 
humanists and “accommodationists” or with the libertarians and “confrontationists” (the 
views of members are addressed in the following chapter).   
These divisions can be understood in relation to the characteristics that define the 
three major sub-groups within the movement, as outlined in Table 3.  Unpacking this will 
require further research and analysis, but for now we can draw several conclusions and 
raise some key questions and issues for future work on the atheist movement.  As my 
concern here is primarily the phenomenon of the “new” atheism, my discussion focuses 
on this group more specifically and its relationship with the others.  McAdam (1994: 47) 
argues that “it is usually possible to identify a particular segment within the movement as 
dominant.  To the extent that this segment is widely perceived as substantially effective 
its cultural ‘package’ will likely be privileged as well”.  I have argued that this is the case 
for the sub-movement called the new atheism, which became privileged thanks to the 
phenomenal publishing successes of the ‘Four Horsemen’ that drew attention to the 
movement and proved very effective in recruitment. Its “cultural package” (McAdam, 
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1994) included the characteristics listed in Table 3; i.e. scientific atheism, liberalism, 
confrontational strategies employing rational-scientific rhetoric, and the cultural goal of 
changing attitudes about science and religion.  Cimino and Smith note that with the rise 
of the New Atheism, “the ‘missionary impulse’ to roll back the ‘ignorance’ and 
‘unenlightenment’ of religion has been revived among freethinkers to an extent that 
outweighs the concern about equal rights” (2010: 143). Even secular humanists took the 
success of the New Atheism as a “cultural opportunity” (Johnston and Klandermans 
1995) to expand the horizons of the movement and attract members.  
I have argued that this trend is now being reversed. After the glow provided by 
the surprising success and celebrity of the New Atheists had dimmed somewhat, their 
cultural package gradually came into question by both secular humanists and libertarian 
atheists, two other sub-groups vying for dominance.  McAdam further argues that to the 
extent that a sub-group “is seen as ineffective, strategic and organizational control of the 
movement will likely shift (often following a period of conflict) to some other contender, 
thereby enhancing the importance of its cultural package” (1994: 48).  The 
accommodation versus confrontation debate is a challenge by secular humanists to the 
effectiveness of the New Atheism’s aggressive, uncompromising approach and its 
cultural goal of ideological proliferation. Some influential libertarians, meanwhile, have 
conversely moved a step beyond the New Atheism in terms of confrontational style and 
ideological militancy while at the same time employing these tools toward different ends, 
pursuing the political goals of minority recognition, protection from discrimination, and 
securing individual rights. The goals of the New Atheism, then, have essentially been 
eclipsed by a return to the traditional freethought discourse of civil rights and goals of 
maintaining the differentiation of secular and religious spheres.  The model of movement 
development presented in Figure 2, then, could be viewed as a feedback loop, with 
persisting political differences and debates over goals and strategy leading to a ‘perpetual 
latency’ and a movement constantly in flux and changing directions.  
Returning to the question that I raised above regarding priorities, we can see that 
the new atheists face a dilemma: their cultural package – i.e. the ideology and collective 
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identity they promote – risks losing its dominant position in the movement as libertarians 
co-opt much of their discourse but inject it with a more Darwinist slant that involves a 
return to 19th century models of the ‘natural’ (and thus only legitimate) social order. In its 
crudest forms this discourse is tantamount to Social Darwinism.  These libertarian 
rationalists espouse a “radical individualism” (Flynn 2012) that not only opposes state 
constraints on individual liberty, but opposes state involvement in economic life in any 
way because the free market is equated with this liberty, while taxation and social welfare 
are considered inherently authoritarian.  An alternative for new atheists is to unite more 
closely with the secular humanists, but in the view of leaders this would mean also 
“accommodating” liberal or moderate religion and thus compromising the ultimate goals 
and the underlying ideology of a movement intent on dispelling religious myths and 
cementing the hegemonic authority of science over and against its dichotomous Other.  
The final option is to oppose the political radicalization of atheism while staying the 
course in terms of the cultural objective, but given their strategic concordance (favouring 
a category-supportive political identity strategy grounded in distinction, as opposed to the 
secular humanists’ deconstructive strategy that seeks assimilation) and their shared 
scientific atheism, it seems somewhat unlikely that the New Atheists will seek to 
establish a clear distinction from the libertarians. What can be concluded from my 
analysis is that the three sub-groups within the movement are linked to each other in 
various ways, but the only thing they all share is non-belief, while all three can be 
distinguished on the basis of ideology and the tensions between them will require 
considerable work to overcome if the movement is to avoid factionalism.  Indeed, these 
tensions have already resulted in a new group marking their political differences with the 
broader atheist movement.   
It is worth noting the correspondence between the division within atheism today 
and that which occurred in the 19th century when, as I have argued, atheism diverged into 
two major trajectories, scientific and humanistic.  I also argued that within scientific 
atheism of that period, which was closely attached to Darwinism, there was a further 
division between liberal scientific atheism and the more extreme atheistic individualism 
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of Social Darwinism, represented and advocated principally by Herbert Spencer.  That 
19th century constellation of humanistic atheism, scientific atheism, and Social 
Darwinism mirrors that of the contemporary atheist movement and the composition of the 
three major sub-groups (or sub-ideologies) that constitute it.  While the libertarian 
rationalists would likely reject the label Social Darwinism because of the stigma it 
carries, their views are essentially Spencerian.  More proximally, they appear to be 
influenced by Ayn Rand, who essentially advocated for Spencerism and added a more 
explicit and vigorous critique of religion.   
The grass roots nature of Atheism+ and its opposition to the atheist Right compels 
us to consider where the members of the movement stand on these issues. That is, are 
they scientific atheists who oppose religion as the Other of scientific rationalism and 
modernity?  Or are they secular humanists who embrace naturalism and humanist ethics 
seeking to promote science education and tolerance of diversity?  Are they mainly 
liberals or libertarians, and are there any socialists among them?  Do they seek 
assimilation and cooperation with religious people, or do they favour minority politics as 
the route to finding a space within society?  In the following chapter I examine interviews 
with fifteen members of the atheist movement in an effort to begin to understand what 
kinds of views they hold on these issues.    
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CHAPTER 4 
ATHEISTS 
 
This chapter presents research undertaken in Montreal and Toronto that involved 
interviews with attendees of an international atheist convention and members of local 
atheist groups. A total of fifteen interviews were conducted. Twelve interviews were 
conducted at the Atheist Alliance International (AAI) Annual Convention (organized in 
partnership with Humanist Canada) held in Montreal, Quebec from October 1-3, 2010. I 
contacted the organizers of the event in advance and informed them of the nature of my 
research and my intention to interview participants, and they offered me a private 
meeting room in the convention area in which to conduct the interviews over the course 
of the weekend. The number of interviews conducted at this event was limited by the fact 
that it took place within one weekend and participants were kept busy by a hectic 
presentation schedule.  I therefore conducted three more interviews in Toronto with 
members of the Ontario branch of the Centre for Inquiry (CFI) to increase the sample 
size, though I also wanted to keep the number of subjects drawn from this pool small to 
prevent this specific city and organization from distorting the results. Two of these 
interviews took place in a park near the CFI office in downtown Toronto, and one more 
took place in a cafe. CFI is the largest atheist organization in North America, while the 
AAI convention is attended by hundreds of atheists each year and provided a good 
opportunity to conduct interviews with atheists from disparate geographic locations (the 
2010 convention was attended, according to an organizer I interviewed, by approximately 
300 people). These organizations were also the primary object of the social movements 
analysis in the preceding chapter, so I restricted interview subjects to members of these 
organizations to ensure coherence.  
Respondents were selected by non-random means. Specifically, the sampling 
method involved emails with requests for interview subjects sent to organization listservs 
on my behalf by the Executive Director of CFI upon my emailed request. Subjects at the 
AAI convention were located by posting a message to the group’s Facebook page in 
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advance of the convention, with the exception of one subject who agreed to an interview 
following a casual conversation at our table at the end of a presentation we had attended. 
My respondents ranged in age from 23 to 58 years old, with nine females and six males. 
All had attended university, ranging from one year of undergraduate education to PhD-
level study. In terms of religious background, the traditions represented include five 
Catholics, one Baptist, one United Church, one Hindu, one Buddhist, one Ismaili Muslim, 
while five subjects had secular upbringings. Details on sample demographics are 
summarized in Table 4.   
The semi-structured interviews asked open-ended questions that invited 
respondents to talk about their religious background, experiences that contributed to their 
changing views on religion, their motivations for joining atheist organizations, current 
views on the New Atheism and the nature of religion and its relationship to science, 
tensions and conflicts they see within the movement, and areas where they find 
themselves disagreeing with official discourse or fellow members. Because I used a 
open-ended format and wanted to encourage subjects to follow lines of thought that 
emerged in the course of their responses, the interviews sometimes drifted to topics I 
didn’t anticipate in advance (it bears noting that these subjects were generally very open 
and little encouragement was required for them to give extensive answers and opinions 
on all the topics that came up). This in turn also meant that some questions that I did plan 
in advance weren’t addressed in every interview.  In cases where not all subjects were 
asked a particular question, I have noted the number of subjects the question applied to in 
the frequency tables summarizing the responses.   
While many questions were open-ended, some were designed so as to elicit fairly 
straightforward answers. This is most obvious in questions pertaining to the extent and 
duration of involvement in the movement, family religious background, and so on. Some 
others did not necessarily have a straightforward answer – for example, “Is the existence 
of God a scientific question? – but are reported here as a Yes/No response in summary 
tables, with some elaborations in the text. In these cases I have “reduced” (Guest 2012) or 
“simplified” the data for the purpose of comparing these responses with the dominant  
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Table 4: Sample Demographics (N=15) 
 
Age 21-30 5 
 
31-40 4 
 
41-50 1 
 
51-60 5 
Sex Female 9 
 
Male 6 
Nationality Canada 10 
 
United States 4 
 
Sweden* 1 
Ethnicity White 12 
 
South Asian 1 
 
East Asian 1 
 
African 1 
Education** Some university 2 
 
Bachelor's 
Degree 8 
 
Master's Degree 4 
 
PhD 1 
Religious Background Catholic 5 
 
United Church 1 
 
Baptist 1 
 
Hindu 1 
 
Buddhist 1 
 
Ismaili 1 
 
Secular 5 
 
 
* Now resides in the United States. 
** Areas of study: Human Relations, Business (4), Public Health, Liberal Arts, Communication 
Studies, Criminology, Labour Relations, Library and Information Science, Social Work, Fine 
Arts, Chemistry (2), Psychology, Statistics (N = 17 due to two joint majors) 
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themes of official movement discourse.  In this example there was a roughly even split on 
the matter of whether the existence of God is a scientific question, which is an interesting 
contrast to the prevailing view among the New Atheists and their supporters that it is, of 
course, a scientific question regarding the origins and functioning of nature. This strategy 
of data reduction through an interpretive reconstruction of responses into codes was 
employed in a number of other instances for purposes of drawing comparisons between 
members’ views and New Atheism discourse, including the questions of why people 
believe in God, and what causes them to lose their beliefs. These questions are all 
covered in the chapter section on “Science, Religion, and the New Atheism”.   
This chapter analyzes these themes, and is structured according to the general 
categories they fall in, reflected in the chapter’s division into three major sections.  The 
first, “Trajectories of Belief”, examines the various paths to atheism travelled by my 
respondents.  It demonstrates that there is no one “standard” path to atheism, but that 
these subjects came to their beliefs from different points of origin and proceeded through 
different stages.  The second section, “Science, Religion, and the New Atheism”, presents 
responses to such questions as whether the existence of god is a scientific question, why 
people believe in god, and why they stop believing.  It also examines the influence of the 
New Atheism in the development of religious beliefs.  The final section, “The Atheist 
Movement”, details respondents’ reasons for joining atheist groups and how they 
discovered them, their views on the purpose of the movement, tensions they perceive 
within the movement, and tensions they themselves feel with aspects of the movement.   
 
Trajectories of Belief  
Smith (2011) identifies four stages in the “slow progression” toward atheism: the 
ubiquity of theism, questioning theism, rejecting theism, and coming out atheist. This 
process involves starting out in a culture steeped in theism with people generally 
accepting the religious beliefs that dominate American society, proceeding to a “period of 
doubt” (generally occurring from the teenage years into the twenties) where these beliefs 
are gradually questioned, examined, and finally rejected as false. This period of doubt 
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and eventual rejection of theism culminates in “coming out,” which involves people 
claiming an atheist identity and explicitly using the label “atheist” to describe their 
beliefs to others, with the public expression of an atheist identity “an important step 
toward a new self-concept and a feeling of independence and empowerment” (Smith 
2011:229).  
Hunsberger and Altemeyer (2007) and Zuckerman (2011) offer similar portraits 
of “apostates” – people experiencing a religious socialization who were believers, but 
went through a process of questioning and doubt that eventually resulted in abandoning 
their beliefs and adopting an atheist identity. I propose that this model of atheist identity 
formation, rooted in a narrative of conversion, should be called the standard trajectory.  It 
represents both the majority of atheists in these various studies, as well as, perhaps, our 
intuitive expectations about how the process might work.  It involves a linear progression 
from a theistic socialization, through questioning and doubt that comes with education 
and being exposed to new ideas, to a conversion from believer to atheist. This linear view 
of the development of atheism is endorsed by leading figures like Richard Dawkins who 
consider religion a kind of primitive pseudo-science and assume progress from religion to 
scientific rationality at both the macro socio-historical level and at the micro individual 
level.  
My research both confirms and challenges the findings of Smith (2011) and 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2007). These authors found that atheists commonly 
experience an extended period of doubt, usually coinciding with the teenage years and 
advancing education in high school and university. This finding is supported by my 
research. Among my ten subjects who were raised in a religious family and attended 
church at least periodically, all but two report experiencing a period of doubt as teenagers 
culminating in fully-realized atheism most frequently by the late teens and no later than 
the age of twenty-one. These respondents report going through a gradual process of 
questioning of religious doctrines and reflection on their own beliefs – Smith describes 
this, in the words of one of his interview subjects, as a “slow progression” toward 
atheism. This would not surprise Michael, one of my respondents who has been active in 
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atheist organizations for almost thirty years, who said: “Most atheists I know go through 
at least, if they’ve been raised religious, go through some kind of a journey. It’s very rare 
that you find a sort of overnight conversion.”   
A good example to illustrate this process is Fahim, who at the age of twenty-one 
completed a protracted journey from devout religiosity, through a period of doubt and 
questioning, to committed atheism.   Fahim, 26, was born in British Columbia to Ismaili 
Muslim parents who emigrated from Africa before he was born.  His parents were not 
only strong believers, but very active in the local Ismaili community. He himself was 
“absolutely” a believer in his childhood and enjoyed going to Mosque, where he 
participated in religious debates. But by the age of twelve, he says, “I knew there was 
something majorly off and I couldn’t articulate it, I couldn’t put it into words.”  Between 
the ages of thirteen and sixteen he entered a period of doubt when “things weren’t 
making sense because questions weren’t being answered.”  He became interested in 
science and particularly reading popular science magazines, and observed that “there was 
a consistent sense of agreement at a very general level as to the ideas of scientific 
discourse,” while when it came to religion he observed the opposite. That is, science was 
governed by rules of method and rationality, which he saw as representing an “objective 
reality”, while religion appeared as a “subjective reality” where there were many 
different viewpoints (i.e. belief and value systems, understandings of the nature of 
scripture, etc.), and “none of them could be consolidated, and when you couldn’t 
consolidate something you left people in a state of confusion. When they’re in confusion 
they tend to go somewhere else.”  Because religion didn’t meet up to the objective 
standards of knowledge and universality he admired in science, he began to question the 
truths it espoused.  
These seeds of doubt took root when he went to university. He still went to 
Mosque during his first year of study, but also met atheists for the first time in his life, 
including two of his roommates, and “the conversation started to pop up” – that is, the 
conversation addressing the question of God’s existence. Studying science intensively 
was, for Fahim, a process of discovering that “there was something greater going on 
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beyond the scope of religion,” and that science addressed questions and a greater truth 
that religion was not equipped to deal with. A signature event in his fourth year of study 
signaled the end of his period of doubt and his transition to atheism: reading Richard 
Dawkins’ (2006) The God Delusion. While this book did not convert him from believer 
to non-believer (this process was already well underway), it did give him the language 
and concepts to articulate the doubts and questions he had struggled with for years. He 
explains:  
I knew right away that was a book I had to read...So then I actually 
picked up the book and I pretty much laughed my way through the 
book because it was almost hilarious to me, I almost read it as a 
comedy show of how people are ridiculous. Like, it just shows, I didn’t 
know if I could have figured it out on my own, maybe it would have 
taken me longer, but as soon as I got through the first hundred pages the 
book was pretty much closed to me. I didn’t need – I continued to finish 
it obviously, and read it over a couple times, but I knew at that point 
what it is that I was missing. I knew all the ideas and thoughts that I had 
had now been put into words. 
 Fahim’s path to atheism follows the standard trajectory and his views echo those 
of the New Atheists, who assume that atheism is the end point of a gradual progression 
from religiously-fueled ignorance to scientific enlightenment. This sentiment was also 
expressed by Tim, who in describing his transition from believing Catholic to atheist 
says, “as any child growing up you’re fed this information, you know, you have no 
alternative theories to evaluate...as you grow up, you’re exposed to more information.”  
The “period of doubt” is clearly an important concept that represents a common stage in 
the process of atheist identity formation, and the mid-to-late teenage years seem to be a 
critical period in the development of non-religious beliefs and identities. 
Not all atheists pass through this stage, however, and those who do can arrive at it 
from different directions.  The standard trajectory implies a particular kind of 
socialization and an initial state of belief, but we should expect to encounter atheists from 
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a wide range of religious and non-religious backgrounds and social environments. 
Recognizing this heterogeneity in religious socialization, I divide my sample into two 
major categories. The first is “secular socialization” – those for whom religion was absent 
or a very insignificant element of their upbringing, and thus were never believers. The 
second is “religious socialization” – those who were raised in religious environments of 
varying degrees of intensity of belief and practice and were once believers. Baker and 
Smith (2009a, 2009b) employ the same categories in their analysis of the “nones,” and 
define religious socialization simply as having parents who are believers and attending 
religious services, which of course all varies in frequency and intensity.  Taking these 
two categories as a starting point, I outline five different paths to atheism followed by my 
subjects, represented in Figure 3.  
Two paths were taken by those in the category of “secular socialization.” The first 
and most straightforward is simply an extension of socialization, where the individual 
starts life in a secular private sphere and never adopts religious beliefs, represented in 
Figure 3 as path (1). For example, Stacey was raised by her non-religious mother and 
says that religion simply was not a part of her upbringing. She didn’t go to church and her 
mother never talked about religion, so in her early years she had a very limited 
understanding of what religion actually was. She was once taken to Sunday school by her 
father, who attended a Methodist church, where she was introduced to the ideas for the 
first time. She says of the experience, “Once someone finally explained the premise to 
me, I was like, okay, so you believe there’s an invisible man in the sky (laughter)...It 
never jived with me.” Stacey was raised in a secular environment and did not feel the 
presence of religion in her life in any significant way, never held religious beliefs, and 
never experienced a desire to believe or any real curiosity regarding the practice of 
religion. Her atheism proceeded directly from her socialization.  
The other path to atheism for individuals in this category, represented in Figure 3 
as path (2), is indicative of the dynamic nature of the development of atheism. Individuals 
following this trajectory experience a secular socialization and grow up non-believers, 
and then at some point and for some reason experiment with religion, in some cases fully 
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converting. This is represented in Figure 3 as a phase of “seeking religion,” a detour on 
the path from secular socialization to atheism, before proceeding through the period of 
doubt and back to atheism. Three respondents took this route, with one, Diana, seeking 
religion in early childhood. She was raised by agnostic parents but at about the age of six 
started to have questions about God and became interested in religion “because the fact 
is, you know, lots of other people are doing it so there must be something there.” She 
joined a Bible study class in school, but explains that “I just had a lot of questions that I 
never got satisfactory answers, so I just obviously stayed on the agnostic side of things.”  
 
Figure 3: Trajectories to atheism  
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Despite his secular upbringing, he found himself motivated to seek religion: “Most of my 
life I was sort of an agnostic that wanted to believe. So, and I thought good people 
believed, so wanting to be a good person I was trying to believe.” Recovery from alcohol 
addiction motivated him to probe “issues around religion and spirituality” more 
intensively. Believing there was a link between religiosity and morality, he began looking 
for books to “help me believe there was a God” but instead discovered Bertrand Russell’s 
essay Why I Am Not a Christian and a collection of writings by atheists including Freud 
and Nietzsche. Reading these texts brought on an extended period of doubt that finally 
convinced him at the age of 46 that he was an atheist.  
Alicia was raised in Sweden in a family and social environment where religion 
was “non-existent” (and thus provides a useful contrast to the theistically ubiquitous 
context of Smith’s study).  At the age of twenty-five she met a colleague at work who 
practiced Kabbalah and persuaded her to adopt the religion. She explains: “I had many 
questions like, is there evil in the world? Is there evil people? Because I saw people doing 
evil things to me. So I thought there must be a Satan or evil. And he could answer those 
questions for me, at the time.” After becoming heavily involved with the religion for five 
years she entered the transitional period of doubt. In her case, however, it came not after 
the ubiquity of theism, but rather, the ubiquity of secularism: her experience of the 
presence of evil in the world led her to seek explanations that, for several years, were 
satisfactorily provided by religion.  
 In the second major category of Figure 3 we have those experiencing a religious 
socialization. The first path for those in this category is the standard trajectory, 
represented here as path (3). Fahim, discussed above, is a clear example here, proceeding 
from religious socialization and professed belief through a period of doubt to atheism. 
Even in this path, however, there is an exception that illustrates the fluidity of the 
process. Tim was raised Catholic and was a believer who for a time thought about 
becoming a priest before entering a period of doubt in his early teenage years brought on 
by his discomfort with stringent doctrines concerning sexual morality and the notion of 
hell. A fully-realized atheist by his late teens, he returned to the Catholic church as an 
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adult after a time of crisis that included a divorce and addiction to cocaine. He credits a 
priest as crucial in his recovery, but explains that after only six months another period of 
doubt came: “And then as I grew out of the emotional situation, and got stronger, the 
same questions that I had before were back again...It was in a time of a lot of stress that I 
went back, and I thought it could help me. And it temporarily did, but it didn’t change the 
whole make up of my thought process.”  Tim’s journey involved oscillating between 
religion and atheism, and it is not atypical in my sample, which is clear from the 
examples of religious seekers. What these subjects share, along with the fluidity of their 
beliefs, is a time of personal crisis as the trigger for their turn to religion.  
I have outlined two further paths to atheism for those in the religious socialization 
category that are taken by an unusual subgroup: those who experienced a religious 
socialization but claim never to have believed and to have been skeptical of religious 
ideas and teachings since early childhood (that is, as far back as the subjects can 
remember). Borrowing from Catholic theology, I refer to this as “original skepticism.”  
For example, Elaine, a high school science teacher, describes herself as “atheist since 
birth” despite being raised by practicing Catholics in Quebec. She explains: “Maybe it’s 
because I’m a scientist by trade, maybe it’s because my personality brought me to 
science. I have a very hard time believing imaginary things.” She indicates here that she 
considers herself in some way predisposed to reject religion because of a personality type 
that also led her to science. Patrice, a francophone Quebecer also raised in a Catholic 
family, says “I was never a big fan of religion” and explains that he rebelled against 
religious teachings at a young age: “I was a big problem in school at religion classes. In 
exam, you know, religious exam, I was giving them shit from one end to the other. My 
average at school was ninety except I was flunking religion, you know?”  Terry, who 
regularly attended Sunday school classes in the United Church, claims he never accepted 
religious teachings:  
…there was something in me that always thought, it doesn’t make sense 
to me. I didn’t grasp the truth. When I went to Sunday school and I 
learned more about the stories it kind of confirmed to me that it was all 
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nonsense...So I sometimes say I don’t think I was born with a God 
gene, if there’s such a thing, because I always questioned…so I guess I 
was always a curious kid. Different maybe, I don’t know…And I 
wasn’t an overly, you know, highly intelligent kid, I was just a regular 
kid, but I was, I guess I was never taking it for face value. I guess I was 
a free thinking kid. 
Figure 3 illustrates two separate paths taken by these original skeptics. Path (5) is 
a corollary to path (1) in the sense that they both bypass the central period of doubt. It 
includes people who never believed and claim to have been atheists their entire lives, 
despite the presence of religion in their private spheres (Patrice and Terry are 
representatives of this path). Path (4) is a corollary to the detour taken by the religious 
seekers following path (2). It involves moving from original skepticism to seeking 
religion, proceeding through a period of doubt to atheism. Again we see a fluid and 
dynamic process at work, with subjects in this trajectory moving from atheism to seeking 
religion and back to atheism. The example here is Elaine, mentioned above, who 
struggled to find a way to believe what she was taught by her Catholic parents and 
priests, but was always limited by an underlying skepticism: 
I really tried to find that spark, that thing that everybody managed to 
capture or get that made them suddenly light up and say, yeah, yeah, of 
course I believe. And it was always elusive to me, it never, never 
worked. And at one point I was like, what’s wrong with me? Why can’t 
I believe?  And then eventually I got older and I started reasoning with 
myself and instead of saying what’s wrong with me, I started thinking, 
what’s wrong with them? And that’s when I really, you know, defined 
myself as an atheist instead of trying to be a believer that just wouldn’t 
be.  
Elaine’s seeking (as well as that of Phil, discussed above) reflects Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger’s finding that apostates frequently said they gave up their faith because they 
“could not make themselves believe what they had been taught” and in many cases 
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“indicated they truly wished they could believe” (2007:42). For these respondents 
seeking religion did not culminate in believing or taking on a religious identity, but it 
does again illustrate the fluidity of religious and non-religious identities.   
Atheism is clearly not a permanent condition or culmination of a narrowly-
defined evolutionary trajectory. The development of non-belief and the adoption of an 
atheist identity is a complex process that can follow various trajectories.  The special 
cases I have discussed of the “original skeptics” and the “religious seekers” should lead 
us to carefully examine and question not only the influence of socialization, but the linear 
progression that occurs within the standard trajectory.  My research indicates that identity 
formation among individuals socialized in both religious and secular environments is a 
fluid process, with individuals moving dynamically between belief, non-belief, and 
doubt, returning to religion or atheism and back again a number of times. This fluidity 
corresponds with research reporting that many “nones” oscillate between affiliated and 
unaffiliated or occupy a perpetually “liminal” position (Lim et al. 2010). We might 
understand this as akin to cases of individuals who exhibit fluid sexual orientation and 
identity over time, experiencing attraction to males, females, both, or neither at any given 
point (Diamond 2008). Similarly, religious and non-religious identities are not 
permanently fixed. Figure 3 illustrates a range of possible (and reversible) trajectories to 
atheist identity.The end point of all trajectories outlined in Figure 3 is “atheist activism”.  
Accounting for this step is essential in any research that focuses specifically on active 
atheists, and this step is examined more closely in the final section of this chapter.  
Before proceeding to a discussion of activism and the atheist movement, however, I will 
more closely examine respondents’ views on the nature of religion and its relationship to 
science. This analysis illustrates that these members are not as influenced by the 
discourse of the New Atheism as might be expected, and in fact hold many views that are 
in direct conflict with those of the Four Horsemen.   
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Table 5: Views on Religion, Science, and the New Atheism  
 
General atheistic orientation  scientific 3 
 
humanistic  12 
Why do people believe in God?  comfort 9 
 
socialization/culture 7 
 
explanation 5 
 
fear of death 4 
 
meaning 3 
 
control 3 
 
biological factors 2 
 
community 1 
 
moral guidance 1 
Why do people stop believing in God? (N=12) intellectual  6 
 
moral/political 2 
 
both 1 
 
don’t know 3 
Is the existence of God a scientific question? (N=12) Yes 7 
 
No 5 
Which of the four major New Atheist books have you read?  Dawkins 11 
 
Harris 8 
 
Hitchens 7 
 
Dennett 3 
 
All 3 
 
None* 3 
    
* These three respondents all said they had watched some of these authors’ lectures on the 
internet.  
 
 
Science, Religion, and the New Atheism 
This section analyzes respondents’ views on the nature of religion and 
motivations for belief, religion’s relationship to science, and the New Atheism.  By 
examining views on these specific issues I make a general assessment of their position on 
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religion – scientific or humanistic. Of course the distinction is not clear-cut, but some 
trends emerge that I think allow me to position most of them as more humanistic than 
scientific in their orientation.  Results of my research in this section are summarized in 
Table 5.    
 
Is the existence of God a scientific question?  
 Respondents were presented with Richard Dawkins’ “God Hypothesis”, which is 
his view that the idea of God is actually an attempt to explain nature, including the origin 
of life and of the universe. He thus believes it should be treated as “a scientific hypothesis 
about the universe, which should be analyzed as sceptically as any other” (Dawkins 2006: 
2).  Subjecting the God Hypothesis to scientific scrutiny, Dawkins concludes that it is 
false. I questioned respondents on this issue, reviewing Dawkins’ idea of the God 
Hypothesis and asking them whether they think the existence of God is a scientific 
question that can be proven true or false.  
While all respondents were asked questions regarding the relationship between 
religion and science, only twelve were asked to comment specifically on the God 
Hypothesis (three respondents were not asked because in those cases respondents veered 
into other topics that I allowed them to discuss at length before the question of the God 
Hypothesis could be raised, and after the discussion moved to these other places we did 
not return, but rather pursued these new lines of thought).  Of these twelve, seven agreed 
that the existence of God is essentially a scientific question that can, at least in theory, be 
answered by scientific methods, while five disagreed. A few on either side were very 
certain of their answers. For example, Sahani was adamant that “It’s impossible to 
disprove something that is by definition unseeable,” while Jen conversely believes that 
“it’s like any phenomenon in science, you take something, you test your hypothesis, if it 
doesn’t work out then you reject the hypothesis. So yeah, I do agree with that... if you 
treat it like any other scientific phenomenon then you can answer it that way.”  Patrice 
referred to Bertrand Russell’s famous example of a hypothetical “celestial teapot” 
 
 
168 
orbiting the sun to argue that one cannot prove the non-existence of something that 
cannot be observed:  
I think I would need more than that. I mean just working on the 
God Hypothesis as it exists or not, prove it, I mean, I don’t see 
how I, on what I can work on, you know? If you add to that “and 
the Bible proves it”, you know, then I can destroy it because the 
Bible there are so many contradictions, stupidities, that this is not 
the word of a God, okay?  I need something else to destroy because 
the God Hypothesis, it’s like the teapot of Russell, okay? You 
cannot prove a negative.  
There were many nuances in other responses, however.  For example, Terry’s 
answer is no, but he seems to indicate that neuroscience might eventually prove that God 
is a product of the human brain, which would effectively ‘prove’ that he does not exist: 
It’s like trying to analyze Santa Claus as a scientific question, 
‘cause it’s something that’s made up in our imagination, so it’s 
hard to- They are actually learning about it through neuroscience, 
the brain. Like certain areas where we pray, it’s the same as 
meditation, I think...I can’t remember the part of the brain that 
lights up, sparks up when we pray, and maybe that’s the God part 
of our brain, right? So maybe through neuroscience we can 
explain, and I think we are already, this make believe magic that 
we need, right? But yeah, there’s still a lot of stuff that we don’t 
know, but I don’t think we can prove that God doesn’t exist by 
science... 
In a similar vein, Phil believes that “The definitive proof of whether God exists is outside 
the boundaries of science,” but adds the caveat, “For now, anyways,” implying, like 
Terry, that while the answer right now is “no”, science may be on track to reach a point 
where it is equipped to address the question.  
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There was also some uncertainty and even self-contradiction among those who 
agree with Dawkins’ view.  Fahim argues, like Patrice, that one cannot prove a negative, 
yet also suggests that science can rule out the existence of God with near, but not 
absolute, certainty: 
Science is based on falsifiability. So we can falsify things. It can’t 
prove, you can’t be asked to, you know, prove a negative. So in 
this it can say the likelihood of it not existing, or the likelihood of 
it existing. It won’t say it in absolute terms, science is not an 
absolute...That doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist, it’s just that 
there’s no evidence right now, and as [Stephen] Hawking puts it, 
you can build the universe without a God.  So yeah, there’s a 
99.9% chance, 100% would be saying you’re arrogant...So yeah, I 
think science can disprove it to a point where it’s negligible, but I 
would refrain from saying absolute just for the sake of not being 
arrogant. 
Diana says that “If there’s a God, I suppose we could test that empirically,” but also 
indicates that there may be a supernatural realm outside the boundaries of science: “I 
suppose if you really want to get into sophisticated philosophical speculations about it 
there’s room for belief in the supernatural, and that’s interesting to do, it’s an interesting 
intellectual exercise. But for practical purposes it’s probably useful to assume that there’s 
not.”  While Fahim’s argument for near-certainty echoes Dawkins’ own position, Diana’s 
view is completely out of line with that author’s insistence that there is nothing that can 
be called “supernatural” because anything that exists – including God – must be material 
and thus “natural”.  
Why do people believe in God, and why do they stop believing? 
 Respondents were asked for their opinion on the question of why people believe 
in God and invited to offer as many reasons as they thought were pertinent.  I made an 
assessment of each subject’s “atheistic orientation” on the basis of these responses as 
well as their views on the God Hypothesis question noted above. There was some 
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overlap, but my interpretation is that three subjects fall primarily in the “scientific” 
category while twelve could roughly be characterized as “humanistic” atheists.  The most 
common reason given for religious belief was “comfort”, followed closely by 
“upbringing” or “cultural and social influences”, which I have combined into the 
category “socialization/culture”.  “Explanation” – that is, the idea that religion offers an 
explanation of nature/reality and our place in it, the hallmark of scientific atheism – 
ranked third, and only one respondent mentioned the possibility that biological factors 
may play a role. Other reasons given included the fear of death (which could actually be 
included in the “comfort” category) and people’s desire for meaning and control over 
their own lives. In general these responses are much more in line with the 
sociological/anthropological approach of humanistic atheism, which understands religion 
as a social phenomenon, rather than scientific atheism and its view of religion as false 
explanation and product of scientific ignorance (as well as, for some, a product of the 
evolution of the human brain).   
 Most respondents thought comfort was the most important reason for belief in 
God, citing existential insecurities and suffering.  For example, Helen focuses on comfort 
in the face of death and loss: “I think it’s really scary to think that you have, say eighty 
years, and then it’s done and that’s it. And I think it’s really hard to believe that when 
someone you love is gone, they’re gone, and you’re not going to ever see them 
again...My father had cancer, and so you kind of, it’s something to comfort you and to 
cling to. And it’s a nice idea, right, to think that somebody’s going to a better place.”  
Sarah puts it a little more bluntly: “That’s one thing that being an atheist hasn’t helped 
me with, isfear of dying...I accept that, I mean, we can never really know, but we can 
have a pretty good idea. And to me the pretty good idea at this point points to nothing.”  
Diana, like Sarah, mentions dealing with the fear of death, but says that she does not need 
help with that in her response: “Comfort, probably. Answers to questions that – I think 
sometimes people aren’t okay with there not being answers to questions. And I’m 
perfectly comfortable with that for some reason. I know that we don’t know what 
happens after we die, and I’m okay with that.”  Tim, meanwhile, relates to the 
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consolation that religion provides to people who are suffering: “I am a very empathetic 
person and when I see all the misery and suffering in this world it just, sometimes it just... 
takes you back. And this is what I see religion as doing. Parts of religion might be 
helpful, but the premise of it is not. It separates people.”  He explains that the promise of 
an afterlife is especially appealing to people who suffer in their lives, which is roughly 
equivalent to the position taken by Marx, who saw religion’s promise of a just afterlife as 
a powerful ideological instrument. Some respondents combined comfort with 
explanation, seeing explanation as itself a kind of comfort. 
 Respondents also noted the importance of socialization and the impact of culture 
and social pressures, which was articulated in a number of forms, including 
“brainwashing of kids”, “complacency with one’s upbringing”, “historical context”, and 
“learned behaviour”. More substantially, Sahani explains her view that “if you grow up 
with something you have to think outside of that frame to understand everything that’s 
wrong with it. And I don’t know how I started thinking outside the frame, but if people 
have gone most of their childhood and adolescence not thinking out of it, and then get to 
adulthood and they’re asked to, I think that it’s really easy to consciously choose not to 
step outside the frame”.  Combining socialization and comfort in her response, Marcia 
believes that “if you grow up as a secularist, you’re likely going to be one as an adult 
unless you’re very weak emotionally and you need something to cling to”.  Phil was one 
of very few respondents to focus on the social experience of religion: “You know, partly I 
did because I thought good people believed and it’s all in the structure of society and 
everything and everybody believed in it...Because also there’s the whole social aspect, 
the community aspect with the church and so on.”  
 A few respondents invoked the idea that religion serves as explanation, which is 
the idea that scientific atheism rests on.  Michael, for example, offers a line reminiscent 
of Dawkins in explaining his view of why people believe in God: “It’s easy. It’s a lot 
easier than doing the work necessary to figure things out.”  While Michael focuses on 
what is knowable, Diana suggests that what is unknowable is more important: “There’s 
just some questions that we don’t know, and I’m okay with that, and I think a lot of 
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people aren’t.”  In either case, these people express the belief that the appeal of religion 
rests on the explanations it provides for some of our most difficult questions regarding 
nature and our place in it. Stacey also articulates this idea: “Like, they need to have an 
idea in their mind, I mean they need to think there’s someone guiding them because 
they’re just not okay with being free in the world, they’re not okay with not knowing 
where we came from. And if they believe that there’s someone guiding them and can give 
them all the answers to everything, then they’re just, you know, more grounded.”  In 
other cases explanation was combined with a desire for meaning, control, and comfort, 
and most respondents mentioned more than one reason for belief in God.   
Only two respondents mentioned biological factors, though neither assigned them 
a determinative role.  One believes that biological and environmental factors “mingle”, 
while another explained, “I think we’re learning more about how the brain operates, and 
that some of these things we take to be profound experiences are simply a matter of 
neurons firing or whatever. Again, I’m not a scientist so maybe I’m using the wrong 
term, but again, it’s a chemical, biological thing, some of these feelings.” But this same 
respondent also suggested that comfort was the most important reason that people believe 
in God.  Even Patrice, who I consider the closest thing to a “pure” scientific atheist in my 
sample, rejected genetic and neuroscientific explanations of religious belief.  “Religion is 
not coming from the brain”, he said, “it’s coming from brainwashing, and the social 
pressure”.  While I would not generalize my sample, it is clear that my respondents are 
not biological determinists who derive their views on religion from neuroscience, and 
generally they are much more likely to invoke sociological or anthropological theories of 
religious belief than to claim, like the New Atheists, that it is a means to fill in the gaps in 
our understanding.  
 On the reverse question – namely, why people stop believing in God – the 
answers given somewhat contradicted the views on why people believe in the first place.  
While offering “humanistic” explanations for religious belief, the explanations for 
apostasy were generally “scientific”.  I have categorized answers to this question as 
indicating either “intellectual” or “moral/political” reasons for non-belief.  Some 
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examples will serve to illustrate the nature of these responses.  Jen assumes that most 
people give up belief for the same reason she did: “science and logical inconsistencies 
and being unable to reconcile the two”, and added, “I think the studies show that people 
who are more educated tend to be atheist”.  More bluntly, Stacey confidently suggested 
that the reason people give up their beliefs is “They think”, and added, “They stop 
avoiding thinking when it comes to that part of their brain”.  Helen offered the 
explanation that “people who are less religious often are more critical thinkers”.  Fahim 
makes a link between education, standard of living, and religiosity: 
Well, it’s quite obvious if you look at countries like Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, the Middle East, countries in South America, 
versus countries like Scandinavian countries, Germany, France, I’ll 
leave out the United States ‘cause they’re just CF [completely 
fucked], Canada. You’ll notice it’s quite evident where the 
standard of living is higher. Why is that? Because of education, I 
think is the first major, major point...And it’s just no coincidence 
that in a more educated population that can think rationally, think 
for themselves, make good decisions, don’t need someone to tell 
them what good morality is.  
Patrice pointed to social pressures in restricting the individual’s thinking about religion: 
It certainly helps when the family, the grasp of the family on that 
individual is not too, is not killing, you know, the freedom to think. 
I see some documentary on TV, you know, a girl that was in a very 
religious family and she decided no, that doesn’t make sense, you 
know. And then the family rejects her, don’t want to talk to her, 
and all her friends, nobody talks to her. I mean, this is difficult, 
you have to be a strong-minded individual to go through that.  
In taking these positions these respondents embraced the narrative of scientific 
atheism, which posits that religious belief and science are mutually exclusive, and that for 
those sufficiently educated the latter will inevitably overwhelm the former, resulting in 
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atheism.  This is in contrast with the generally humanistic orientation respondents 
evidenced on the question of why people believe in God.  I interpret this contradiction as 
a result of a lack of a conceptual scheme that can account for losing religion.  While some 
humanistic reasons for belief are fairly intuitive (fear of death, comfort, etc.), the 
humanistic explanations for apostasy – focusing on social conditions – are less obvious, 
and these people therefore resort to scientific or “New Atheist” explanations that view 
apostasy as a response to the “cognitive critique”, one of the three major forms of 
religious criticism that emerged from the Enlightenment, which constitutes the basis of 
the division between scientific and humanistic atheism.   
A few respondents did, however, cite moral or political reasons, which correspond 
to the other two Enlightenment forms of religious criticism, the “moral-subjective” and 
“practical-political” critiques. Michael says, “If you have to choose between medicine 
and prayer, and if you have a good social safety net the medicine, the doctors, are there. 
If you don’t have that, well then you have to rely on prayer”.  These comments on 
standard of living present religion as a political issue.  He also gave a moral reason, 
pointing specifically to “the problem of evil” – one of the oldest conundrums in theology 
(that is, if God is omnipotent and benevolent, why is there evil and suffering?) – as “the 
thing that drives a lot of people toward atheism”.  Diana similarly noted that personal 
tragedy can lead one to question the idea of a benevolent and loving God: “if something 
tragic happens you might decide that, you know, God must not care about me or 
whatever, and I can see people rejecting their religion on that sort of a basis”.  Finally, 
one of the respondents who declined to offer an answer did offer a negative answer. 
Sahani claimed that “you’re not going to come to atheism because of scientific thinking 
on its own”, thus refuting the notion that apostasy is strictly an intellectual maneuver.   
How influential are the New Atheists?  
The New Atheism, surprisingly, was not directly or highly influential on the 
development of most respondents’ views.  Of my fifteen subjects, only three had read all 
four canonical New Atheist texts, while three had not read any of them (though it bears 
noting that all those who hadn’t read any of these books had at least watched some of the 
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authors’ lectures on the internet). Eleven people had read Dawkins, eight read Harris, 
seven read Hitchens, and only three had read Dennett. Dawkins seems to be the most 
important figure, which is not surprising given his prominence and celebrity status within 
the movement, and the fact that The God Delusion was a phenomenal bestseller and is 
widely considered the key text of the New Atheism. To underscore this point, every 
subject who had read at least one of the four authors had read Dawkins. In general, only a 
few younger subjects reported being somewhat to heavily influenced by the New 
Atheists. They do not seem to be of particular importance among older respondents, and 
for those people I interviewed who had been involved in the movement for a decade or 
more the New Atheists are basically irrelevant.   
Several interviewees noted that while the New Atheists didn’t change their views 
or “convert” them to atheism, they did “reinforce” their views. In response to being asked 
whether the New Atheists had any impact on their beliefs about religion, Helen said, “It 
more felt like my ideas were being reinforced when I started reading them.”  Diana 
suggested that “They’re just saying what lots of us have been thinking for a long time.”  
Similarly, Phil said, “I guess they might have made me more confirmed in my dislike of 
religion.” This notion of a “reinforcement” of ideas – often articulated using this specific 
word – was a common response. This is true even for respondents who reported being 
heavily influenced by the New Atheists.  A good example is Fahim, who described The 
God Delusion as “the book that put words to my thoughts in a way that I could have 
never thought that would happen”, suggesting that Dawkins didn’t change his mind so 
much as give clear expression to views he already held. Sarah reported a similar 
experience: “[Dawkins] was able to put some arguments of why religion is detrimental 
together. I’m not sure that I felt quite as strongly about that before I read Dawkins...I 
think it pushed me a little bit further toward anti-religious, not just a-religious, not just 
not-religious but anti-religious.” The best way to describe the influence of the New 
Atheism, then, would be that it has been very effective in terms of recruitment and 
mobilization, while not having a large impact on actual beliefs.  The following section 
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examines these atheists’ participation in the movement, and their opinions regarding its 
purpose and the tensions that currently shape it.   
 
The Atheist Movement 
From atheism to activism: Discovering the atheist movement  
 There was some variance in my sample in terms of the duration of involvement 
with organized atheism, with the range spanning from two weeks to almost three decades. 
All but two, however, have been members only since 2007, with one joining in 2000 and 
another in 1984.  The 2007 cut-off point makes sense since this year was the height of the 
New Atheism. It was when Hitchens arrived to round out the ‘Four Horsemen’, and one 
year after the publication of Dawkins’ The God Delusion, Dennett’s Breaking the Spell, 
and Harris’ second foray into religious criticism, Letter to a Christian Nation.  It is not a 
coincidence that membership in these organizations and participation in atheist events 
began to swell at about this time.  As evidence of the impact of the New Atheism on 
membership numbers, the Freedom From Religion Foundation did report a 25% increase 
in membership in the year 2006 alone (Zuckerman, 2012: 4), while the British Humanist 
Association's membership increased by 103.5% from 2004 to 2008, from 3713 to 7556 
(Bullivant 2010: 122).  (I sent a request for membership data to CFI communications 
director Paul Fidalgo, but he offered little information other than that they have “over 
4000 donors”, and “tens of thousands” of email subscribers.)  The trend of growth is 
reflected in the fact that seven of my respondents – about half of the total – had joined the 
movement in the same year in which I interviewed them, though I cannot say whether the 
growth is still ongoing or has stalled.  More details on respondents’ participation with the 
atheist movement, including duration and what organizations they are members of, are 
summarized in Table 6.  
While the New Atheists may not have transformed a lot of opinions, then, they do 
appear to have had some effect on the development of identity, playing an important role 
in the construction of a collective identity and community that appeals to atheists seeking 
external validation. One interviewee credited the New Atheism and the corresponding 
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social movement with “making it okay to be an out atheist,” while another said that the 
major goal of the movement is to “make it socially acceptable to be an atheist,” a view 
most of my subjects shared. The New Atheism, then, was important mainly as a very 
effective instrument of mobilization and recruitment rather than a force of conversion.  
 While the New Atheism was a key catalyst for the surge in growth in the atheist 
movement in the past decade, it would have remained primarily a popular literary 
phenomenon without the internet.  Most of my respondents said that they discovered the 
atheist movement through the internet after reading articles and watching YouTube 
videos about the Four Horsemen.  In some cases this occurred by chance, through web 
surfing and a random click of a link that might bring one to the home page of AAI or 
CFI.  Helen’s story of how she discovered atheism is a good example of the importance 
of both the New Atheism and the internet: 
I think it may have been a Bill Maher episode and Richard Dawkins 
was on it. And I was really interested in what he was saying and I went 
out and bought The God Delusion and it just kind of snowballed. I 
bought The God Delusion, I started watching YouTube videos of 
Dawkins. Then, you know how YouTube has that suggested videos? 
And then I stumbled upon Sam Harris, and I bought Letter to a 
Christina Nation, and it was just very much through television and 
through YouTube that I discovered all of these, the Four Horsemen and 
Hitchens, and I just started buying books. I mean, nobody else around 
me was into that kind of thing. My mother was like what are you doing, 
who cares, what does it matter, you know? But I think that that was my 
first encounter, I think it was an interview with Richard Dawkins. 
Importantly, Helen explained that Dawkins and the New Atheists didn’t change her views 
or convert her to atheism: “it wasn’t like, oh, I never thought of it that way. It more felt 
like my ideas were being reinforced when I started reading them.”  Eventually her 
internet searching revealed that there were organizations dedicated to the same causes 
that the New Atheists were arguing for, and she joined a local atheist group.  So again, 
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the New Atheism was a force of recruitment, rather than a force of conversion.  In 
another example, Elaine discovered the movement through social media, where her 
Facebook status as an “atheist” brought her messages and links to information from other 
people on the network: 
It’s basically when I started meeting other people online, and that was 
only a year or two ago that I started on Facebook. And finding other 
people who were atheist who happened to see that I was an atheist and 
started friending me, and then started posting, you know, a lot of 
YouTube videos about people, you know, arguing against religion, 
showing the inconsistencies with it, and some blogs online. 
Elaine’s discovery of the atheist movement through social media was a revelation 
to her.  As her network of Facebook friends grew and she gradually became aware of the 
atheist organizations they were members of, and she described her elation at “that 
connection, that feeling that, oh wow, there’s other people out there who think like me”. 
This was a common sentiment among all respondents, who frequently pointed to being in 
the company of “like-minded people” as a primary motivation for attending gatherings in 
person rather than strictly participating online (though many also pointed to the internet 
as their primary connection to the movement for much of the time, with in-person 
meetings happening infrequently for those not affiliated with a local group).  This points 
to the two major reasons that my respondents gave for their participation in the 
movement: a desire for a sense of community and identity. While an intellectual interest 
in the New Atheism may have shown them the way to the movement, it was the social 
satisfactions the movement provided that kept them there.  
 Elaine is again a good example here, as she points specifically to the “social 
aspect” of the movement as its most important function.  For Jen, her involvement with 
the Centre for Inquiry was motivated more by social concerns than intellectual ones: 
I originally started up, joined them, because I was in a new country, I 
didn’t know anybody. It was a way to meet friends, and then it ended 
up taking over my life. But it’s something I enjoyed so I was okay with 
 
 
179 
that... I’m naturally attracted to these types of people... I mean I’ve 
lived in Toronto all my life but I’ve never really gotten to know a lot of 
people. My friends have moved away...So yeah, CFI just helps me find, 
meet people. 
 
Table 6: Movement participation  
 
Year of first participation in atheist movement  2010 7 
 
2009 2 
 
2008 3 
 
2007 1 
 
2000 1 
 
1984 1 
Organization membership* CFI 7 
 
AAI 3 
 
FFRF 1 
 
AHA 1 
 
local groups** 5 
 
Non-members*** 4 
Purpose of the movement community 11 
 
identity 8 
 
political/instrumenta
l 5 
 
*CFI=Center for Inquiry, AAI=Atheist Alliance International, FFRF=Freedom From Religion 
Foundation, AHA-American Humanist Association.   
**Only one of these respondents was a member of a local group exclusively. The other four were 
also members of an international organization.  
*** Two of these respondents were people interviewed at the 2010 AAI convention in Montreal 
who were attending their first meeting of an atheist group. Another two were people who had 
previously attended AAI conventions but had not officially joined any organization. All other 
respondents were members of a national (FFRF, AHA) or international (CFI, AAI) atheist 
organization, and some were also members of local groups.  
  
  
Several respondents also noted that their atheist groups provided an environment where 
they could discuss some of their interests and concerns that they wouldn’t feel 
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comfortable expressing in other places.  Alicia likes the fact that, among atheists, “I can 
say whatever, I don’t have to censor anything”.  Terry appreciates being able to “just be 
with a bunch of atheists”, which is “a good thing because you can bitch about religion to 
each other, and sometimes you can say really awful things and no one cares”.  Sahani has 
friends who are non-religious but “even with them I never felt completely comfortable 
questioning religious practices”, so she likes that in her atheist group she can “feel safe to 
discuss certain things without worrying about offending someone or their mother”.  
Being able to feely express ideas with “like-minded people” was a commonly reported 
motivation for participation.  
 A few respondents expressed a more intense experience that drew them to atheist 
groups.  Marcia, who has been active in various atheist, humanist, and secularist 
organizations for over a decade, described her elation after discovering that the atheist 
movement existed, which told her, “there’s a name for me, and there are organizations, 
and there are publications, and there are conventions, and there are groups, and that’s 
when I realized that I wasn’t the only one.”  A few others also mentioned feeling “alone” 
and how joining atheist groups eased that feeling.  Phil developed a drinking problem and 
went to AA, which did help him with his drinking, and yet he felt “sort of a distance with 
the other people that do believe”.  The religious elements of AA made him feel excluded, 
and though he still attends their meetings, he feels more of a sense of community with his 
local atheist organization.  Sarah described very clearly what meetings with her atheist 
group do for her: 
I wanted to meet some people...that I could discuss this with because I 
didn’t really have anyone. I was looking for a little stimulation, a little 
conversation and an outlet for my frustrations with, just, things related 
to atheism, you know?...I feel better after having left, and sort of just 
had it out with what’s been on my mind bothering me lately about what 
I’ve seen on tv, or just, you know, what I saw out on the street...I’m still 
in a place where I feel totally overwhelmed by my position in relation 
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to the rest of societyon religion. So I’m just starting to make sense of it 
with them.  
Sarah’s articulation of feeling “overwhelmed” in relation to society captures the 
essence of an experience reported by these and some other respondents: alienation.  For a 
rationalist or simply a non-believer, living in a world where those who believe in gods 
and supernatural miracles are the majority can be a mystifying and alienating experience.  
Alicia describes a similar experience when explaining her reaction to watching the 2007 
AAI convention, which she stumbled across on Netflix: 
Every single speaker talked about things that I had already thought in 
my mind. I thought I was kind of crazy or something. Or you’re not 
allowed to say that, or that I’m the only person thinking that. But they 
just laid it out. And it was almost like being born again, I use that 
expression. I guess being in Texas, everything is just kind of, you 
know, medieval, at times…I was crippled with fear that the world is 
crazy. And, wow, this ain’t never going to work for me, I can’t live in 
this world ‘cause they’re crazy…So they gave me the voice of reason 
and I could relax.  
Surrounded by fervent believers in her Texas town, Alicia’s fear that “the world is crazy” 
is an experience of alienation, or at least a profound disconnection from those around her.  
The New Atheism, and attending atheist conventions, gave her a perspective that allowed 
her to make sense of what she was seeing and told her that she was, in fact, not alone in 
her views on religion and her social experience.  She added that attending atheist 
gatherings was also a way for her to meet men: “I want to meet guys, ok. (laughs). That’s 
kind of the human side of it. Because there’s not a lot of interesting guys in Texas.  I’m 
never going to meet anybody there.  ‘Cause it’s religious, it feels like it’s hard to meet 
somebody”.  
 The experience of alienation is not limited to the private sphere and personal 
relationships.  In describing what motivates his activity in atheist organizations, Terry 
articulates a common sentiment: “Well I think it makes me feel a part of society in a way, 
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like, my voice is a part of society. Because it’s growing and we’re getting a voice... so it 
makes me feel part of that voice, whereas for too long it was just, you know, an atheist on 
my own kind of thing, you know?”  Through his involvement with the atheist movement, 
Terry feels a sense of both connection to others and empowerment, whereas as an atheist 
on his own he felt isolated and powerless in a religious society.  Being a member of the 
atheist movement therefore addresses a kind of political alienation.  Several other 
respondents referred to the notion of gaining a “voice” through the movement and being 
encouraged by their experiences to become more “vocal” about their atheism, or in other 
words, to “come out” and embrace an atheist identity.   
This last point is crucial. My interviews indicate that the most important function 
of the atheist movement has been creating an environment where people who are already 
non-believers can experience the benefits of a community of like-minded people and can 
feel comfortable “coming out”.  This is in some contrast to the official goals of the major 
organizations discussed in the previous chapter, which focus on political goals.  The 
following section explores members’ views on the purposes of the atheist movement, and 
demonstrates that they consider community and identity the most important goals, not 
surprising given that these are their most important reasons for joining the movement in 
the first place.  
What is the purpose of the movement? 
 I have grouped respondents’ views on the purposes of the movement into three 
major categories: community, identity, and political change.  The last two categories 
overlap to the extent that atheist collective identity construction is a project of political 
identity deployment (Bernstein 1997; 2002; 2008), but generally these refer to different 
kinds of goals, with some respondents pointing to instrumental pursuits like church-state 
separation.  The frequencies of these responses are included in Table 6, with community 
the most frequent response, identity second, and political goals last.  In general, these 
respondents considered the atheist movement a project of community- and identity-
building, and placed much less attention on political goals than we see in official 
movement discourse. Some respondents cited purposes that fall in multiple categories, 
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but only two, Stacey and Michael, discussed all three kinds of goals.  It is noteworthy that 
these two respondents are both very active, occupying positions on the executive 
committees of their organizations, and are therefore familiar with the formal mandates of 
their organizations and framed their responses in those terms.  Some other members who 
are more casually involved gave more personal responses, pointing out what the purpose 
of the movement is for them personally and what they would like to see it strive for.   
Michael’s views on the purpose of the movement amounted to the official 
purposes of his local organization, of which he is a founding member and has served as 
president.  His outline of these purposes encapsulates the three major types of goals 
reported by all respondents: 
We have three purposes. The first is to provide a community for 
atheists...We have black communities, gay communities, women’s 
groups. We’re an atheist group, we provide this community for 
atheists...The second thing is to educate the public about atheism. Now 
that’s to let us define ourselves rather than have Pat Robertson define 
us...Again it’s not to try to convert everyone in the public to an atheist, 
it’s just to say we’re atheist, this is what an atheist is, this is the atheist 
worldview. You know, we’re not Satan worshippers, we’re not evil, 
we’re not hedonists...And then the third purpose we have, and this is 
something we do try to change people’s minds on, is to promote 
separation of church and state. And that’s our third thing because, third 
in importance because you already have the American Civil Liberties 
Union out there doing that as well. 
The goal of building community is explicitly noted here as such.  The related purpose of 
identity construction is here stated as a project to “define ourselves” and delineate the 
“atheist worldview”, and to show people that “we’re not evil”, an allusion to the 
morality-based nature of atheist representations of identity (mentioning evangelical 
pastor Pat Robertson is important here because it means rejecting the representation of 
atheists as immoral people). Finally, the least important purpose is promoting separation 
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of church and state, the only explicitly political goal he references. It is important to note 
that he explicitly states that converting people to atheism is not a goal, which reflects a 
division between movement members and those New Atheists who seek broad cultural 
transformation where scientific rationality replaces religion.  Michael’s prioritization of 
the purposes of the movement reflects that of my sample as a whole.  The frequency of 
responses for each of the major categories, as well as the importance individuals placed 
on these, points to a hierarchy of goals with community at the top, identity a close 
second, and instrumental/political goals a clear third.  
 Eleven of the fifteen respondents cited community as a purpose of the movement, 
and for many of them this was the most important goal.  Several said that atheist 
organizations provide an alternative source of support for those who no longer have a 
support “system” or “network” to rely on after leaving religion.  For example, Tim 
explains his view that “there’s alternative people out there who are reasonable, who 
desire a better world. And I think there’s a lot people that are probably...who don’t have a 
support system to navigate through their feelings, like religions do. So I think this 
provides that opportunity”.  Respondents also pointed to the importance of being with 
“like-minded people” with whom they can freely express their views. Marcia, referring to 
her own experiences as well as those of others she has spoken with, explains that “there 
are those who come because they realize, okay, these are people who I can really talk to 
about these things. So it’s very positive in that aspect because of the camaraderie, 
because people can feel like they’re not alone”.  Alicia similarly thinks the movement is 
important primarily because it provides its members with “a place where they belong – 
where they’re not outcasts, a place where they don’t have to lie”, giving them “somebody 
to talk to” without having to “pretend constantly”.  These references to atheists as 
“outcasts” and the importance of having a place where they can feel that “they’re not 
alone” were common among my respondents and point to the experience of alienation 
that I believe drives many to participation in the movement.   
 While community ranked as the most important purpose of the movement, 
political goals were the least important, with only five respondents pointing to 
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instrumental pursuits as a desired focus of movement activity. None of these respondents 
cited political goals alone as the movement’s purpose – in all cases they combined 
political goals with at least one of the other two major types.  Two respondents – both 
American – cited separation of church and state as a primary movement goal.  Diana 
suggested that “upholding human rights” should be a goal of the movement, including the 
rights of atheists to protection from discrimination.  She spoke of her desire for atheism 
to become a “social justice movement”, pointing to birth control and the right to die as 
social issues that atheists should be fighting for.  Two more respondents had no clear idea 
of what specific political goals should be pursued, but felt that the atheist movement 
should have a voice in politics.  Phil said, “I’d like to see us try to get more of a political 
movement, to get more politically involved to try to have our voice be more included in 
governance,” without elaborating on what exactly that “voice” might say.  Patrice, taking 
the same point of view, explained, “I think that, fuck, I mean, when you stay quiet in the 
corner, people, they run it in a crazy way, okay? They run the society in a crazy way.”  
Like Phil, Patrice’s reference to political goals is vague.  While he wants atheists to have 
a voice in politics, he also does not have a clear vision of what specific goals they would 
pursue.  When pressed on the question of specific goals, he turned to discussing identity 
as a goal, and indeed this is where, I have argued, cultural and political goals intersect.  
Identity, the second purpose that Michael referred to, was also the second most 
common answer to the question of movement purpose among my sample.  Responses in 
this vein frequently referred to combating a perceived stigma associated with atheism, 
which is understood as a notion that atheism is without a moral foundation and atheists 
can therefore be expected to be immoral.  Several respondents echoed Michael’s 
comment implying that religious people might view atheists as “Satan worshippers”.  
Diana wants to point out to people that this “makes no sense of course because if we 
don’t believe in God we’re probably not going to believe in the Devil either” and 
suggests that “atheism maybe could use a PR campaign”.  Sarah and Stacey both think 
one of the movement’s most important purposes is to make it more “socially acceptable” 
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to be an atheist.  Stacey and Patrice believe that it is important to “come out” in public 
and become more visible, with the goal of making people more comfortable with atheists.   
All of these respondents referred in some way to stigma and the need for atheists 
to construct an alternative representation of themselves that emphasizes their capacity to 
be good, moral people.  The imperative to “come out” is a strategy toward this goal of 
constructing a positive identity and fostering a cultural climate in which atheism is 
accepted, which, as demonstrated in the last chapter, is viewed as a necessary step in 
growing the movement and pursuing more ambitious goals of cultural and political 
change.  Sahani describes just this view in describing her own coming out:   
Because even though I came out to my parents as an atheist when I was 
fifteen, it still, it wasn’t, I think that it’s a big part of my identity now 
because I think that religion, I’ve seen so much more how much of an 
impact religion has on public policy and things like that. And that’s 
why I think it’s more important to sort of be open about your atheism 
too, so other atheists feel more comfortable too, and we can become 
more of a force for secularism in our society. 
Fahim echoes this view, describing a similar process of first constructing identity for the 
purpose of gaining acceptance and recognition, which in turn opens up opportunities for 
social movement activity: “First of all it has to become acceptable, that’s our first step. 
And once it becomes acceptable, then we have to get people to think about it in a 
meaningful way, and once it becomes that then you can really start holding the reins and 
having an impact in politics”.  Many other respondents spoke of the importance of 
coming out in the development of the movement and its goals (precisely nine invoked the 
phrase “coming out” or “out of the closet”), and like the leaders and organizations 
discussed in the previous chapter, they seem to feel an affinity with the LGBT movement.  
For example, Terry speaks of atheists facing a similar challenge of first dealing with 
stigma: 
 ...that’s why you say you’re an atheist, because once people realize that 
you’re just a regular person then it gets rid of the stereotype. Like the 
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gay movement, right?...So CFI does that, we’re saying it’s ok, like the 
gay movement said it’s ok to be queer, we’re queer and we’re here and 
we’re not going away. It’s the same thing now, it’s like we’re out, were 
talking about it. 
Like Sahani and Fahim, Terry recognizes the importance of identity as both a 
strategy and a goal in itself.  That is, these atheists view the construction of a positive 
identity based on morality as a worthwhile goal for atheists who feel stigmatized, but also 
as a strategic necessity prior to pursuing more instrumental goals.  We can therefore see 
the hierarchy of movement purposes reflected in these interviews as a process of 
movement development, following the latency model of Melucci (1988, 1989) presented 
in the previous chapter.  This process is comprised of three elements or stages: 
community, identity, and instrumental pursuits.  The sample studied here suggests that 
community is the first and most important purpose of the atheist movement.  Identity 
comes next, with collective expression of identity a tool for building community, the 
greatest goal, as well as a goal in itself.  The collective attracts more members by offering 
an avenue for the expression of individual identities, a process Snow and McAdam refer 
to as “identity seeking”, where “individuals strongly imbued with a particular identity 
actively search for groups (movements, cults, subcultures) with perspectives and 
practices consistent with that identity and that allow for its expression” (2000: 48).  
Joining these communities provides atheists with “self-verification” (Pinel and Swann, 
2000) and empowers them to “come out” and embrace the identity shared by the 
collective.  Finally, there are instrumental pursuits such as church-state separation and the 
more vague goal of gaining a “voice” in politics and governance.   
Reflecting the official discourse reviewed in the previous chapter, atheists in my 
sample seem to believe that identity construction is an important step – and strategy – 
toward these instrumental goals.  Bernstein’s “political identity” approach, then, seems 
appropriate for understanding this process at the levels of leadership and official 
discourse as well as individual members.  At all of these levels, atheists encourage the 
construction and deployment of identity as a strategy for achieving instrumental goals.  
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There are, however, important differences between these organizations and their 
members regarding the specific nature of these goals.  My interviews reveal that these 
atheists are not interested in conversion and therefore do not embrace the New Atheist 
cultural project of replacing religion with scientific authority (or at least do not view this 
as a primary goal of movement activity).  Rather, they seek to build communities and to 
carve out their own space in the cultural landscape and assert their claim to self-
representation by collectively – and publicly – constructing an atheist identity.  
Instrumental political goals are also not a high priority for these atheists, and those who 
did discuss instrumental goals were more inclined to mention social justice and 
secularism than scientism and individualism, which are emerging goals of organizations 
under the influence of leaders from the new atheist and libertarian factions.  The grass 
roots rebellion against established discourse that took the form of Atheism+ is therefore 
not surprising given the incongruence between the goals of leaders and the goals of 
regular members revealed in these interviews.  The following section addresses this 
incongruence in more detail by examining respondents’ views on the tensions within the 
movement that were discussed in the previous chapter.   
Atheism and Humanism: Scientism versus Social Justice   
 In the course of interviews I asked respondents if there were any contentious 
issues within the movement or points on which they found themselves disagreeing with 
leaders or other members.  In a few cases these questions received little in the way of 
response, but most subjects referred to some common issues and some offered quite 
extensive discussions.  Most significantly, they spoke of tensions between atheists and 
humanists, and between those favouring confrontation and accommodation (they did not 
always use precisely these terms).  It’s difficult to quantify these views on tensions 
simply because these individual members’ views are much more nuanced than those of 
the New Atheists and other movement leaders, and they often expressed contradictory 
opinions and were not sure where they stood.  In a few cases people gave clear answers 
and felt very certain.  For example, Patrice favours a confrontational approach to religion 
in the vein of the New Atheism, a product of his strong view that religion is “a crime 
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against humanity” that must be eliminated.  Diana, by contrast, feels that “challenging 
these groups directly” is not worthwhile because “they’re not going to listen”, and instead 
thinks atheists should try to “prevent more people from being persuaded to that side of 
things” and suggests encouraging the more “gentle aspects” of religion that make it 
“positive” for some people.  This is a very different tone from that of Dawkins, and her 
fellow member Patrice, who refuse to grant that religion can do much of anything that is 
positive to anybody.  In general respondents expressed a range of opinions on this issue, 
though most were moderate and generally favoured an accommodating stance.  But many 
expressed ambivalence on these issues.  Rather than attempting to summarize and 
interpret a larger number of responses, I have chosen to focus on a few individuals and 
present some more extended quotations here to let them speak for themselves and to 
demonstrate the nuances, complexities, and contradictions in their views, which are 
arrived at through struggle and careful consideration and illustrate that these atheists are 
not passive receptacles of ideology.   
 Marcia, 38, has been involved with what she calls the “freethought movement” 
since 2000.  She was raised in Florida in a Southern Baptist family and was a 
“fundamentalist” until she gradually lost her religious beliefs in her early 20’s.  Some 
years later she wrote a book about her experiences with religion and becoming a self-
described secular humanist, and was invited to speak at a meeting of a freethought group 
in her home town.  Following this she became very active in the movement, serving on 
the executive committee of the Council for Secular Humanism, and participating in major 
events like the Godless Americans March on Washington in 2002.  She left her position 
with CSH in 2003 and since then has pursued independent projects that she regularly 
promotes at freethought events, such as the AAI Convention, where I interviewed her.  
She offered a number of insights based on her experiences with the movement, including 
some comments on the tensions within it between secular humanists and those she refers 
to as “purists”: 
Well, you’ve got different, let’s say, factions of freethought. The purists 
are one part of the spectrum. If you were to compare them between a 
 
 
190 
liberal Christian and a right-wing Christian, the purist would be the 
right-wing Christian parallel. And I think the secular humanists would 
be on the other end of the spectrum, they’d be liberal Christians. The 
purists, they do not want to hold any notion whatsoever that there 
should be any doubt that there isn’t a God. They assert that there 
absolutely is no higher power whatsoever, don’t even think about the 
possibility, it just plain isn’t. And it’s kind of a closed-minded angle, 
too much so to actually call one a freethinker from that point of view, in 
my opinion. The purist doesn’t seem very open-minded to me. And 
they tend to be – I don’t want to make a sweeping generalization of 
purists, but there are many who tend to be anti-religion, so I guess that 
would be part of the New Atheism as well, they’re more of a purist, 
evangelical almost, aspect of it. Me personally, I assert that I don’t 
know and can’t know if there’s some sort of higher power but I’m not 
going to make something up until there’s evidence of such. I can 
suspend my judgment indefinitely, I’m okay with that. Purists, they 
made their judgment, there’s no suspension of judgment, there is no 
God, period.  
Marcia’s analogical use of Christianity here posits that “purists” are, in their own way, 
fundamentalists – in her words, “evangelical” – who are just as dogmatic in their 
approach to the subject of religion as fundamentalists of the Christian variety.  She notes 
that the New Atheists are purists of this kind, and opposes purists to secular humanists, 
who she identifies with and who she feels embrace a properly open-minded attitude that 
is skeptical but not certain.  These different “factions”, as she puts it, roughly correspond 
to the two groups I have identified: new atheists and secular humanists (the libertarians, 
as I argued in the last chapter, are best understood as a sub-section of the new atheist 
group distinguished by their political orientation and unique view of movement goals).  
Marcia went on to explain that the “purists” don’t speak for everyone within the 
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movement, and that many are opposed to their ideological militancy and insistence on 
attacking religion: 
The religious bashing, it’s actually less frequent than you would think.  
A lot – like I said, there are a lot of freethinkers who are in that agnostic 
spectrum, and they tend to show how much they dislike the whole 
bashing aspect of religion... I don’t hear it a lot in the community, jabs 
here and there, but overall there’s not that much hostility. 
 Alicia, 35 years old, grew up in Sweden in a secular family and as an adult moved 
to Texas, where she currently resides.  She expressed concerns about the movement that 
closely reflect Marcia’s views on “purists”.  Discussing an atheist event at which Sam 
Harris was booed for talking about meditation and spirituality, she points to members of 
the movement who don’t embody what she feels atheism is about: 
I guess when I heard that Sam Harris got booed at some, in 
Washington, when he talked about the meditation or something like 
that, I guess I would be a little afraid of meeting those people that 
would boo Sam Harris. ‘Cause then I would feel the same as, ok, these 
are religious nuts but on the other end of the spectrum. I guess what I’m 
now learning is that there’s atheists that also have closed their mind on 
to… that there’s something going on in the brain that we don’t know 
about. They say, ‘No, the brain is just the brain. It makes us fart. It 
makes us eat. It makes us fuck’. And that’s it. Which I find, for me 
personally, I don’t go there. ‘Cause that feels like religion to me. 
‘Cause there’s so much that we don’t really know...And I feel that 
that’s kind of sad because my view of the atheist people would be that 
they would be scientifically geared and not dogma geared.  
These “dogma-geared” atheists, she feels, neglect an important aspect of what it means to 
be human in focusing only on material, physical processes.  This point is revealed in her 
response to the question of what she thinks is not being sufficiently accounted for in the 
dominant discourse on religion in the movement: 
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I think it’s the emotional importance of being a human. Just what Sam 
Harris is talking about, the feeling of this, you know, Godly love that 
religious organizations have now patented and trademarked and kept to 
themselves. They have a copyright on that. I think that’s the most 
important thing. ‘Cause feelings, in my view, are the things that guide 
us and I don’t think it’s addressed, I don’t think it’s addressed at all, 
actually.  
 Alicia’s critique of dogmatic materialism among some atheists is only one point of 
contention.  She also has problems with the politics of some atheists: 
I have a problem with – I don’t know if this pertains to anything here, 
but Ayn Rand, I have a problem with that. ‘Cause I heard that there’s a 
lot of atheists who are the Ayn Rand fans, like every man just needs to 
go and do whatever he needs to be doing right now, without any regard, 
you know, if he, whatever, blah blahblah, objectivist, you know, 
everything will work. Well it don’t work, I mean, to me. The U.S., it 
don’t work, it’s a third world country, and it’s all about objectivism. 
Don’t help anybody, don’t do anything, you know, it’s all for me, I’m 
not gonna pay for anybody, blah blah. It doesn’t work.  
As a humanist, Alicia is opposed to the libertarianism in the movement – which, as she 
notes, often takes the form of Ayn Rand’s atheistic individualism – which does not match 
her idea of the values of atheism. Finally, she also expresses opposition to the strategy of 
confrontation that dominates official movement discourse.  Her favouring of 
accommodation perhaps reflects her general attitude about atheism and the movement.  
She believes atheists should be “open-minded” and not “dogmatic”, and this applies to 
dealing with believers: 
You can’t tell people what they don’t know. You have to come to that 
conclusion yourself. You can’t tell a religious person or a person on the 
fence that, hey, that’s bullshit, cause nobody wants to be wrong. You 
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can’t tell people that they’re wrong, and you can’t try to manipulate 
them either, ‘cause that’s not going to be the truth for them. 
 Fahim, a respondent I have identified as a scientific atheist, expresses 
considerable ambivalence on movement positions regarding strategy and discourse on the 
nature of religion.  When asked if there were any presentations of discussions at the AAI 
convention that he found problematic or disagreed with, this was his response: 
Yeah, there was actually a few things I kind of disagreed with. And 
they were saying how, you know, religion serves no purpose, or some 
people made some comments about, you know, religion is completely 
useless or doesn’t serve any purpose, and I think that’s just completely 
false. I’ve grown up in a religion that’s very serving to the people, and 
very good. It does wonders, I mean we’ve had families in our house 
stay from Afghanistan, get them over here. If it wasn’t for the religion I 
probably wouldn’t be in a place like Canada today...So I think some of 
the unfair bias, because maybe they’ve had some bad experiences in 
their life, yeah, I can see that there’s maybe not, they’re not totally 
objective to that.  
Though he is a strong atheist, Fahim nonetheless recognizes some value in religion, and 
in describing the attitudes of some atheists toward religion as “not totally objective” he 
takes the same position as Marcia and Alicia, who are dismayed by the “closed-minded” 
and “dogmatic” approach they see in the movement.  Fahim’s views on strategy thus take 
a similar form: 
I think we should engage them first, rather than provoke them. But that 
level of engagement is so much more difficult and I just know that first-
hand having chatted with two levels of extreme, whether it’s my parents 
or a friend. I know that engaging is extremely difficult, but I think 
that’s something we need to continue to do.  
Preferring to “engage” with the religious rather than “provoke” them, Fahim clearly 
favours a strategy of accommodation over confrontation. This position, along with his 
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more nuanced views on the nature and value of religion, sets him apart from the New 
Atheists and other leaders who craft official discourse.   
 Michael, 51, was raised in a Catholic family in Minnesota.  He framed atheism 
and humanism as distinct but complimentary groups and positions within the freethought 
movement that need to work together to achieve their goals: 
If you think of this as an operation, the whole trying to get religion out 
of society as an operation, atheism is like the sharp scalpel. You’ve got 
to cut out the nonsense. And humanism is like the healing, the bedside 
manner and the stitches and the recovery. So you need the atheism to go 
in there and cut out the superstition, but then you’ve got to follow 
through with the healing and the alternatives and the healthy lifestyle. 
So they can work hand in hand, they each have sort of a different 
mission… There’s a lot of emphasis, there’s been more emphasis in 
atheist groups on going after things in religion that are factually 
incorrect. Resurrections, miracles, that kind of thing.A more analytical 
approach. And I think in humanist movements, they’re more interested 
in the emotional stuff. Meaning in life, and trying to create the society 
that is emotionally fulfilling and replaces the emotional needs, the 
emotional things that religion supplies. So yeah, the atheists are the 
more analytical, intellectual thing, and the humanists are the more 
societal, emotional aspect. And that’s where I’ve been very interested 
for a number of years now in trying to fuse those two, get those groups 
to come together. It used to be that a lot of the humanists were afraid in 
the atheist community, but that’s less and less now. So the humanists 
are not afraid of the atheists, they realize the value of atheists. And I 
think the atheists are starting to realize that it takes more than bashing 
religion to be successful, we have to have an alternative life. And so the 
humanists have been working on that. So we do well together, we can 
work together, and to really be successful we’ll need both parts.  
 
 
195 
Though he notes a tension, he also believes that each of these groups recognizes that the 
other has a role to play in the movement and will eventually overcome their differences.  
What is crucial is that, in his view, they must overcome these differences for the 
movement to be effective.  Like Alicia, he notes the importance of the “emotional stuff”, 
which he sees as the province of humanism, while atheism has a more scientific or 
“analytical” mission. He also pointed out the tension regarding strategy, which he 
describes as one between “hard-line” and “friendly” approaches to dealing with religion.  
Given that it directly addresses some of the debates discussed in the preceding chapter, 
his comments are worth quoting at length: 
Well, there is sort of a disagreement in the movement about whether we 
should be real hard and edgy and ridiculing, that’s one camp. And the 
other camp is friendly and some would call accommodationalist in a 
derisive way. So some will say, you know, religion wherever we find it 
is the enemy, we should go after it full force, we should ridicule it. 
That’s, you could call it the hard-line atheism. And others would say, 
look, we’ve got family and friends who are religious. We don’t want to 
alienate them, especially if they’re liberal religious people who might 
vote with us, and if you start ridiculing the liberal religious people who 
might otherwise vote with us, you might just drive them into the other 
camp. But going back to the first group of people, they say, and this is 
Sam Harris’ idea, that any kind of religiosity, even liberal religiosity, 
gives cover to the more extreme kind. That as long as you give anybody 
a pass on believing anything supernatural, you’re giving an ok to 
anything, anything supernatural, giving cover to it so we should strike 
at it wherever we find it. So that’s, I think, one of the struggles or 
disagreements that sometimes exist… I used to be totally in the friendly 
approach because I want to treat other people the way I would want to 
be treated. I don’t want to be ridiculed, so why should I ridicule 
somebody else? When you ridicule somebody they become defensive, 
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you know, they fold their arms, they back away emotionally. I don’t 
think it’s a very good tactic, and I don’t think it’s very respectful. On 
the other hand I did once have a young woman come up to me and say 
‘it was the ridicule of religion that shook me’….SoI think ridicule has 
its place but we’ve got to separate ridiculing ideas from ridiculing 
people. I do think we should be respectful toward people, but you 
know, if someone says the earth is only 6000 years old, we can say 
“that’s ridiculous because”, and you have to get into some evidence. So 
I think that’s okay.   
Some elements of this passage worth highlighting include Michael’s summary of 
the “friendly” (accommodation) position as being rooted in a desire not to alienate 
“liberal religious people who might vote with us”.  He indicates here that the essence of 
this position is the view that social issues and politics are of primary concern, whereas for 
“hard-line” (confrontation) atheists religion is an enemy, and the imperative to attack it 
“wherever we find it” trumps other concerns.  When it comes to his own opinion on 
which strategy is better, he expresses considerable ambivalence, explaining that he “used 
to be totally in the friendly approach”, indicating that he has wavered on this position.  
He argues that ridicule isn’t a good tactic, but then immediately also suggests that 
ridicule has its place but should be accompanied by respect.  How ridicule and respect go 
together is a problem he does not address, and the contradictory nature of this statement 
reflects the ambivalence many atheists feel on this issue.   
 Another respondent who expressed a similar ambivalence regarding strategy is 
Terry, a 51-year-old gay man from Ontario who was raised in the United Church.  He 
describes his desire to “build bridges” with liberal religious groups while at the same time 
trying to balance this strategic choice with a “strong dislike” for religion in general that 
comes in part from its association with conservative positions on sexuality:  
I want to try to build bridges and be one of those atheists that are, like, 
building bridges with liberal religious people. It’s not possible to do it 
with fundamentalists, there’s too much of a divide… You know, you 
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don’t want to really piss them off if they’re just liberal Christians or 
whatever or liberal Muslims, and they have some of the same values 
that we have, for human rights and things like that, women’s rights and 
gay rights, stuff like that…I do have to be careful because like I said I 
do have issues with religion. I wouldn’t call it hatred, but a very strong 
dislike...I can’t let that voice out, and I have to think, maybe you’re 
being a little harsh. You know, maybe, try to balance yourself, you 
know? Not all religious people are like that. Which is true, so it’s good 
for me to actually go out and meet religious people, and I don’t enough 
because I’m always with atheists, right? So it’s good to have that 
balance because it’s easy to get hooked into, when you’re in a 
movement, it’s easy to get wrapped up in “Yeah, yeah”, you know, that 
kind of fanaticism. And I’m not really like that, like, I do have a lot of 
anger about a lot of things about religion, but I also respect people and 
their right to believe whatever they want to believe. So there’s a bit of a 
fight there in my head. 
Like Michael, Terry speaks about building relationships with “liberal religious people” 
with whom he and other atheists share core values relating to human rights. The essence 
of his concerns, then, is related to questions of social justice rather than a desire to assert 
the superiority of truths revealed by science.  Like Michael, his humanistic values and 
desire to advance liberal politics take priority over an ideological conflict with religion.  
Also like Michael, however, he expresses considerable ambivalence on how to relate to 
religious people. Taking a “friendly” or “accommodating” approach involves a constant 
struggle with some deeply felt antagonism toward religion.  This ambivalence is even 
more clear in his comments on which New Atheists he likes most: 
I think actually of all of them I probably like him [Dennett] the best, 
even though I’ve read less of him than anyone. He just seems kind of 
moderate, he’s not like, he doesn’t have anger. Although I do like 
Hitchens. A lot of atheists don’t like him ‘cause he’s too loud and 
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offensive and pisses off religious people, but like, we’ve been pissed 
off by religious people a long time, so why not? 
Here Terry at once favours Dennett for his “moderate” approach that comes without 
“anger”, but at the same time like Hitchens for precisely the opposite reason: because his 
approach does come with anger and is blatantly combative. Relating this to his comments 
regarding strategy, I believe he favours an accommodating position as a reasoned 
strategic approach, but struggles with his more emotional and reactionary side that 
responds to aggression and attack.   
 While struggling on the question of strategy and relating to religious people, 
Terry is less ambivalent when it comes to the ideological divide between those Marcia 
calls “purists” (i.e. new atheists) and the more “open-minded” secular humanists.  He 
refers to this divide in discussing an experience with the Japanese healing art Reiki in 
which, contrary to his expectations, he found himself convinced of its effectiveness:  
As a very strong atheist, I thought, this is challenging my whole 
worldview. And time and time again other stuff has happened where 
it’s like, how could that happen? So it gives me sort of an interesting 
perspective because a lot of people that are atheist, like especially some 
of the real vocal, loudmouth, angry ones, are like, there’s nothing, the 
way it is is the way it is. And I’m going no, I don’t believe there’s any 
god in the sky and stuff for universal energy, whatever, but there’s so 
much stuff that we don’t know, and just accept that, it’s a great feeling. 
And actually a lot of people who are believers would probably not want 
to do Reiki because they think it’s a demon’s work or evil. And I’m 
thinking there’s something to it, and one day science will probably 
show what it is, right? But until then, whatever, and that’s the good 
thing about being an atheist, is that you’re not just stuck believing these 
old stories that are 99.99%, I’m sure, false. It gives you the ability to 
accept that there’s mysteries to be discovered, and it’s 
exciting...Because some atheists are sceptics, right? And I’m a skeptic, 
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obviously. But they’re almost negative sceptics, they go in saying it’s 
not true, there’s nothing rational about it, without actually having an 
open mind, right? So I guess I’m an open-minded skeptic. There are 
possible things that we don’t understand. And it’s like, don’t get 
worried sceptics, it’s not because of something supernatural, it’s a 
natural explanation that we don’t understand yet.  
Like Marcia, Alicia, and Fahim, Terry marks his distinction from “vocal, loudmouth, 
angry” atheists, and emphasizes the importance of being “open-minded” and avoiding a 
dogmatic approach that excludes certain questions and approaches.  His descrption of 
atheists who say “there’s nothing, the way it is is the way it is” is very much like Alicia’s 
description of atheists who say “the brain is just the brain”, and like her, he counters these 
views with “there’s so much stuff that we don’t know”.   
 Sahani, 23 years old, was born in Sri Lanka and moved to Canada with her family 
when she was a small child.  She was raised Hindu, as she describes it, “in a pretty lax 
way”.  At the time of our interview she had recently taken on an administrative position 
with a major atheist organization, but only weeks into this role she was already having 
doubts about her participation in the movement that were related to the same issues raised 
by other respondents – that is, ideological dogmatism and a confrontational strategy.  
This is revealed in Sahani’s discussion of CFI’s “Extraordinary Claims” campaign, 
another advertising campaign like ABC that asserts that “Extraordinary Claims Require 
Extraordinary Evidence” and lists among these “claims” bigfoot, UFO’s, Allah, and 
Jesus:  
I didn’t want to read The God Delusion because I felt like I had been 
driven to tears by these people who wanted to convince me that I was 
wrong, and I never wanted to put anyone else in that position. And I felt 
that these books and this campaign, Extraordinary Claims, is sort of 
doing that. They’re not sitting in a corner and forcing you to listen to 
them, but it’s such a private, such an intimate part of people’s identities, 
even if they only believe a little bit or if they’re on the cusp of 
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switching, it’s not going to help to tell them that they’re idiots... So, like 
I was saying about the words “the God delusion’ and things like that. I 
think when it’s a negative – when it’s a campaign that’s framed 
negatively by telling people to question themselves instead of seeing 
the benefit that comes from the other point of view. I mean, it doesn’t 
seem to say “atheism makes sense”, it’s more like “religion does not 
make sense for these reasons”, which doesn’t give people an incentive 
to join the atheist movement. Even if I was religious or I was at that 
stage where I was on the cusp of not being religious, seeing those ads 
would not make me want to become atheist. It would make me really 
angry, and it still makes me really angry because I think it’s the same 
attitude that a lot of evangelicals have, where they have a specific frame 
to put things and their frame makes sense to them. It’s not going to 
make sense to you, and that rationalist framework that we each come to 
on our own as atheists does not apply necessarily to religious people. 
And it’s just – Creating a fence is not a way to create dialogue...I’m not 
sure I want to stay openly part of an organization that is doing that 
campaign right now.   
While Sahani enjoys the experience of community provided by her atheist group, she 
disagrees with its dogmatically scientistic and confrontational approach, so much so that 
she is debating whether she wants to continue participating in the organization.  Like 
Marcia and Alicia, she compares some more dogmatic atheists to evangelicals, and feels 
that rather than trying to discredit religion, they should be focusing on what’s positive 
about atheism. This is based on her view that applying a rationalist framework to religion 
and presenting it to religious people is a fundamental error in understanding what 
motivates religious people – that is, their beliefs are not motivated by reason.  A 
confrontational approach, then, is misguided.  She further elaborates these views in her 
discussion of the New Atheists’ aggressive attack on religion: 
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I feel like it turns people off more than anything, so it doesn’t 
accomplish what they’re trying to do. And then, it doesn’t accomplish 
what they’re trying to do, and at the same time it makes atheists seem 
like these awful people who are belittling and creating really extreme 
analogies which we accuse the religious people of doing about 
atheists....It’s when they talk positively about the meaning that atheism 
can bring versus when they talk negatively about what God has done to 
our society that I find more appealing.  
 
...people don’t come to god as a scientific hypothesis. They don’t come 
to it that way. If they’re looking at it that way they’re already on the 
side of Richard Dawkins. So putting it in that framing is only really 
going to convince the people on the fence who are already looking at 
this in that way anyway. I mean, I didn’t decide that I wasn’t going to 
believe in God because I thought about the rationale for it and then 
realized that, overt, careful, rational thinking, that I didn’t believe. 
Again, Sahani doesn’t believe that rational argumentation and scientific evidence are 
going to convince people to give up their religious beliefs.  She also thinks that the 
confrontational approach is a style of discourse that atheists criticize in religion and is 
thus hypocritical. Rather than focusing on the negative attacks, she prefers focusing on 
doing something positive: “I’d really like them to do more charity work to show that it 
doesn’t have to be churches who do it. Because that’s often an argument that comes up, 
about how we need religion because otherwise who would run the soup kitchens?”  In 
taking this position, Sahani indicates that she would like her group to do some of the 
“healing” work that Michael described as the job of humanism.  Sahani, like many of the 
other respondents, may not believe in God, but she is much more a humanist than a “new 
atheist”.   
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 Finally, Sahani made an interesting observation no doubt related to her experience 
of being a member of a minority group.  She frames it in the discourse on Christmas and 
other religious holidays that sometimes comes up in the atheist movement: 
So there’s this, I don’t want to put a stereotype on this either, but it 
seems like people who are against Christmas are probably, they get the 
sense that anything cultural is sort of beneath them because they’re not 
cultural, but they don’t realize they’re cultural. And it also speaks to 
somebody who’s had a lot of privilege and comes from the majority 
culture and doesn’t see that minority cultures, which include religious 
cultures, have just as much right to be there.  
 
But things to address I guess, it would be nice, now that we’ve talked 
about it, to talk about the intersection between culture and religion and 
where to draw the line for what we accept in terms of religion but what 
we need to accept in terms of culture. Because otherwise we’re just, 
we’re being blind and exercising a privilege that we don’t have the right 
to exercise over these oppressed minorities.  
Sahani notes here a conflict between multiculturalism (or pluralism) and hard-line 
atheism.  We might again see this in terms of ideological tensions between new atheists 
and secular humanists, and confrontationists and accommodationists.  For the 
ideologically militant new atheists, multiculturalism and pluralism are out of the 
question, since the goal is cultural homogenization through scientific hegemony.  For 
secular humanists who embrace a more accommodating position, multiculturalism is a 
value to be embraced.   
In the comments from all these respondents, there is discussion of tensions 
between atheism and humanism, and between confrontation and accommodation.  There 
is also an equation of “hard-line” atheism with confrontation, while accommodation is 
associated with a more “open-minded” approach that emphasizes underlying values and 
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political ideals rather than an attack on religion.  This is the approach favoured by 
humanistic atheists, who place social concerns above ideological opposition to religion.   
 
Conclusion 
 The research presented in this chapter indicates that atheists very a great deal in 
terms of their religious backgrounds, the development of their beliefs, their current views 
on religion and science, and their motivations for joining the movement and the goals 
they wish to pursue.  Analysis of trajectories to atheism reveals that there is no one 
standard path (as implied by the New Atheists, who assume progression from ignorance 
to enlightenment is analogous to a move from religious superstition to science). Rather, 
people come to atheism from different directions and for different reasons.  Furthermore, 
most atheists in my sample follow a humanistic, rather than scientific, approach to 
religion, which is the reverse of leaders and official discourse, where scientific atheism is 
the norm.  That is, these atheists understand the reasons for religious belief in humanistic 
terms (socialization, comfort, fear of death, etc.).  However, on the question of apostasy, 
they preferred to cite intellectual, rather than moral/political/social reasons, in my view 
because they do not have an alternative framework for understanding the complexities 
and variables involved in this process, but instead reduce it to the level of individual 
consciousness – the view promoted by the New Atheism.  Interestingly, the New Atheism 
does not appear to have had a major or direct impact on the development of beliefs 
among these respondents.  Rather, they “reinforce” existing positions, while their major 
success was in their effectiveness as a tool of recruitment and mobilization, rather than 
conversion.   
The most frequently cited purpose of the movement was community, followed by 
identity, with direct political (instrumental) goals a clear third, and not clearly defined.  
For these members, the movement is not about changing the world, it is about providing a 
sense of community and belonging for an alienated group.  Importantly, they equated the 
purpose of the movement with their own experiences and reasons for joining, which was 
generally a search for community. Examination of atheists’ views on issues within the 
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movement and points of disagreement revealed that there are some major internal 
tensions, including an ideological tension between new atheists (“purists”, “hard-liners”) 
and secular humanists, and a strategic tension between those who favour accommodation 
and those favouring confrontation.  The interviews therefore support the preceding 
chapter’s analysis, which argued that the movement is internally divided on ideological 
grounds, a division manifest in disagreements concerning strategy and identity.  Those in 
my sample are generally supportive of a more accommodating atheism, with some 
ambivalence about the issue.  This is because their objection to religion seems to be a 
lower priority than liberal political concerns – the ideological and strategic tensions, and 
the greater emphasis on advancing a liberal agenda on social issues than attacking 
religion, reflect the generally humanistic orientation of the sample, in contrast to the 
scientific orientation of the leaders and most of the official discourse.  For members, 
social justice is a higher priority than the New Atheism’s goal of advancing a scientistic 
worldview by attacking religion.  This reflects the previous chapter’s finding that new 
groups are emerging that assign similar priorities to the movement.  
The discrepancy between the views of members and movement leaders is the 
most interesting finding to emerge from this research. Rather than a homogeneous group 
of followers of Richard Dawkins, the presumptive leader of the New Atheism, these 
members are agents who weigh the views of these leaders against their own ideas and 
lived experiences, asserting their own positions and goals for the movement. What makes 
this distinct from other cultural movements that might have more internal cohesion and 
top-down following of leaders is that this one is based on a belief system (or a number of 
belief systems sometimes in conflict with each other) rather than some more intrinsic 
characteristic (e.g. sexuality) or a position on a specific social issue (e.g. 
environmentalism). A movement about beliefs is bound to experience tensions between 
people holding different beliefs. Unlike religious fundamentalisms, atheism has no text 
that serves as an unquestionable source of authority, thus the meaning of atheism is 
continually constructed and re-constructed by individuals and groups with different 
views. The New Atheism is only one of these groups, and while The God Delusion might 
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anchor a canon, it is not sacred.  Perhaps most importantly, these members generally do 
not share the New Atheism’s goal of universalization, but instead seek to carve out a 
space for atheists in the cultural landscape and create communities for non-believers, and 
are willing to accommodate religious (and other) groups and points of view that share a 
basic progressive position on social issues. This seems to support Taylor’s (2007) point 
regarding the pluralist cultural logic of the secular age, where dogmatism and absolutism 
(religious or secular) give way to acceptance of the possibility of a vast array of different 
forms of belief co-existing.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Atheism was born of – and took shape in association with – politically radical 
intellectual and social justice movements, including the French Revolution, Marxism, and 
Darwinism’s resistance to church authority. The progressive element is largely absent in 
the New Atheism, which supplants it with a laissez-faire view that the only problem with 
the socio-political arrangement of modernity is the persistence of irrational religious 
beliefs, which impede natural social progress. While New Atheism is typically 
understood as a “liberal” ideology (Eagleton 2009; McAnulla 2012; Schulzke 2013b), 
there are conservative dimensions to the movement, particularly with respect to 
Eurocentrism/Orientalism, libertarianism, Social Darwinism, and patriarchy. These are 
not features of progressive liberalism, or the Left, but rather they are tantamount to a 
conservative defense of the status quo and a hierarchical social structure.  
 Commenting on the New Atheism, Terry Eagleton writes, “Your average liberal 
rationalist does not need to believe that despite the tormented condition of humanity there 
might still, implausibly enough, be hope, since they do not credit such a condition in the 
first place” (2009: 38).  This complacent view insists that the ‘darkness’ outside 
modernity’s boundaries can be precisely located in religious fundamentalism within the 
West, and in the Middle East in general.  This “mindless progressivism” (Eagleton 
2010:155) is the product of a kind of faith – not in a transcendent deity or divine law, but 
rather in the power of science to create a perfect world.  This involves a dualistic 
worldview where religion is the cause of modern social problems, while science is the 
engine of progress that will inevitably solve these problems (Harrison 2010).  The only 
contradiction within modernity, for the New Atheism, is the persistence of religion, 
which has proven more resilient than once thought within the secularization paradigm of 
the social sciences as well as in evolutionistic narratives of progress. The ideology of 
New Atheism, however, holds to the traditional secularization narrative, and a general 
faith in progress, that is tantamount to the passive acceptance of the conditions of modern 
life. Eagleton notes that in some formulations, “the very concept of ideology is 
synonymous with the attempt to provide rational, technical, ‘scientific’ rationales for 
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social domination, rather than mythic, religious or metaphysical ones” (1991:37). New 
Atheism might be considered a case in point, instituting rational-scientific rationales for 
domination that replace less efficient (and more dubious) religious ones. In casting 
religion as a scapegoat for the inequities that plague modernity, asserting science as an 
unquestionable source of authority, and insisting that techno-scientific progress is social 
and moral progress, it legitimates the current neoliberal world order. In one particular 
case – the libertarian element within the movement – it does so explicitly. The Four 
Horsemen also adopt Hebert Spencer’s evolutionistic vision of social progress. While 
they do not explicitly support his advocacy of cutthroat economics, any mention of 
capitalism as a source of social problems is absent from their work, which assigns blame 
for social ills to the persistence of violent, irrational religion, in line with the legitimating 
myth of modernity (Cavanaugh 2009).  
 New Atheism is, indeed, an ideological defense of a modern utopia against its 
perceived antagonists: religion and relativism. It does this by taking shape as a cultural 
movement that seeks to universalize this ideology, converting masses to a science-based 
belief system and asserting scientific authority in all spheres of life. As both a utopian 
belief system and a social movement that advances a political program, it can be 
understood as a secular fundamentalism, as opposed to religious fundamentalisms that are 
anti-modern (Eisenstadt 1999). Like all fundamentalisms, New Atheism is totalizing. Just 
as communists claimed to have a scientific understanding of the “laws of motion of 
history” and thus legitimated the centralized management of society by “experts” (Held 
1980), the New Atheists see a law of evolution guiding history on its natural course 
toward ‘civilization’ – that is, a society administered according to scientific authority.  
 The New Atheism’s legacy is somewhat unclear. While tremendously popular for 
a short period of time, it remains to be seen if the New Atheists’ ideas will prove 
influential in a lasting way, and to what extent they have contributed to a significant 
cultural transformation, as they intend. As noted in the introduction of this dissertation, 
the “nones” (the religiously unaffiliated) are growing in western societies. While we 
cannot attribute causality to the New Atheism (in fact the growth was noticed in the early 
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1990s), it may be fair to say that they are bound up in one process. We cannot say 
whether this process is secularization as traditionally formulated, or simply the 
emergence of one more group in accordance with the expanding possibilities of belief in 
the “secular age” (Taylor 2007). However, I do think this is open to questioning, contrary 
to the emerging axiomatic position of “post-secularism” (e.g. Calhoun et al. 2011; Gorski 
et al. 2012; Mendieta and VanAntwerpen 2011). That is, the question of secularization is 
not yet settled, and a version of the thesis is still defended by some, notably Steve Bruce 
(2002, 2011). Might the rise of atheists and the nones portend a generational shift away 
from religious belief? Or does it simply point to a diversification in religious belief and 
practice, with atheism arriving as one more position in a pluralistic cultural landscape? 
We might also ask whether the apparent “desecularization” of the world (Berger 1999) – 
or, the deprivatization of religion and its growing influence in politics – negates the 
secularization thesis, or whether this might be understood as just another stage in 
religious decline. That is, is this revival, and particularly the turn to fundamentalism and 
more extreme forms of belief, religion’s ‘last gasp’ before it finally succumbs to the 
pressures of modernization? Predictions of this kind of sweeping historical change are 
probably best avoided: we perhaps should have learned to be wary from previous 
predictions of religion’s demise that were articulated with the same certainty found in 
today’s dominant claim that religion is here to stay. The outcome of these processes is not 
certain, and while it is possible that the New Atheism was a temporary phenomenon with 
a limited scope, it is also possible that it signals a step toward an age that is secular in a 
more traditional sense of the term.  
 In terms of its legacy within the secular movement, my research illustrates that 
after a period of dominance and profound influence by the New Atheism, deep tensions 
have risen to the surface and another latency period appears to be underway. The New 
Atheism’s social movement aspirations and dimensions are being challenged by 
competing ideologies and groups within the movement more broadly, and the future of 
these developments is unclear. Darwin viewed evolution as a process with no fixed 
direction, and invoked the metaphor of a “radiating bush” to describe adaptation and 
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differentiation to changing environmental conditions. We might apply the same metaphor 
to contemporary developments in the atheist movement, which is changing rapidly in 
response to social, cultural, and political changes. We are seeing a process of 
differentiation in the movement, with distinct groups seeking to advance their own 
agendas, and a potential for fragmentation or total breakdown. The New Atheism came to 
prominence in the mid-2000s, when the events of September 11, 2001 were not as 
distant, and Canada, the United States, and Britain were deeply involved in military 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In the post-9/11 context, where religious 
fundamentalism on both sides of the “clash of civilizations” was reaching new heights of 
influence, the New Atheism presented a radical critique and a promise of social 
transformation that clearly spoke to many people. However, the cultural project of 
ideological universalism, which seemed tantalizingly realizable at the height of the New 
Atheism’s popularity and public presence, has given way to more moderate and specific 
instrumental goals of constructing and defending a minority identity, and the functional 
differentiation of religious and political spheres.  This strategy is a tacit recognition that 
the narrative of secularization has not been realized as expected and likely will not be in 
the foreseeable future.  The evangelical approach of the New Atheism, which was 
predicated upon the supposition that scientism was the inevitable and proximate trend of 
history, has thus given way to a defence of strict ideological boundaries through an 
identity strategy that emphasizes a distinction from, rather than assimilation with, 
mainstream society.   
 Aside from a failed prophecy of secularization and a mass turn to a science-based 
worldview, New Atheism has also been challenged by other groups within the atheist 
movement motivated by humanistic ethics and political secularism (in the case of secular 
humanists) as well as by individualism and the opposition to state intervention in the 
economic sphere (in the case of libertarian rationalists). Further, a newer emerging trend 
in the movement is toward “social justice”, particularly with respect to sexuality and 
gender. These are not rigidly distinct groups of people, since it is likely that many 
movement participants embrace views that cross the boundaries between these systems of 
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belief (this is confirmed by the interview research in this dissertation).  However, they are 
distinct ideologies that carry implications for what goals and strategies should be 
pursued.  Most importantly, they all abandon the totalizing tendencies of New Atheism 
and turn instead toward finding a place in what is, and is expected to remain, a pluralistic 
society.  
 The fact that New Atheism is influential but controversial within the movement, 
and that there are groups distinctly opposed to it in some ways, was an unexpected 
finding. It is but one group and one ideology within a diverse and complex movement 
that is still struggling to define itself and its goals. The key distinction is perhaps best 
expressed by Michael, a long-time member of the movement, who cautioned against 
alienating liberal religious people because “they might vote with us”. This is in contrast 
to New Atheists who insist on attacking religious beliefs and those who hold them 
wherever they appear. Michael’s core concern, like other secularists in the movement, is 
political. Given an agreement on some core political issues he is willing to overlook a 
disagreement on religion, as opposed to New Atheism, which makes religion the primary 
target because their goal is not social justice, but scientific authority. This disconnection 
between members and their leaders/organizations, and the struggle between groups with 
different goals and values, reveals a movement with major obstacles to maintaining 
cohesion. The movement is developing beyond New Atheism and combining different 
ideologies and goals in novel ways (e.g. scientific atheism combined with the goal of 
pursuing social justice) that may result in further diversification, or simply to 
fragmentation or breakdown.  
 Whether the movement will be able to survive these challenges is a question that 
only time will answer.  What seems clear is that we are in the midst of another revolution 
in atheism’s history.  The two forms that have dominated since the 19th century are 
further evolving into the more complex forms that we see emerging in the atheist 
movement today, such as Atheism+. The issue of sexism within the movement that 
inspired Atheism+ has only grown more controversial, culminating in Chris Mooney’s 
resignation as host of Point of Inquiry after Ronald Lindsay’s opening remarks at the 
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Women in Secularism conference in 2013 that rebuked feminists in the movement for 
“silencing men” (Lee 2013). These ongoing developments, and how the movement will 
respond, are matters for further study.  
 
Problems, Limitations, and Outstanding Questions  
 There are some limitations to this project with respect to the research on the 
atheist movement. First, it only addresses the North American context, while the 
movement may take different shapes in other contexts. However, the New Atheism 
movement specifically (that is, New Atheism as an intellectual current and cultural 
movement) is not tied to any particular context or location. It is a transnational 
ideological movement that seeks cultural universalism. The atheist movement more 
broadly, however, is bound to develop different goals, strategies, and identities in other 
contexts, as it responds to specific social, cultural, and political situations. Notably, the 
movement in western Europe is likely to look much different from that in the United 
States given the wide gap in levels of religiosity, and religious influence in public affairs, 
and specifically, on government officials. Atheists in some other contexts might also not 
be nearly as highly stigmatized – indeed, atheism is the norm in many western countries, 
notably in Scandinavia, which has some of the lowest rates of religiosity in the world 
(Norris and Inglehart 2004). Somewhat surprisingly, some atheist groups in Canada 
(Center for Inquiry Canada, Canadian Secular Alliance) have embraced the minority 
discourse of their American counterparts, arguing that atheists should be protected from 
discrimination, though their focus is generally on atheists globally rather than in Canada 
specifically. Despite a great deal of overlap in discourse and activism among atheist 
groups in Canada and the U.S., more rigorous research on each context is required. This 
is particularly true for Canada, where research on atheists is virtually non-existent despite 
the fact that there are very active atheist groups across the country, and that the numbers 
of atheists and the religiously unaffiliated are growing. Between 1991 and 2001 the 
proportion of the Canadian population with no religious affiliation grew from 12.3% to 
16.2% (Statistics Canada 2003), while a more recent study projects that by 2031 fully 
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one-fifth of Canadians will be religiously unaffiliated, even accounting for immigration 
from countries with higher rates of religiosity (Statistics Canada 2010). These are 
significant developments that merit closer attention.  
 With respect to the interview research in chapter four, there are several 
shortcomings. First and most obvious is the small sample, which was a result of limited 
resources. Without research funding I was not able to travel to attend atheist meetings 
and conduct interviews. The one convention I did attend was in Montreal, where I was 
able to interview people from different geographic areas. I added some interviews with 
members of CFI in Toronto, and could have done more there, but I was wary of an over-
representation of this context. I was interested in getting perspectives from different 
geographical and cultural contexts to see how much of a common experience there is 
within a movement that is largely deterritorialized and transnational.  A major 
omission from the interviews is a direct inquiry into respondents’ political views. While 
this came out organically in the course of interviews in some cases, a clearer 
understanding of atheists’ politics would obviously be very beneficial. This omission is a 
product of the generally inductive and exploratory approach I took in the interviews. At 
that stage of the project I was interested in learning about atheists’ views on religion and 
its relationship to science, and did not anticipate the importance of political goals for the 
movement, or the tensions between groups with different politics and motivated by 
different ideologies. Research on the political orientations of atheists is one of the most 
important outstanding questions facing atheism and secularity studies (note the discussion 
above of how my research illustrates that the assumption that atheists are ‘liberal’ should 
be questioned). In addition to a qualitative understanding of the beliefs of atheists, 
quantitative data on their political views would be helpful in understanding the 
development of the movement.   
 Some important questions emerge from my findings and arguments about the 
diversity in paths to atheism, particularly in terms of the categories I add to Smith’s 
(2011) model. First and foremost, what effect does the intensity of religious socialization 
have on the nature and the development of atheist identities?  The possible variation in 
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intensity of religious socialization is a variable that should be addressed in future 
research. Smith (2011) offers a preliminary hypothesis based on his finding that atheists 
from a strong religious background tend to have greater feelings of acrimony toward 
religion and to be more outspoken about their beliefs, and this is a point worth examining 
in more detail.  There are also many questions we might want to address regarding the 
“original skeptics” I discussed, such as Elaine, who claims she is “atheist since birth,” 
and Terry, who believes he was a “free thinking kid.”  These questions might include: 
How do they differ from other atheists? Is this a matter of individual psychology? What 
social conditions are involved?  Another significant issue is the matter of “seeking 
religion” among those who experienced a secular socialization. The question, 
specifically, is what compels those who never held religious beliefs or practiced religion 
to experiment with religion? In the very few cases I examined, social pressures seemed to 
be important, with these subjects reporting asking themselves questions like “What’s 
wrong with me?” given that so many others around them apparently believed.  As 
mentioned above, one subject sought religion because she had questions that were not 
being answered, such as the question of why there is evil in the world. The obvious irony 
here is that the problem of evil has traditionally been employed as an argument against 
the existence of God, and following the logic and assumptions that underpin this 
argument we would expect the problem of evil to incline one to move away from 
religion, rather than toward it. It seems that disconcerting existential questions can lead to 
religiosity or atheism, depending where one starts out from.   
The biggest question that emerges from this paper is why exactly people doubt, or 
what exactly their doubt is rooted in (this study has principally dealt with the “how” of 
discovering atheism and the steps involved in the process). In terms of why people 
become atheist, there are many possible reasons. The literature reviewed in chapter four 
posits that most atheists reject religion primarily for intellectual reasons, coming to feel 
that they cannot reconcile religious beliefs with science and reason (e.g. Hunsberger and 
Altemeyer 2007; Smith 2011).  Others have argued that apostates turn away from religion 
primarily for political and moral reasons, since most atheists have liberal views on social 
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issues and many associate religion with conservatism (e.g. Beit-Hallahmi 2007; Hout and 
Fischer 2002; Nelson 1988; Putnam and Campbell 2010).  My own research has raised 
the possibility that atheists reject religion for other reasons having to do with individual 
psychology and personality, as in the example of “original skeptics”.  These people 
apparently experienced a religious socialization similar to many others’, and yet never 
believed, a fact that might require us to look for differences at the level of the individual 
if we cannot discern salient social factors.   
The key question here is what reasons are most important and for whom.  Just as 
Smith (2011) suggests that a stronger religious background might result in stronger 
antipathy to religion and a stronger anti-religious identity, I would suggest that a similar 
relationship may exist concerning stronger political views given the perceived 
correspondence between religiosity and conservatism. Comments from Marcia, a self-
described progressive liberal, are revealing of the importance of political views in the 
development of an atheist identity:  
Because religion interferes with policies, and just the religious climate, 
the Right is just being very, very, what’s the word I’m looking for?  
Invasive. And I think people are getting fed up, and those who are 
already of the mindset of, well I don’t believe in that bullshit, are just 
verbalizing their thoughts more now...It’s definitely reactionary, there’s 
nothing proactive about it, it’s being defensive, finally being verbal. 
For Marcia, the politics of religion compels her to atheist activism and strengthens her 
identity, and it is in cases like hers that collective identity and social movement discourse 
is clearly important in identity formation. Here the link between the atheist movement 
and the Christian Right is explicit: these movements grow and develop in close 
relationship to each other.  
 There is also much work to be done to understand the structure of the atheist 
movement and the organizations that comprise it, including the linkages between them, 
the sources of their funding, and membership numbers and demographics.  I have focused 
here on discourse and major examples of activism, but a more rigorous analysis of 
 
 
215 
movement structure is clearly required.  In general, my analysis of the movement and the 
three groups is only an entry into this topic. It is a necessary first step given the nascent 
status of the field at this point. My research is an original contribution to a body of 
knowledge that is in a very early stage of development – indeed, this project is the first 
major study of its kind – and thus it is necessarily somewhat limited and exploratory, 
given that there was no existing research to build on or frame my own approach. What I 
have proposed is a framework for future research and analysis, and the arguments 
presented here require much more empirical investigation and support. Social movement 
scholarship has not yet addressed the atheist movement, which is a major lacuna in that 
field. Given the growth and level of activity in atheist organizations, however, I expect 
that more rigorous research and analysis of the movement is coming. I hope that this 
dissertation provides a useful entry point.  
 In terms of my own future research interests, I would like to pursue a different 
direction. My interest in New Atheism is rooted more in the sociology of religion, and I 
would like to further develop the understanding of New Atheism as a form of belief by 
moving beyond the concept of secular fundamentalism, and approaching it specifically as 
a secular religion. I want to explore how a concept of secular religion can help us to 
understand New Atheism as a belief system, as well as forms of ritual and collective 
practices, that construct meaning and community. In some classic formulations, including 
Berger (1967), Geertz (1973), and Weber (1963), religion is defined as a system of 
meaning-making for which the supernatural is not an essential requirement. Berger 
specifically cites science as a secular form of cosmization (the process of meaning-
making and constructing purpose for human life), creating a space for the notion of 
secular religion. This concept can, I think, be applied in the case of the New Atheism as 
well as the atheist movement more broadly (or at least some elements and groups within 
it). I have argued in this dissertation that New Atheism is an ideology. But our 
understanding of it, the sources of its appeal, and how it translates into social practices 
may be enhanced with the concept of religion, its ostensible adversary.  
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NOTES 
 
 
1 Shortly after the documentary was released Haggard was forced to resign his position 
due to the revelation that he had purchased methamphetamine from a male prostitute, 
who alleged the two had also had regular sex for three years  
(http://articles.cnn.com/2006-11-03/us/haggard.allegations_1_sexually-immoral-conduct-
morning-services-church-forces?_s=PM:US) 
2 http://old.richarddawkins.net/articles/5000#455619 
3 http://old.richarddawkins.net/articles/618232-message-to-american-atheists 
4 The same notion appears in the book God: The Failed Hypothesis by American 
physicist Victor Stenger (2008), a contemporary of the Four Horsemen.   
5 Dawkins participated in another documentary for Channel 4 called The Enemies of 
Reason where he deals with this conflict between superstition and rationalism.  The film 
follows him in conversations with psychics, astrologers, etc., as well as their followers, in 
an examination of how the continuing popularity of pre-modern superstitions and pseudo-
sciences demonstrates that we have a long way to go to achieve a rational society and that 
the ‘pre-modern’ enchanted world is very much still with us. 
6 The version of the article cited here is the one reprinted on Harris’ web site 
(http://www.samharris.org/site/full_text/the-end-of-liberalism)   
7 Major sponsoring organizations include American Atheists, American Humanist 
Association, Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science, United Coalition of 
Reason, Center for Inquiry, StiefelFreethought Foundation, Secular Coalition for 
America, Secular Student Alliance, and the Freedom From Religion Foundation (Reason 
Rally, 2013a).  
8 The word “probably” was initially used for legal reasons, since claiming that “there is 
no God” could lead to the advertisers having to prove it.  When the campaign came to 
North America, the use of the word “probably” was explained by organizers as a 
reflection of the proper scientific position on the existence of God, which is not certainty 
but scepticism based on lack of evidence.   
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9 The most infamous work to come out of this celebration is “Jesus Does His Nails” by 
Dana Ellyn, a submission to the 2009 Blasphemy Rights Day exhibit which depicts Jesus 
applying nail polish to nails driven through his hands. 
10 Organizations participate simply by linking the donation site to their own websites.  
11 Out of the Closet user-created billboards can be viewed at http://ffrf.org/get-
involved/bus-billboard-campaign/out-of-the-closet-campaign/. 
12 To provide evidence for his belief that Christianity is much less pervasive in Britain 
than commonly thought, Dawkins commissioned a study through RDFRS that concluded 
that most British are only nominal Christians because, among other reasons, most who 
identified as Christians could not name the first book of the New Testament (Kirby 
2012).  Soon after the study was reported Dawkins was challenged on this point by an 
interviewer who asked him for the full title of Darwin’s Origin of Species.  Dawkins’ 
inability to provide the answer (the full title is “On the Origin of Species by Means of 
Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life”) – and 
his muttering “Oh, God” as he became flummoxed – were a major embarrassment 
(McGrath 2012).   
13 Streaming video of many of the conference sessions, including this one, can be viewed 
at http://www.secularhumanism.org/laconference/live.html, which serves as the reference 
for all of my discussion of this debate. Edited versions of the four presentations were 
published in the June/July 2011 issue of Free Inquiry (vol. 31 no. 4).   
14 PZ Myers describes himself as a “godless liberal” 
(http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/about.php). At the CSH conference Sam Harris took 
pains to make it clear that he is a Left-leaning liberal with progressive views on gender 
equality, gay marriage, economic inequality, and wealth redistribution.  In August of 
2011 he wrote a blog entry under the heading “How Rich is Too Rich?” 
(http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/how-rich-is-too-rich/) where he advocated 
increasing taxes on the wealthy in order to address the economic crisis in the United 
States.  Noting the large amount of negative feedback he received about this post – much 
of it presumably from atheists, who surely constitute the majority of his readers – which 
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was “a little crazier than normal”, he followed it up with another post discussing the 
American “quasi-religious abhorrence of ‘wealth redistribution’” and suggests that “The 
conviction that taxation is intrinsically evil has achieved a sadomasochistic fervor in 
conservative circles”, including libertarians who consider it a species of theft 
(http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/how-to-lose-readers-without-even-trying/).  This 
post includes a critique of Ayn Rand’s objectivism – which Harris describes as “a view 
that makes a religious fetish of selfishness and disposes of altruism and compassion as 
character flaws” – in response to the many objectivists and libertarians who were 
“enraged that I could support taxation in any form”.      
15Atheism+ was originally conceived by Jen McCreight, author of the blog Blag Hag 
(http://freethoughtblogs.com/blaghag), which is hosted on the Freethought Blogs network 
headed by PZ Myers.    
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